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IHTAODUCTION
Out of th• state•nts and events aade durina the war years and 1-dl

ately thereafter, one fact clearly ••ra•• \8lil1pinaed.

Opportunis• and the

will to politieal power doainate the thouaht and actions of the aianu of
the Communist world.

Usina the Marxian line, with it• typical coofusion,

and prolllses of the better life, such leaden

as

Stalin, Tito, and ao.ulka

strove to i11poa• their will• upOG the peoples of Sutem Europe ad ended
in conflict with one another,
llPJ>•ar to have 1erved only as by-motiva
tional forc.s, taliaa a far aecoad to the lustful peed tor power.
tempted to uke the too ,...ral 1tate•nt 'that ewry thina

vu

One is

det•�•d on

the political-opportm11tic plane incl\adln1 the action of the 1upposedly
"icleallatic" Amricaa.

It was looaevelt who inatiaated the liberal ideals

found in the Atlantic Oaarter but wllo ude the followin1 i11posin1 nun on
the fut,un of Polach

"Al far

u

Poland 11 conoemed. the i9'>ortant 1:hin1

is to ••t it up in a way that will aaintain the peace of the world.ul

Roose

wlt postponed mcl procrastinated on the Pol1ah question larply becaus e of
do_.tic politic.a md the clNin to placate the wishes of Stalin.2

And it wu

Roalewlt'• c:oe1patoiy at Quebec. WlnstOll Quarcbill, who atte1pted. llld

lloaa� �nn1 the S.cond World

lquoted in Gadd.11 Sa1 th, AMrlcan Di
War 1941-1945 (New York: John Wiley and�ona,
2Gaddia lllltll take1 notice of thia 1•

1

R7),

.!!?!•! ,

p.62.

pp. 70-78.

2

possibly aore sucusafully than iaagined, to al'bitrarily divide

5�ope

between

Eut ad West.1
lut pe1'hapa Roosevelt ad Olurchill and even Stalin, Gomlka, and Tito
were motivated by their 1d4tall no utter how ulterior they •ay seem.

Granted,

thi1 is possible. The ••• employed, howewr, have a tenancy to blur, if
not buiy, �se lntan1i1'le hypothffet.

The

Ji ants paid lip service to their

icleau while th• ct.terllinina actiona were on a quite different level.

The

Ruaslan writer Chemyahewky, speakina throuah his hero Dtlitry Seraeich., e1plains
it aptly 1n the followln11
practlc8ble an.cl cold •• aft therefore right in sayina that un is
by aelf lnt•nstT
They an rlpt. What an called elevated ••nti•nts, ideal aspirations,
·-all that, in th• punl comae of affaln, ls a1oltahly null, and 11
•clips•cl by incli vidual interest; r••e veiy senti•nta are nothln1 but
1elf�tnt•nt1t ci.ui, mden� • .

The

aovenecl excl•lvely

..

Lenin mad St�ia b•• ooncrioniNtecl • iia• ••• •1plored.

l•n they at l••t

.Uvated by an ideal factoc, or a• till• projected utopia

abiply

ratl.onallua1

Cllp&city in

\.

:fll ••lf-int•n•tf

order

act

•

a

to 1actlfy aay &CU• pe1petraced in th• nae

Aaain Dllltiy •••:

Were they dn- of lowf.... What could you ••ct1' ca a aatnia·
li•t think of anythln.1 but ht.1 lnten1tsf Our hero, then, th�•t of
int•n•t• 101•11 • la1teed of cffri.1•ln1 lofty •• poet ic •n-, he wu
lbsol'bed by such cln.. of low • ue ln ha� vi th th• poss nature
ef uterialiaa.S
Pet'bapa the equivocal Lenin wu ript, at leut in thla cue, when h• statff
at th• Ninth Party Conan•• that ''Politics is the aost conC9fttrated ••n•sion
of econoaics.11
an

Polltica, th• desire to dolllnate, 11 the detenr:ln-tn1 stnicture

which all id.eoloaies, all ideals within

tile

1upHStnactun-, aft contrive4.

lPor the COllpl•t• di1cus1loo betWMn Cbunhill and Stalin ln which Eutem
Europe was "divided" into "aph•n• of inflimace" ••• Win.ton Olurch111, Trim1Rh
and Tr!l!cly (Cubri.dae:
Houpton Mifflin COllpmay, 1953), pp.227-228.
p.81.

2N. G. Cheraysbevsky, What 11 To Be Done?
ltbid., p.114.
-

(New

Yorlt:

Rando• Holille, 1161),

The insistence ao 1tron1.11 •1phulnd by Lenin in Materialls• and B!Ririco
ai ticiaa on the political nleY1nc.e of ewn th• aost technical phlloaopblc

docirinH led owr th• yean to a real lawnion of fmction•.
the ..c orrect" politics whic:b detezainecl phi1Noph y rath•1' thu
phllotophy det•nin1aa poU.tia.l
such a reversal took place.

tut

Now 1 t wu
the

"coJ"ftctn

lt wu neither odd nor peculiar that

It wu 1i11ply

llON

expe'Client. 110n opportune.

Lenin'• view of the natlanal q••tlon aay throw so. llaht

oa

dd• ad

m

the

tactics used by his ••lf-tppOi�t•d 1ucee11or1 to be 411cua1ed lateT.
Self-detenination for Lenin wu 1i11ply a tactical step.
on the national ct••t1on at wn

en

In his •pe•ch

May 12, 1917, Lenin said that "In Russia we

.. t stre11 the ri&ht of separation for the sd>jective nations, while in Poland
we Miit stress the riaht of 1uch nad.� to unite. n2
Of cwne, Stalin at
A

Soviet 1tratear.

no

ti• loat slpt of political.at.• when deGldina

true Clauawitaima at

any

co.t, eva if lt ••t eo111pro1aise

of his supposed" pals, Stalin practiced the fonaula that war is only the con.,

tinoation of pol �
tics by other Mani.
put it 11ptly when he stated that

The Pl'US•ian General Karl von Clausewit1
smordlnatlon of the political point of

''The
'

view to the llilita.ry would be unreuon1'bl• , for policy has created war; policy
.....

ls tbe intelliaent faculty, war only the ln1trumnt, and in th• reverse. uS
Stalin's attitude 11 succinctly expreaaed in a conversation held with Milovan
Djilu:
This war is not u in the put; wh�ver occupies a territory also
impo••• on it his own 1ocial aystea. &veiyone hpo••• hi• own ayatea
aa far u the U'llY has power to do.
It cmmot be otherwiseo4
lJ. H. "Phllcwophy in Polmd,•• ll•t•m Buryee, IX, vi, p.1-4.

2a..en1n. '"I'll• ap..ch on the National Question.'·' May 12, 1117, in Collected
lme, V , p.JOI.
Sxarl von Clauaewi t1, 0n ••r, Modern Libr -ay ed.
pp.16-17 ..

(Hw

York:

Randoa House).,

4Mi lovan Oji las, CmyenasSMJ wit;h sialin (London, 1962) • p .105 .

That W.. tem fonlp policy• ••peel ally that of th• AMrioDS • wu
sterile in contrast .toes not nMd to b• cli1eut1ecl hne.

Let it only be add

that •••tern policy revolved aroun4 and wu ttl'lGtly subordinated to llllttary
conaict.rationa.

Wrltln1 with CGildtematlon to a trl•i\d ln Septell>er of 1944.

Secntary of the Navy J-• Porreatal phraaed it this wayz
.
Whenever any American •uaaests that we act in accord.nee with the
nMda or on ••CNl'l ty he· 11 11pt to be cal led a 1od-clamed fucls t or
b1perl.ali1t, whll• lf �el• Joe •uaae•ts that he n"da th• Baltic Province•,
half of Poland,, au of h•sarabia ad .access to the tc.clltenaean, all hands
•ire• that he la a ftne, frank, candid ad a-orally dellahtfUl fellelft!' who
i• Ye'fY euy to deal with because he i• 10 •1plid.t la what he vmta.l

Thb and th• pr&(iic:e of postp

..

*1tn1

all Ul\IH not directly related �o the

aillta"Y defeat of the AJd.1 wen certaiuly two halves of the , .. waln\rt. 2
Na'ti.�:ftln in Eaten Europe poaea a ao...,hat different prablo• end ca
DOt be ad hoc 1'.9l•1ated to the 1phere of Iii.tty lde�l• and aoala.
.

Con��JY. to

'

tia. tttatMnt

ai-veD

aationall•• by Marx and ,.
.. in the Co-11t Ma1life1to
_
(the, tnat.�ationali1a .. a 'VUtipal n-.ln about to be nleaatecl to the

hl1torical put for pd) nationallaa 11 one of th• dowinant forces in th•t
area and ln .�• world.

Bertrand lqlf• ••1• that oa• of the ''h�atoric �tea••

in ttl•· gowtll. of nationa11•• i• 1948- 3
tile Tl,�-�nfora aplit.

Tb• year si1nlfiu, uon1

.o��J. thinp,

Uov sianiftcant wu the role play•4 by n•��ali••

lD precipl�at.in1 ad aai.nt.ainia1 the rift Meween th• Union of Soviet Socialist

a.p•Uoa and YvaoalariaT

The nal 1plit occurnd �•t•••n Stalin 111d th•

1tl1h•:r party offid.ala of Yuaoelaria led by Tito.

S.•n in this light. 9ation

ali•• f..S.1. into th twillabt alone vi th. icltolop.. 1114 other like 1�11..
..
.
·

lwalter Milli•. ed., The Pon.ital Diaries

(Hew York:

r

What

Mikina, 1951) , p 14.
.

'

md the
2Por a COllpl•te dl1cm11on ••• Walter Lafeber, Amri •· lul•J.
Cold War • .ll•S-1"6 (Nw York: John Wiley md Sons, 11g7 , pp.!Y-'3 • 'ftie
so-ealtia "tVo halves of the aw walnut" wen the T:ruaan Doctrine and the
Manhall Pla.

laertru

Wolfe, Marxi•• (Ul s.:

.
The Dell Pmli1hin1 Company, 1965) , p.11.

s

doet shine out 1mt brightly 1• the dil••• confronted b-y th• Yuaoslav
They .. t cbooa• either aowreipty or party dlsdpline at the

Comun isu.

hands of Stalin.

Th• Co-.a iat leaden of YQ1otlavia and th• other Eutern

Eunpean coootri•• were trained in the school of international C-.un isa but
achieved po1itiou of power u the rulers
In

cnen tina

their

own

power positions,

••1 ns with the ralaon d •

of their nspect!ve

coun

tries.

10• of the• tended to lc:t.ntify thea

etat of their napectlw

countries.

Tile Soviet

Union, however, c:ontin•d to look upon th• u "blrelln11 or ldeolopcal
vu1al1.nl

Th•• eentri.fuaal tendend•• CGllbined with iacreutn1 pOit-War,

But-lest tension•;wen all th• naoaa needecl to found the Colll.nfona in
Septnber, 1947, Md to precipitat• the Soviet-Yu1ot lav rift th• next year.
Th• aplit lt•elf •1-..d a truly "national0 •tivation later on ln the
heat of the

fnrf

ancl bee•• "National to...Jll•a'' in order to aet the backinc

of the Yutoslav intelll1ent1ta and aaa•••·
Throuahout blatory Poli1h aatlonali1•,

u well be •••n later, bu

alway1 been a prenqu11it• to popular backln1 froa the people.

At this point

let it only be obaerY•d that the 1pllt1 between the Polish Co9nmi1t1 and
Social11ts, their aucceaaea and their failure•, have always been tied to their
view• on tht• point of natiouali••·
when he stated that:

Plleuclsltl u early

u 1903 realized thl•

"A aocialiat in Polud 9U9t first strive to achieve th•

lndependenc:e of hi• hOM11D4 u a 1tate.
of the sodaliet let.a.u2

for thi• ia essential to th• victory

Gcmulka tippean to be followtn1 not oaly the advice

of Pllludaki but also that of Lnin's enmentecl

lbove

in 1917

an

the national

ct••tlon when he eaid in 1941 ta. i t "Tb• first coacem of the Poli1h Socialist

i'· .

ls... 1 L. Sharp, "eo...ani• t Re1i•1 in Eastern Europe.'' Poreip
Policy Reports, Xxvt, p.181.
2

Q1aotecl ba Kao1jakob Stehle, 'nle In"!J?!
ndent Satellite: Society and
Prederick X
. . Pruaer, 1965) , p.20.
Politics in Poland since 1945 (N.W Yori::

6
Party and the Polish Work�r's Party 11 for th• independence of Poland and
overythina ebe i•. aubordinat•d to this. nl
The Comnfona wu aet up ia Septellber of
1uch "nationalist deviation."

1�47 t o contend also with

'lbia typo of use of nationalia• among East

Buropean Co•mlist le�n becaM a misu.e when tho woTld situation and
tbe wishes and tactics of Moscow chanaed.

And naw Moscow wu ruled by the

iron lo1ic of tho polari&ation of pOlitions and the .,nolithic (dualistic)
Yi• of the world.

'lbe reinstitution of a at.rict Democratic Centralis•

within the 1ntemational COlmUDiat pu.ty ••t, of c ours e, the aW>ordination
of all power in the Bast European Co•uniat parties to that

of Stalin's, the

occupier of the apex.

· Nationalis• wi 11 be viewed u an 111p
· ortant ll0Yin1 force..

However, in

the hands of the Comaunists, it can only be looked upon u a tool to attain
1nd aaintain their power.

A rudi•ntary tool it wu, one which could just

u easily be tossed ulde to take ita "rl1htful" place as a •re oddity in
biatoiy books.

But. ironically enouah. perhaps it wu the Marxist Stalin hi11-

self who 1ave a

new

�

leue on the life of national •• in Butem Europe.

The Polish-American historian Oscar Malecki says that "The rise of nationalisa
ln liutem Burope was and sti 11 is aainly a reaction a1ainst suffering, suffer
ing from foreian aggression or at le..t penetration and f!'Ol't foreien doaination
.

.

or even oppression and persecution.,

• •

u2

A great di.Ghotoay easted between the political state•nts of S�alin.
Gomalka, and Tito and their actions.

Public state•n.ta by the lbove were
r.

constantly infmu with profe1aion1 of ideals and proaises to both foreign
l1bi4.
-

2c1car

Haleck1, "Nationalis• in Eut ·Central Burope," J ournal o f

M«ff",.

Intema�ion�.

11.

p.J2.

7
ad clomatic •1--ta.

However, their tec:arrina diaailll.lar aotiou and

secret cornaponance betray th• f\lndmental aotlvatla1 policy ln their

proaru, the will to po11tlcal pow••·

The followlna atate•at of Stalin

• Soviet fonian pollcy prlneipl•• enumrated in bls address of Noveaber
6, 1141, to which Tito met Gmulka •an•d ls an exapl• of such a 1nj)lic
atate•nt which .. , be CClllpared to their actlcma ia the crude arna of
polltlcal opportunlaa ad will to power:
h haw ·not an4 CID DOC ban any 1udl war ai• u that of
i11posin1 our will and our nai• upon the Slavonic and other enslaved
Dattoa1 of luope, who an e1pectt•1 our help.
Our ai• 11 to help these nations in the •tl'Ulll• for liberation
uey an. ••lint •aalut Kitl•r ' • tyr-y aacl then to leaw it to th••
quit• freely to arranae their liftl on their lands .. they think fit.
Tbere ...t at• no l1ttel'fennce wlla u..wr la tit• 1nt•"1•1 affain of
other nations . 1

Inter-conflicta ..,n1 this mbove-aantioned trio were daapened dUTin1
the war years by the comon 1oal of ailituy success a1a1nst the Nuis and,
1-diately after, by the atte..,ts to 10Ud1.fy political power on the ho.
front aaainst the host of real and iusin•d enellies now ready to block any
such atte111>ts.

In th• 1prin1 ad •�r of 19C8, however. th• seel'ling

cohesion betw..n the Soviet Union md her new satellite states was releaated
to the hiatorical put.
In April 1948 Andrija tt.bran1 and Stnten Zhujovic, •llb•rs of the C.n
tral COllllittH of the Comw\ist Party of Yupslavia with hip positions in the
Govern•nt, were e1pelled from the Yueoslav eo-.ntst Party and 1\i>seqvently
arrested.

Th• cliffennces between the Yuplav Party and its affiliate the

Comunist Party of th• Soviet Union now ••rpd into open colbat.

Two even ta

occurred in January o f that year which urt the �in1 of thi•, th• decisive
phuo , in the conflict.

The Soviet Union vetoed the plan for the Balkan

1Yu,oslma, Mlnl1tant•o taoatr•lh poetova. Malt• look {leofndt
1951). p.12.

a

.. t fonip policy aoal, Md Hebrang,
Coafederation which bad bMn Tlto'1 fond
who can )oastbly be but clusift ed u a Yu1oslav *-cavlte. wu cleW>ted �.

his post u chainan of th• State Pl11Mtn 1 Co-111lon to an lnf•rlor post (Min
ister of Li&ht Industry).

ff11 foner pOlt wnt to a loyal Tltoite,. Boris 114rich.

It wu at this tl• that tile dispute b•c- a utter of life and ct.ath for the
ttp leadenhip of ti.. party.
wltlli n the party.

Hnnn1 bad bun •• of Ti�o'1 bitterest riYals

The fonet secretuy of �· Croatia Co...Ust Party alon1

wltk Zhujmc. Ml nl1 t er of Pinace. po1ed tlae lnltial threats t o the power
welded by Tito ucl his coheru.

If Tito wen to survive a purp by Stalin,

be ..t erradlcate all thnau to Ilia p•itlon withio Ids own party.

He .. t

parp hi• awn party of "devi.Uoai1t1" ad "fenlp aaents. ••
Tito, bnkoY!cla, Djilu, acl lardelj nulaed in power md t1' • two
clla1e11t en laded ia jail.

Tia• aucl.. of political power ln Yuplavla 1n

19'1 cou lated of f• -··but ihe•• wen all loaa tl• friend• and col leb ora•
ten of Tito.

Mmy of tile yom..r .- had literally been .._.... by Tito.

'ftl•

polltburo of the party eau l•ted of Tlto J two 1ecretan... of the central 009111.t tee, Al•mdel' Rakovld\ (also llllni•�•r of Propaamuta) mad Moa ha Pij•;
llo1oj• NHhkov1ah, Prelll• I' of S.lblaJ lclwal'd l.mt. lj, Minl1t•r of Porelp
Alfaln and Dep1lty Pl'l• Nlni1teri Borl1 'li-9r1ch, 0.ail'Ull of th• State Pl11nnin1
Coml•tion; IT• Cioalmjek, futun Ml1l11ter of War; ad Pranz Lesto1hek, Mlni•·
hr of Heavy Ind•tzy.

the politburo wu nationally well-balaced, thenby

Mintalnln1 llffCled intemal pariy 1tabllity UGftl the diven• •l••nts .

It

c.. lstecl of two Cnata. thrH Seas, 'three Slovene•, and one Monteneartn (Djilu ) .

All of the illpOrtmat local offlolals had been h•d picked

by

Tito md thus

I

al10 stood ·loyally behbd hi• wllethft' for pen•al aft.ctlon or ••lf int•re•t.
In June 1141 tb• nwne o� the 1ltuatlon which occurnd in April_.

1n the

1941

C.tnl Colllt
ll tee of the Caw.i st Puty of Yu.-1aYia .-hen two ••

ben. Hebra1 and Zhujovic, oppoaed Tito'• cleftance of th• Soviet Union but
found themelve1 in a llin<>Tity and were eJCpelled, occurred in Poland .

Here

9

Goaulka defied the aanoli thic views now bolaa vocalized &oa Moaeow.
Goaulka's support wu far fl'Oll u extensive.

He

But

could rely upon t he ,,..port

''aatlvea0 · and •088 of hi• Mos�·traine4 colleaps who bad become even

of the

:t

llOl'e closely

the party had

·atfiliat•d

with the Polish h o•l and .

a lway1 been ·••ldoa aore than cool.

but tbe uMulcovitea" wltbla
It wu thi s inner pal"tf ten

sion that e.natecl th• aeed for 1oae sort oL C011proml1e on ttae lipor.tant iasues

the country, especially collectivi1ation, durin1 the y·eara 1945-1948.

f actn1

In 1948 tb• Muscoritu blew witll the hush·w inds troa the

owted.
aa4

The

pri•l'Y

•t

and GOltUlka was

lve for thla move by th• Mulc:oritu wa political
Pol11h Comuni1ts, unlike thier Yu JOl lav brothors • could

physical auJ'Yl.v al.

not face the towerln1

..t

coll01ua frn th• eut ·with my hope of 1�va1.
•

i

�
��\D'S•.e . ·
.�

•

.•

.�

·,

;

t.hls political e1peclienq wu 1tnn1thned in mmy b1 penonal resen,ment •cl
rival�

w lth

G--1.ka ad ht1 aroup.

Pnaen

U:-b

of

Gomlka' 1 now overt atti·

tude aaa1n1t th• •croaobn t of Soviet domnation (l11p•rl•li••)
euly u Sep�•••r 1947

at the foundin1 of the Coanfon.

the Soviet n1pen1e to th•

can be

'""

u

11>.• Cold.nfora wu

challeqe pn•ente4 by th• phu• of dlvenity cn•ted

ill th• aut•m lunpea countrlu by auch Comt11l 1t

leaden u Gnulka

Md Ti t o .

In 1946 in t emal eacl extenal dewlap.nu cal led tor an·accelerated revol•l.oa•

ary ·pace.

By 1941 ta.ls fieJd.bllity end d.ivenlty in Soviet poll�•• had 1tven
•

Wflf aaatn

to ·the dl ohotoal c 1-.• of the world.

�l,

'nie 1M>t1n force of

Soviet

.

fon1p

polier la th la mv• and la other Soviet font. en policy moves dl• CNtta ed

in dais

p.,.r can be deaipated, as

Power Dynalllo."

put it, u the

"Gre at 

'ftle Coalnfora vu ••t up to coordinate ·the activities of th•

•ariOUI C�t• t partiea m4 chua
unity

one historian has

-un

ideolopcal •olldarlty.

ldeolopcal

ancl poHtle&l · ••emeru:• ven •rely two at.du of the •-·Soviet coin.

11'• foundi�a -una wu
w• attendN

ironically •ouah beld in •·outh--•••t•m Polatl.

l)y npreaent·atlvn of the

It

CGauaiat parde1, of the Soviet u.ton.

10

•l� eut Buropean states, and Italy.

'the host Gomulka vu the only penon
At. this ti• the Cold.nfona wu

p resen t opposed to th• Cold.nfon•s oi:eatlon.

Do••tic policies could

• welcOM develop•nt foT the Yugoslav Coauni1ts.
now

become less blurred encl then would be no MN

oa1 1roup•, eto.

lut

dependnce

on other poli�i"'

by early. 1941 the controwrsy had bep between Yupal avi a

acl th• Soviet Union which 1e4 to tha •"f)ulslon of Ti �o fl'01I the Collinfon in
June of that year.

Gomullla, ·who firaly believed in tla• ript of Coaaist eountrl•• to.
follow:·'�etr own •• to soCiall••··
.......

'

�-

courq....ly ad presumptuously

. (Gollulka had oven1tf.•tecl hi• power to vin friends and influence· people at ..
his provocative atol'llllna ••••i-on at the June

3,

1948 plenua) expretaed hla

Yi•••" At th• June s. ·1941, P oUsh Workers·' Party (Polska Partia RoO,otftte&a•

·ppa) · C�tr.al

co-.it• ·-ti-ng, Goaulla •uaa•s ted a· policy, of conciliation

tawardS lua•lavla ad a ;l;ldependent rouw· fer Pollah Coauni•• based on th•
.

. ··..

pot•Cll•. of· 'Poll•h · natleal independence and aovenipty.
...·�

� Cize·

.to: at�

. l•••.

·

Be

-Ooaulka •:iim t

cm

th• Polub·· Coas.mi1t Party'• Luullbur1lat attitude on ·th• n•tioaal

CP.tJ!l! �.Putia · So cle.11 •,trcana- ·

p\"ai•H � PoH.ab ·Sod all.at Party

....

. ..

,,,,
:;

ldvocat�, -�• · mian

rPi., -for-11lt• tlradl'Uonal· ·�•rt· of Poli1h indepel)denc:e and
,
of th•>'PR •4 ·th• PPS wt th out '-'her purges•
was al�n1· h•· ·hi••lf •1pl'Ma..S succinctly:

Tb• pal for which G�lk-a

"Both" for the PPS and for tho
·'

-

PPR

.

the 1ndep�n�ce of Po land la a aupn• conalderation, to vhtch ell otnen .are
•-.Ol'dina�e4�nl.
G·oailka received a mud reception from

�e
"

••ting, and for. th°' lint

t.i• there w•re heud ao• deunds for hl• roalgnation.

At least ··�� M11ben

of the �tral Celllt
lll tee fo ll owe d. Go•lka in supportina bla dan�." vi••.
•
...

9

.
- ��¥ '�.� .
���·�
lfc. . l. D1iewuowaki.

: .�\ �

.
0Gomalka and Pollah Natl anal Co-.ni s•:

v.elHI,· of C!!!••,
!l!

Historieal Sletch."
Wan•, Sept-Oct 194

•

A Brief

YI, i·, p.•4, quotb'I �· Otoe•

11
But Gnulka wu isolated widaln th• nucl•• of party power.

Mot.hlaa wu dcme

at this plenum a it• ...., •• wne obYiOU9ly taken 'by supri.ae a\ both the tone
.

Ind content or th•�-· of their leader.

However, later ..t1n1 separately,

I>

refused, instead uth1 to ,. oa sick lene.

Durint th• follawf.na •�r a

ftpt took place for th• contnl of the party.
At th•·July plen.. of the Cntnl ComlttM• wlthout the. S.cntuy
General of the party pnaent, the declaraUoa of th• Coainfo1'11 publishu on
June 28, 1948, cron.temla1 Tito •cl oallln1 fa th•· iatenslficaU• of col·
l•ctln1atlon, •• fonally 1pproved.
caactllati•i•U -4 �nat.aiat.1.

Th• PPR Central CoaittM alto attacked
A apMch t.y Hlluy MlDe. cntt�secl lndl...
_

Yldaall1tlc •• capitalbtic •tlaCHla in apieultun, aclvocatecl not. �11ectivl1atlon
but producen' cooperatiwt• and ..._.. th• n•lpad.• of Gaulka.
Gomlka m4 Ma fri•Dda, h••ver, had bMD pl'Opa1atin1 their views thn'ugh
both penuuiOil ad aptatlon.

to

16,

Oa Auplt

Gomulka cut short hls

vacation

,.._., without 1ppnval by the Politbunau, hi• duti• u Secretal')' &.neral

of the Party.

ltepeated ..tt.•1• of th• Politbunau failed to convince GOllUlka

that Ile ahould nc:mt frOll hla J.. view• •d confH• to a pRp�and. catalop
I

of el'l"Ol'I .

�·

Gomlta wa then ampeadecl froa hi• cluti•.

HI wu deprived b'•

.

all •upp ort md lsola'9cl vlthla the Central Comlttee.
11l• Aupat plenm of the Catral eo..lt t.. of th• Workers' Party which
•t at Wan• oa Ataauat 31 th�h Septelber

,_.. .

J. 11•1,

wu for educational

pur

Th• p1'la&ry topic vu nauonal deviation in party leadenhip, tu

ao•cu, and tbe vaya

to owrce. it.

lol••l• Bierut accmed Gomulka of Yio.

laUna the prlactpl.. of Maniat party or1ani1atlon, of falU.aa into the error
of rlpi'"nationalltt deviation, and ot a lukwara 11pproach to collectlvl1ation.
Gomalka had 1n inadequate undent•din1 of the role of th• Soviet Union •d

12
th• a>SU ad had fallecl to follow tile "correct" ro8d by oppo1 in1 tla• foraation
of iM Colllnfon •d by 1dt1�uent critidsa of the Coalafon"• attltu4e toward
Y111oelavia.

Purtbezmre. •ar• llerut,

Com• lie1l•, while declarilll in hls letter to the July Plenua
of the Central Collllt
l t.. his 1aree1111 nt with th• position of the Polit
burew. and Isla accept ace of th• cleolarati• of the Pl••· did not
hesitate at th• •- ti•, both before and clurlnl' hls leaw, to conduct
conv.n•uou vltll hi• collequn la th• .Polltt»unu IDd with othen in
which he aired 1enti•nt1 drutically oppoeed to th• declaration. He
que1tloned tu re1oluticm of the Coldafon concenln1 the •thod
of 1ociall1t recon1truction of qrlculture, and eftll repTOached our
clel•1•t•• to th• COlllnt.n aayina they h .. DO n1ht to vote for that
part of th• re1olution of th• Com.nfora. 'n.• for... of reaction at
hw •cl •n• atan trumpett.111 •wt ·•·MW bnecll la ti\• •.ocntic
anti-i11per1al11t CUIP, and attempted to: 1et Co11rade Wletl9W alon19ide
Ti to u a hero of aa.Jl anal Co•••l1a. l
Stalin !led no tloubta lbout the outcom of hi• cllsput• wlth Yuaoslavia.
Tito'• 1ucces1ful cleftmce of hit autltortty·tttus
�

now: racllcally tlalatene• up

....

c- u a ••v.n thock.

bl• wh•l• policy tawar41

s ..t•rn Europe.

Stalin

�Acaelera�

tioa o.f tile llGDOllthic ata,. occarnd between l'ebruuy and Decelll> er 1948 whell

. the Sociali•t ·Patl• in a..ta. Hm1ary, CuchG*,lovaltia, ad Poland· were
tlbaon.d into .a.. Ca
J anuuy,
Mutual

1Nt,

mist partl•• o f their rupectift

countriea.

Durin1

tha• cowrtri" and the Soviet Union ••t up th• Council for

Bc•a.lc M1i1tmce

(Coecoa)

·u a fon of retort to th• Marshall Plan.

la lNt Stalisa puqed the Co111 •lat parti•• of Butem l!urape, puttlna on trial
a DUlber of le.U.q ca-mists,

Goll.alka'• cue

CID

laclucllza1 lajll ln Hm1ary alHl ltHtov in Bulaaria.

but be uncleatood ln the lipt of th• llbow.

the •-r of 1941 Gomalka had ••rwcl Soviet pmpOl•I in Polad well.

tmtil
He llad

ben the drivtn1 force ad ld»'l'iomt ln the i11poettton of th• Colmlnl•t
• Pol•d.

Kl• •111P&tla1 wlt1' tM

Illa n90l'al b•- lMritllble.

ncalcitrmt

n p•

Tito oould not be tolttated •ti

Tbe Poll1b Reed to Soclalt.•• vu now national

cle'll attoa.
lquoted in Ada a. Ulu, 't'ftut Crisis in th• Polish Co-..n i1t Party,"
Review of Politlcs, XII, pp.84-85.
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Dnin1 th•

Aua-t

JI

...

..,tellber

J

PP• Central COii-

..ting of �ta•

111.ttM, G.ulka waa to neat, ht• �ollcw.n wn to be demotecl, mcl an
tippe•nn•

of Lenlnlat 1elf-crlticf.••

Goaulk•'• 1trcm1

will power

ftOW

and

1olidarity

wa

""orarily save way,

He

to "l'ishti'lt•natianallat" •vtaticm J. he s aid he had ben
lncludllll eolleotlvlaatlon end Yuaoela'ria; ad h• '
the Soviet

pleaded IUilty

"""I

�tted

on •any 'l11ue1

bis di1truat of

Union clurin1 the "ar •d his vtlHnp.. 1 to caprold.•• with nactlon.

But GoaaUta ·wu not •ttt•d for the tole of 1e lf- crt ttc.
�-"

..

out that "Hit confes1ton1 wen a tt ra ,.
juatlfication . ..
ht•

to be stap4.

1

In

·

One historian poinu

illxttan of ••1f-cri.t1d•• md self

fact, Gomlk.a aide thl"M att•111>t• at recantation b efore

c01trade1 were 1atis tled.

He nev.r did renounce th• di f lerence betwHn

Poland and the Sovl•t Union ad .the Poli1h road to Comuni1• entirely.
ll•rut wu now given

th• new position. of Oaairaan of the Pal'.tY while

Gomlka wu dropped frOll the position of Secntary-General of the PPRo
i::·. ·

Pour of G-.alka'·• followers wen reduced froa full to altemate •llben of
Go.alka did ntain for

the C.ntral Comlttee and 8ienkow1ki wu e11pelled.
• ti• his

.

nOlllnal •llbenhip in th•. Central Co..tttM

Pnllle r and Minl•t•r tor the Recovered Tern tori et.

and

hie posts u Deputy

Hi• accusers were forced

to llOve vlth 90Cleration u his deposition literally shook the party to the
core and because of bis popularity and influence with th• aaasn.•

8y

late 1949 ewnts toot place which ?.vealed the radical nature of

the ••1es taklna place and the extent

the•.

to which the Soviet Union wu behind

loth th• PPR end the PPS were pU1'19d.

md the

PPS lOlt ao ,000.
.

·•

nae

PPR •JP•lled

so,ooo •men

In Dec.mer 194' these two wen tu.ed to ton the

Pollsh �ited Wmen'
Party (Polska. Zjednoc.sona Parti,a RobotnJcsa.-PZPR).
.
I
lat chard lliacocks, Poland: lriclp for the M>zssf
p .141.
Toroato. Oxfori Univeni ty Pn11 ,

US&!J,

(London-New

York
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lien& wu Oaai raa

of

th• party,, •d Joseph Cynnkiewt.cs vu Mde aecntary

,.ural althoup ualated by two Noecow•tl"daed 1ecr1tariH, Z•Ml&lti •d
Z..nwalti.

11\e Pl'Olr• of the party wu laid d:,.,.. tn

tlon of tlae PIPR p•H•lled ln Howe

�-"to Gom11ta•1 stand• of 2

Drop of

n, ldeoloalc�l

Jan-Peb lt49.

Declua

Tbl• WU in pat

'nae new emph·u � s wu now on

yean prior.

the SoYiet laloat

cou ollclatina Poled'• tnMpendenCll and her aareb towards
aociali•• is lnclia1olwly linked with th• •t.ruul• for p•ace c•duct•d
WH!er th• leaclenblp of t9'• loYi•t uatn. Ivery ten8ftcy al•d at
loosenin1 colllboration with th• Soviet �ian endanpn the v•� foWl
daUon of the People• 1 De.oency lw Polad lftcl .. . • �· ind9pendeftce of
.,,
the coun tzy. 1

Th• c&U1e of

Durin1 the· autum of 1949, •rked chanpa took place in both the organi

Th• role the Soviets

sation md the c�d of the Poliah armd forces.
played wu quite evident.
replaced by Odalb.

Vice-Mlni1ter of Defense Narim Spychabki wu

In Hovelll>er Stalin, ostensibly at the request of Bierut,

aade .available to Poland an• of his senior allitary co•11nden, Manhall
Rokossowky.

lokosaovaky vu of Polish origin but had become vety unpop\llar

in Polmict due to his pu11ft role durin1 the

•nt u colm8ftor of the Soviet

force•

Wanw

in Poland.

uprising and hi• appoint

Roko1sov1ky now be e&M

Mlniater of Defenae and Q,,..an der-in-0.lef of the Polish ADI/ in place of
.

'

General Zyalenki who went into ntin•nt.
ber of the Central Com ttM md Politbunau.
on Goatllta and bis 1upporten wen

ren
.. d.

Rokossovsky vu alto now a ••Al10 in Novelll>er the attacb
Goaalka wu di11d.1sed fro� his

po.ti u o.puty Prl.. Nlniater and Minlat•r for the Recov.nd Terrlte>l"ies mid
&iWA a llinor 1ppolnt9Ht
al11ion.
an

a

Second Vice-M11'11ter of the SupnM Control Coa

At the Central eo..lttM of th• United Wonen' Party Metina held

Novelll> er lS, Gcmulka, Sphchalall, mid lli11ko wen expelled troa the Central
libld• • p.1.tl.
-
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Comltt•• and tonltlden to partidpate la th• tiature ia ay foni of party
wol'k.

utioally,,
· ad econoalcally that
lkaion.

I

Poland'• 8tallai1t period now officially bepu .
COUftti:y

Polttiully, diplo-

t>•e- t!tbserri.ent to tbe Soviet

All that wu heard w·u the adulation and echotn1 of Stalin.

Yuaoalav

The

road now dep arts radically froa that of the Poltah.·

In his atte11pt1 to i9'>ot• • .on ripcl mnoUtliic nal •ntatlon upo�
his satellites,. s1:.11n drow. two of hta faithful tools, Tito and �lka,
. '
into opposition.

lb• forar

....

el� t.o nt
. at n .men� for. hi••lf'ad

b,11 state while the · 1att.er wu sent into polltical •x$l• ad hi• state con-·

.

tin��io� ._iouow th• Stalinist line.
.

r

lhy th.ls div.raence in th• ...raence of c..un1aa in th••
. • two statesT
Wby Tito and autonmv ad not Gomulkat

What were the

'4�1
tary, po ll_tlcal
..
,.

•

. a,oclal, psycholopoal, md historical reuoaa for this difference an.cl this
11.t»aequent �verpnce!
·Wbl,le diaeutaina th• cue of Yuaoslavla, nphuls will be ;iac:.u on the
powth and tactlca ••d by the victorious Parti1.-is ancl their nlatlonihlp to

th• Soviet \ml.on cullllnatlng in the Soviet-Yugoslav di.apute md sp11t •.
Yuaa.lav Govem.int in BXS.le and oppotlna political aro�s will be
only in pu1in1

a

The

cons idered

their i11po�an•, th• polltlcal power they �•re· able to

earcise., wu s Unlounted with the rl•• of Tito's Partisan .ove�t.
I-n the anal)'ai1 of Polmnd, a di.fferent relatiorisbip will be stressed.
During th• war politic.al power, the bactina of the •1�rity of the i>•ople, was

definitely in th• hands of the Hom An/f in Poland and its political voice,

the Polish Govem•at in Idle loc.at ed in London.
11.ttl• lf

ay

populal' suppo rt.

'nl• Co..an lat Party enjoyed

The Comunist victory he" wu unufactured .

troll afar throuch Soviet apportuni••• takin1 th• fon of llllltazy ad peU.ti
cal 1uppn11loa.

Th•nfon, e111phui 1 will be placed

OD

the ••• e11ployed

1�
by the Russian C�1t1 and their puppet Pole• to extra� political power
fro•· th• Govem•nt· in ED.le durlna the war. ad the •thods uaed to bury all
opposition in the 1-tate after th• Comunist· "victory" in 1945.

SOCIALISM IN mE BALIAHS
AND 'nlE THIRD INTBRNATIONAL

There lt no dod>t that aa the Gel'Uft antes withdrew in the autua
of

1944 the.

CG 1Mi1ts wen tile wt powerful ainsle

in th• Sa.tan Penalnsula·.

Haw

dld thi• situation com lboutT

..Utts •rely •n 1Mll1'1l than their GppOnentt
titaatlont

AnHet69

to a... qautton•

ln1 th• history of th•

political· fora reaalnina

u exploit1n1

can be aad•

COlmunlst llOV9111ftt in the

Were th•. Com·

the warti•

•re dl1cemable by 1tudy

lalklmt in aeneral and. in

Yqoslavia ln partleular.
The foniation of Marxiat. 1oclall1t partl•• in ti\• Balkans proper cue
in

rapid succession dmin1 a 1in1le gen erat ion :

the lu11arian

Social

Demo

cratic Party vu or1ani 1ed in latl, the Ruaanlat& in 119S, the Serbl1n in 1903,
ad the Greek ln 1909; a sodallat party wu botn in Turkey in 1909.

Socialist

partiea were "tabltshed in the lalkan portions of the HabsbU'l'I *1 re in the
·�

•- period:
in

Croatia

la 1194, Slovenia in 1196, · Dalatla l.n 1905, and Bosnia

1109: in the north a Hun1arlan aocialiat party was created in 1890, a year

ati.r t ts counterpart ir.a Austria.
Uny, cliscridant md
indicate that a

Th••• Ba11t1n· partl•• were 11 ttle

..,,..

than

pow•rl••• ·tntell •ctu
.
al aroups , but their for11at10n did

••11 but enerptic sepent of the intellipntsia vu •••king

an alternative to the exiatlna political sy•t••·
Little
of unt.
aaphy

At

ot·1.,ortance affected the aake up of th••• poups until th• spring
thl• tl• a event occurre d which radically changed both ·the phl lo

and the tnedoml of thH• aroupa •
.

In March of 1919 the Pint Conan•• of the Third I ntemation al •t in

17

18.

Noacow.

Intemal 41••1'tlen ad th• pnaeace of the el t• al'ldu pnven ted

to this. th• Plat con,.. •., &t a......

th• attendance of ..., npnsentatlws

for

cens l1ted

couatri••.

only of Rulli• lohhevUte an4 aaall Comualat 1nup1 ho• nuby

Anplla lale•ova, the ftnt Mental')' of th• Ceuaral•• lntena•

tlnal, polata out dlat mat of th•

dt,l•1ates

''lta4 been laend pl:alted by tile lusa1•

eeatl'&l · comltt• fnm ao-calletl Colllftmi1t parti• in tu•• ••ll•r natiou vbich
bu forme rly C011p1'11ed the lustlu e11plre

• • •

or

tb.,, wen war prisoners or

fonlp .radical• vho happ9n•4 to b• in R••l a at th• ti• • ,J

At thl1 pola� •

l1partial obtener voaltl certainly· haw labeled tla• 'ftllZ'd. tnternatieftal a 11saall
sectarian body" when c... alff to th• hne Conference of th• Second lntemaUonal

wldcla- convened • Mnaary

J of th•

...

yen ••which this, tb• Pint Con·

an-11, ltlb•ll•d "apportuai1t." .'Dl• C.'"8• produce• two

•Jn

polltlc:al don-

. ••ta both of which were primrily written by Lenin.
The lol1herib ua--4 that the proletari• rewolµtion in Russia vu
•nly tile flnt pJaue of

a

aeuTal revolution which woul� 1oon apre·acl to

the mon ad•aced W••••Jr'f' s_..,,.� aatl�• �

They npecially felt that Gema y

'!\..,,.knew, too, that th• revoluti�•

waa .ripe for �'9t such ea occunance.

in the •ntem Europe• nations would ceJ'Uinly nll•v• th•.pn11un of tbe
White ualea, bee-• th• l11p9rial11u
Comilllis• on two fronts.

�141

not. •fiord to ftat-t th• war aaain•t

""-• th... n•olwlon• were aot fortbCOllln1. th• 'lblrd

latenational wu fo.-4 to coordiaai. tit• a�lvi tl•• of I'ntenational Co-..n ita.•
Zinoviev wrot• on J.uly 24 /1 ltJO, la his th•• to the Seeo1ttl Coa1ne• that
"the lai.rnatioaal .. , be
fennt countrt.. . •.�
0Withln 10 y.an," writff Stefm T. Pos1ony •. uti. Celdn�m

lJ•e

(Loftdon:

Coe·�a lnternaitonal

Dear-, eel., The
Q:alvent ty Pt"esl •

Oxford

21b1cl• • p.127.

0)

,

p,6�

...

to
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deaenerate into a •n tool of Russian politi cal veltare . " l

this trans iti on

wen nuerous :

The reuans for

the RSFSR wu still the only Co-.nist nation;

tbe location ol the headquarters for the Coalnteln wu well suited to cloe•
Russian scrutiny ( th• Cord.ntem w as almost wholly

funded by

the Sovi•t Govern-

•nt ; the prospects for other reYOlutions of tlae proletariat wen di-1n1;
41.sapee•nts on revolutionuy doctrine and •tl".•t•I)"

nl't

frequent betw"a

daleaat!ons: and the principal function of the Comint•m w u no loapr
I

of world

r�volutlon . but

foretan

and

that

more ,,f a defense of the RSPSll lroa counterrevolution

interventi·on 1o · that "•ociallaa in one countl')',. could 'be realised.

By 1920 the

Cold.n�el"ft

anlu 1·uoce•1" over

was

bett•�

establlabed laJ'l•l1 because of tb• Red

tll• White armies and tore1p in temntlon .

was now becoaln1 truly

i1ttemationa1 and' wu

'11\e Colllntem

beainni.111 to aupercede tll• Second

Intenatlcmal ,
The Second C·onpus of the Collliatem . vu held from July 19 to Aupt
1920.

The h1port•t doc:umnt of ttae Secaad Conpesa was that

known

7.

u ·th•

••21 Co�ditiou•" ·which had to be accepted by ay party that wu 'Co--.1 1t in
orientation •d wu desirou of

beln1 adalt� to

·the 'fttirtl International.

The ·"21 Conditions ." put before the Colllntern by IAnln • ' clearly · reve•led Lenin ' 1
priut'Y · purpose of di•posing of· all MeuhevUt· 01:1eu .
whi ch •ach patty · hld, to ·"11f111 wen:
tlc · centralis11" and l!Ules

to haft the bulc principle of.

i mll ar tO'�,th�• of

s

So• of · th• .conditions
4..cra

..

the atStJi to adhere to t..ll declsiou

of the Comlnt•n. or nth•r the dadsions of the Moscaw eumtive- ''whi:ch are

bindin1. on

•ll · parti•• i" ;:••to
-0,t.

cl•

un c:ondi timal . auppon to my Soviet Republic

la lts. . strua1l• &gainst counter··nYolutionaiy forces; .. to. perloctlcally . pura•
•lll>• n, in _ot'MT to insure strict adbonnce to th• polidff of th•· BucutlYe

Comlllttee ' and� ti•ally .. to renounce refonl•• an d denOUllce

1..,.rt

•.

11...

Th• .

latef1n T. P••OllY , ''fte c..iaten 'I Clala to Muxl•t Lest tlllh)' • n .froa
Cotllaten u HSttorical Hlpllptl , !a1ay1 • Recoll�ctlona • DommntJ , 4td . ,
orei A. fifadtkovitch and lrmk.e Lasitch CN• York 2 Prupr, 1966). , p . 14.

;J

20
u21 Conditions" were meant to

cle

anse the party of

The twenty· first eou4ltion nellJtelled from th• party

al l opposition to Moscow.
• • •

tho1e 11111bers - . .. who

nject in p·rindpl• the condit1cm and th..,1• put forward by th• Coauntst
Int•mational • • • • ul
ln anat eonuast was the aoal of the Iatemati.oual Comunist
u

1tated in the S•cond Con,reu of tho Collintem which was to "rouse · Ciaaa

th• muses

.

llOft•Dt

of the backward

nations a strivina for independent po li ti cal thousht

and independent political activity."
A trans ition 1•

1921.

seen in the policy ot the Third Congress he ld in June,

I t wu no lon.,ger the 111tri>ers of the right vina which received the brunt

ot th• Col'd.ntem 'a attack; it

wu now

the action minded leftists of Cenaany ,

Italy. and Ht.m&U)' who ttere 1 '1ppCSedly negatively . intluend.�g the Cold.ntem • s
objectives .

The Comunlat party mus t , durlns this ,.nod of preparation , while

d111a-ntly maint ainina an as:arusive attitude , lbataln ft"Oll the me of
acts of s sbot a1�

save

in the most extTCa dreww t anas .

to Russian Soviet doctrine was a basic principle.
tion.

on

ara

.;..

md

4',rence

Once again •

HoweveT, thei r offtcial posi·

the i�t•mational · revolutim of the proletariat w u drastically chanpd.

.,

c

n1e e �ect ati on of imedi ate world revolution had new been '�ound to be an t llu�
sicn.

StaUn•s ''soci alls• in one country" had now l'eplaced Trotsky 's concept

of "permanent revolution."

held in 1935.

'th• last Congre•s of the Third International wu

The Comlntem tenlnated its tonal exi•tence in 1t4 3, u will

be seen ,. tor reasons o f forei gn policy.

The constitution of the Comwntst Intemation•l s tate• in part that the
Coalntern "fllflti tor the establisb119tlt of a world Union of Sodalist Soviet

Republics .. "2 lhe union thus far· ls wited undel" the tute lep and dictate• of
.

l por th• C011p l•t• text ••• .Dear•··
2Bul1 D11rt111hyn , USS R A
Soos , 1965) • p.,JS2.
.

ep. clt

• •

Cftu�l•• Hi•�!!'l

pp . 166-172.

(New York : Ola rl •·• Scribner ' •
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Mo. cw �d the Q>SU.

The CPSU waa llOJ'e than th• taere st andard bearer of the Couunist Party
of Yuaos lavia (CPY) and the CoJD11Uni st Party of Pn land (CPP) .

thioup the Comat•m, imposecl

1u

&hip can perhapa be Wac described.

It

1bo CPSU.· ac:tina

will upon th• CPY and the CPP.
o oao

1be nlation

of 41.ctated •aulatlon llld denepati on.

la under thia apec:tn of th• Third International an4 the dictates •f MHcow

tllat �· histoq of tlle two parties takes shape.

+
·

CX>MtUUST PARTY OP YUOOSLAVIA:
The l'ir�t Wor ld t;a.r
partios in

THE BBGtNHINGS

te rmin ated th• a cti viti•s of the soclal democrati c

the Habsburg Empire.

·

lklder

tl� soeiallst leader lol"ae 1 t was ded.dec:l

that revolution wu impoasible bocause of the limited

nud>er and educational

level of th� prolotal'iat in South-nut md Eutem Europ�
�,.

It was thus th•

·-�y of socialist• to fw:thor the revolution by concentratina on the est abl ish
unt

of de110CHC¥ and -reform at hoae .

with other poll tical

lorac v u in favor of collah0Jatin1

aroups in the newly fomed "Peop le ' s Counaib . •·•

1)1,.s
•

.

path wu

J'

, ,.

takon not only because of the.•aknessN of the party· but also because

of the oppos iti on to Rmsian Bolahevisa.

any seli:>lmu:e of uni ty within the soci alis t aroups ,

parti•s blocked
Comunists

The collaboracion with bourgeoisie
as

youns

and doctrinaire Marxists of the pZ'ewar days Ckc lined to follow
...

auch

an

heretical road.

A · �onferonce was held in Zapeb on 8 Octob•r 1918

between th• s o ci a li sts in Croati a and their Bosnian and Slovene coarades in

order to pres ent 10• vi st aa• of unity , · Ho ·ape•nt wu reached.
and Slovene•

j oined th• newly

fono4 Yu101lav Gevem11nt in

. 'Ml.• Croate.s

Oct•er, and in·

Doce••r �orac beua a .S.ni.st•·w ia tlJ• new ly formed 1ovem1MN1t .
·rhe enelliea

ef lorac · now aathe�d in the Serb Social Desaocratlc P·arty

in order to oppC>le lorac and tile aow�t .
•;,.t• .

They opposed 'h• ncon11�ructton

of th• Second International whoso leaden they accused of betrayal , _ -.d in
its stead they

demanded a Third International founded upon the prindple of

11unc:o13promlsina
in

class s truaale . �

In January 1919

th i s party took th• initiative

fond.n1. one wo rkers ' party for th• whole of Yupslaria.

opposed "ain11t•r1•1i••" uacl

Only · tboae who

the SeCODCl· International would b• allowecl to attend
22

2.l
this uni fl cati on con1r.1s •

The conar.sa w as be ld with the full approval

· Of the Social Deaocrat1c Party of aosnia and the left-wing socialists in
Zaarob .

Of course. the conditions imposed upon A.ttendenoe further widened th•

aap clivlcllna Marzista in Y"&oslavia and all but Md• h1poesiblo a sinale oraanization.
'

In April UH9 .. deleaat•� fro11 various socialist oraan1 iatlon1 convenecl
in lelgrade in a

n@w

Kingdoa of Serbs . Croats . and Slovenes and !ormeJ the

Socialist itorkets ' Party of Yuaoa lavia (Comrwnista) .

Differences within th•

rJe1in to uint&in party unity and to oppose

new party were overaha4owed by tb•

the "ainiateriallaa" of �one ' s 1ociallsi.. aad the Second International.

The

new party proc�a1111d lU adherence to the nurcl International and elected a
central and an eucutiv•
th• SWPY

¢: )

coal tt••.

\ION the three Seib• P . Pi lipovic (1 179- 1953) , s. Markov! �

The Second Conar•st of the
It

W&$

party.

(1811·

)•

and z . Topalovie (1886-

1939) •

The leadin1 aellbers of th• executive of

nw

party was held in Juno, 1920, at Vukovar.

at this ti• that the party took on the fora of a deftnit• Com111UDi st
l t$ title

The a tatutes

was

now chanaecl to th• Comunist Party of Yuios lavia

(CPY) .

end oraaiiation of th• party were changed to confora wtth the

l

Russian pat·�rn .. and it wua stated that the party would strive for a YlolS:oslaY
Soviet Rep\i>llc which would join in a Balkan Soviet Pede1·atloa u4 •vntually

in a univers al Co•Wlia;t union.

Th• party acbd. tted that they were not in a

position to seize pow•r but that they would ''prevent the consolld'!tica of th•
wu;table a tate of affairs " then ezistina in Yuaoalavia.

'nils could best be

p

done by o poaine the rec:oveiy of the Yuaos lav eCOnCJllY .
TI1e wave of Comunisa in poat-wu Yuios lavia reac:Attd it £enith with
th• General Strlk• of July 20. lPlg.
this ti• in the Tuao1 lav Anry

Two Iii.nor autinies alto occurred at

in an attnpt to 1etse power.

Both were put

24
down within 24 hours .
TI1us by tho bepnning of Juno.
pllrties :

th• Socialist Workors '

1!>19, Yugos lnvi a

and

two Marxiat

Party of Yuaoal:s.via (ColmUnists) which joined

the Cold.ntem and which would presently chanp

Party of Yu1os lavia.

possessed

1ts

title

to

the

Coalauni•t

the S oci al DeJaOcratlc Party of Yua o1 l avi a which fol·

lowed cl�sely th e pattem set by the $oct al democratic parties in Western and
Cent ral Burope .

In ncvember. 1920_ e le ctions
'nlete elections

wore held for tho Consti tuent Assembly.

havo boen consi dore d by most to represent the freest election•

held in Yugos lavia during

the in ter-w ar poriod.

The ele ction5 were a aaj or

The Comunists po l le d

victory fo r the Communists.

l.arae nwrl>ett of votes

a

and became tho thircl strongest party by winnina S8 of
Comunists
The

mid Democrats were able to win seau in every province of YlJ&Ollavia.

Comnmlsts

were fourth

percent to the O.OO crats

HRSS 1 4 . 3 percent.
'The

in

19. �

the

percentaie ot votes

cast.

They pol l ed

12.4

pe-r�ent , the Jtad1 ca ls 17. 7 1)ercent, and Radie' s

J:orac' s Social Democrats were left far behi nd.

are11.test successes of the party canm. i roni cal ly e.nough , in the tw9

lcRSt industriali�ed provin coa of the

new s t ate .

11\e discontented natiOll a l i ti es

were provi ding a truitf\11 fie ld for Comwli1t work .

cent of the votes
which l1ad

419 seats •l Only the

in the

te rri to%)'

chara.cteristically

wus n one xi s ten t here.

"Which be fore

boon pro-Russian.

In the otber

1912

nothina to them.

for the m03t

Comnuniata won 40

per

hac.t formed Montenearo and

The industrial work ina c l as s

disatfocted and 110st backward �eal on ,

doni a , the Comwiists won 33 percent ot the seats .
reaion� simply voted

The

Mac.-

The pe op le of these two

radical party avai l ab l e .

Co1111un
1
ism

It mil(ht be ad�cl that �lonten•aro furnished Tito

meant

with

a

disproportionate number of his aene rals and party leaden.
These victories have been attributed to the 1uperiol' state

lAdam B .

Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge :
Press , 1952) p . 9 .

of the party

Harvard University
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...... ..u. OWi' lU riYW ... 1930 - to th• •t.llty of tM Co•••l•h
•• ••lolt the •sl•llia 4taooateat •
.-.ver, ta the tu Mlt ••••cl mad iadultri alt.Hd

.....

wh4tn aatlon

all•• .,.. ai.o • 1.,.�., facior, la Cnatla •• Slowala, tbe Co 1mlau
•• h_.111

.,......

1'e Yietny la tlae otJaer ae• of the

aoi ate •aplcd te4I "--• t11e puiy ••

.,,.

..,,

..

•••• co.14

_.a-1et•1 • 1..-•• •taaa•·

Uae bl'OUlht 11>..a "'9 a foalaa power.
Oa 2t ........ ltJO, aoon after a. op•l•1 el th• rAastttuent
tlw eo-l•t• caH-4 fn a ..-ni atnu Md pNtat

..t1a11

to thvat the

19111fna1n t•• at� to 1tt1p a ooal atrlk• la a.ua Md 8iow.ta.

Ur

AH•1Y•

Oa tlae •

th co.Utt• ....,.
.. et Demcnta _. bdlcals ,..... • •a.e knawn
..

a tlae Obaa•a•

1'e ..UM , _, otMr tbia.. , tll••ol-4 al l (o-ilt ftlMI ·

•Ml4'ft1 •cl pl'Oblblted _, tne el 1eMnl 1irln. __. Yiol••, md pnplfada
aaU...t th• aownmnt.

,,_ party l•ICl•nlllp fall•• t• -.lat oftectiwly

•lala lecl _, of ta.. ,....... Co

tats into h•ty a.- of tenon••·

�1•

led to an e.- ... """ mtt.·Co-mut pleoe ef 1-P.1lattan, U• L9r fn
U.. Pl'Ot•cti• of 09 State.
Th• leaal •w.... l• of th• pare, •lm \>•1• in late lll20 _. wtd.ch

GUlllbated la -..• 1111 witta t"9 dla•luU• of Uie eo-m•t pany •d
all of it• lea.i oramaatlou lecl to a rmp.lcl •cHM ln th• popularity of

tlM party � late lt21 . 1

Thi• wu the nault Mt mly of tlut auppJU•l• of

the party but abo of tbe party ll• I teelf.
In

Tia• puty •• now in fut ••

aw a 1ectt• of tH Ca-l•t lateftatl•al ... GUI • all• for• In

Ylfloalav life.
Th• party •• al•o etnck win cUssentl• --• it• om r•b.

flnt

purse el tbe party toek place after tile S.C8H Coapu • .

ft•

At thl• ti•

26
a unifesto wu issued by a aro� of centrists vho protested the complianee
of the party with th•

"21

Condition•" of th• co.dntern.

'11\• centrists ,

amon1

other thinrs , did not wish to fall in Un• with the deaand that every Co•
llUftiat pa1'ty 1ublllt to the Coaintem.
•lllber of the 1hird lnt•mat1onal.

(Tito ' s nvolt

28

years l ater echoes this

Tile slpen of th• aanife1to were excluded fr. the party in Decellber

clala.)
of

They dealnd eutono.y for every constituent

1920.

'Ibis act npresents the ftnt and ded.stw step in the process of

subordination of the party to the lnterMtl of an outside power.
th11 ti•

en

hoa

A.a seen ,

the party wu to add to 1 ts proclautiou th• n•• 0A Section of

the Collaunl st International . "

Th• party ylelded � the dictates of Moseow.

Its first standard vu to be ••11pluy in its allepence to M09cow.

1923

In

the party created a le1al front known u th• Independent Workers '

Party of Yugoa lari a.

18 ,000

However, ln th• 192S el eciiont the party captured only

votes , a dl'Op of more than

of the Collmuni1t1 at the poll• �

party'•

90

percent froa the pnviout achieve•nt

The party had quickly lost it• a�ort.

'nle

1trua1ln over th• next 5 yean involved a relatively ••all n\llber of

people and were carried on laqely with th• police.

Both the COllintem ad

th• Yuaoslav Comuni1t1 realised the alpificanc:e of th• defeat suffered.
Various solutiant wen tried throuahout the 1120 ' 1 , all of which fai led to
produce th• desired resul ts.
'n\ese probl- contributed to the d1vl1lcn ' of the Cl'Y into Left and IU.pt
wina factions whic:h were to shake the very foundations �f th• YUBotlav Co�unist
aove•nt throuahout th•

1920 ' • ·

Th• Ri1ht-wln1, under the leadenhlp of Matkovic

and Milojkovi c . harbored MenahevUt views .

11\e faction

feasibility of further i l legal aptation.

Instead, e11phuis was to be plac.d

WU

skeptical mboot the

on a aodic\m of aal tatian carried out throuah l•a•l oraanl zations .

I t hoped

for a change in the government and a subsequent lifting of the ban on the CPY,

ltbid •

•

p.9.
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ud it adwcatecl a heavy concentration oa trade union won.

It 1natly dl1-

tru1ted the nationalist•. ••p•clally Radie'• HASS acl the ati-Serb nationallsts .
The

Left-wina faction diffend radically f1• the Ript-win1

•

.

It ••h•·

ai ae4 lll•aal act1 of terroriaa alona with the exploitation of th• natifllll aliat
situation.

The latter was uaed to 1uch

ua

•xt•nt that the party threatened

to diainte1rate iato u aany "radical" aowmnt1 u thez:e wen nauoaali ties
in Yuaoalavia.

Th• put)' ' • exnpl•l'Y alleaience to Moscow was thua tinpd with

• ever i11penclin1 aplit on tile ia1ue of natlcmali••·

Ul• atat•• that "Th•

1tory of Yugo.lavia la one lon1 story of a clash of Nationaliau . u l
wlna reflected thi1 club clurlna this period.

The lAlt

In order to becae a dominant

force in Yugoslav politics, th• Com\miau had to adapt a viable posltioo on
this i111portant queation of nationallaa.
'lbe YU1os lav poll ce , interventions from

Noa cow ,

the above diveqencea ,

and th• acee>11p anyia1 1trua1l•1 for contnl of th• party apparatua all threatened
th• 11 fe of the pU'ty.
In 1925 the diapute was 1ettled by Stalin '•
of Markov which led to the Coaintem'1 colllna
faction.

out

crl tid••

ancl clenunciatioa

ln favor of th• Left-wine

The party wu rul•d fl'Oll lbroad.

The Third Conan•• of the

CPY

was held in Vienna in 1926.

1he party

could now, because of Stalin'• cbatl•••Dt ot Markovic , for th• tint ti•
present th• spectacle of Staliniat cohesion mnd unity oo the nationality que•tlon.

Soon after, however, sectarian ati:tf• qain broke out.

that "In order to beco• unified, an ideoloalcal 11e>ve•nt
a party and to beco• an any.

h•

Ulu observes
to cease belna

Tuaoalav Comunl1t1 coulcl not u yet settle

clown to th• latter condition ."2
lAd.. 8 . UlD, Titoiaa and the Colllnfon (Cubrid1e :
Prest, 19S2) , p.7.
2Ibld. , p. lJ.
-

Harvard Univenlty
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Another

UUH

o f P&l'tF •trite nich b•1• to ni•• it• heed clnin1 th•

Ca-

periocl 1923 •o ltlO wu tH P-S• •••• ta the Soviet C:0-1.et Party .

..tau who hacl la tile put enj oyed the 909t ccmtacts with ''hentlca1° comuni1t1 ,
tint the TroUkyit•• •• th• th• foll••n of ttaOYlev a4 l*hari.n, naw ai.o
lott favor wi tll tile l•...n of tla• UBSR ad of th• 1'1lird lntenational.
Witla all patta. blocked by tlae pwmmat i• the political 1plleN, th•
en ebos• to ••rt it•

.....1 ..

la tla• nalll of tnde unioai••·

a, late 1921

tla• 1overnmat ane its pend.11ion to c..unts t trade Wli•l•t• to fon «"•
lac&ep.ndettt Tnde Ullom .
CPY end tu

'nl•• •ima epenly dl1pl117•• . iM ••*•••••• of th•

_,.,uluttJ -• tlut •Olten .

Tile mlou

HYH

••tri "°"

tll• 30,00G •llb•n -· tlaelr fold •41 fallM to ral ly _, eppreci9ble ••·
peri.

1

Moet

of their •••rs were, in fact, employed in U'tl•an work1hop1
Tb• party alto failed to attract youn1

rather· th• in ioNtrial plmu.

wonen ancl appns d.cea.

Olaly •o• 1 , 000 out of over 200 ,000 join•d

J.eaal wol'ken' youth or1mt 1at1m

rwa

by the Cowmmtsta .

tile

IY• AYatmcrdc

d.t.. th• fol lowln1 t•l• to slaop th• lmpot•cy of Co••l•t tl'ede unionists
d..taa tile 1120' • =

TABLB 1

•1opiOiiiiw� Diis

•

LOST THJOUGt

1S>Jo

:tlffi&i'oif

Source :

*

INSURED WORORS

11,000,600
llS,716
416,S92
151,'°0
76 ,SS7
110,600
157,485
28, llS
117,471

1921
1922
11JS
1924'
1125
1926
19J7
1928

369,648
4JS,2U
453,515
441 , 4 16
461 ,573
41J,101
564,.l49

i}

Ivan Avakmovlc , Hiato
of the Comtmi•t Putr of Yt1Qalavia
.
(Aberdeen : Abel"Mft ua wnlty '"• ' , 1064), p .It.

lPor a cowplete table of
Op. cit . ' p . 117.

I

STRilBS

Comnmist

trade unian •llb•nhlp

'"

Avatu.ovlc,

29
AYakmodc •ar• that a CoWlist lll1tori• Uat.ts that only a lltnority of

dlu• •trikn wen ors•t&e4 by th• ee...11 t1.

Th• rualacler

an

clustfted

u being 111pontaneo\la . 0

ly 1928 th• p� bad only J,000 •••n .

It ha.cl ••1't•d little lnflu

•• in Yuam lav political life betwffft 1922 md 1921.

In this •- year,

J . lroa-Ttto of the Left-vln1, secretary of th• •tal worken end leather
woken union la Cl'oatla, .,.,. ht• ri.1• to pl"Olllnence.

Duri1'1 the period

1926 to 1928, tb• Zapeb lr•cll of the CIY, led by Tito, ..,,.aled to the

tffn to take the CPY ia had ad to en4 the factional strife.
.

.

Collin

Thia ac:t created

a 10ocl l11pnaal0ft la Mo9 cow nen they •• in Tito on• who 1i11ply wated to
foUow orden .

Tia• ec.laten now 1ntennec1 a1aln la O'l'der to noraanl ae th•

CPY.

Th• nw nol'111'11atioa of th• party be.- in late 1921 wu brought to
m al>rupt halt when , on 6 J•uuy 1121 , th• shell of

cou titutlonali••

in

Yup lavia co11.,.ed with tbe proclaution by «lna Alexander of the 1mpen1lon

of tb• VldoY4-l Constitution mid th• parll ...nt, the cil11olvtlon of all poll·
tlcal partl••· md th• bepnaina of a penoaal dictatorial nai•·
.ocll OUll of parli ...,ari••

nmined .

Only a

The new pvemaen t , presided over b;

General P . Zivltovlc, b-•• all 1.. al eo..mt1t n•1p11p9n, periodleall, ancl
dl11olftd the ln..,_...t Tnde �-- .
The C�l•U nacted in th• only possible way be declarin1 that the
cmly poaalble solution to the workin1·clas1 problea wu th• an:'d 1truule
aaaiut th• bouqeolale aoveruent .

Tb• need to pnpan and actual ly •n1ap

la a cl vil war now fl aun• prominently in uny Cwiat party docaenta fro11
th• end of 1921 to 1934.

The new policy also fell in line with 1lai lar die-

tat•• froll th• Colllnte�.
At the Pounh Party Con1n11 , party functlonarl•• were li�tl• 110n tba

30
Soviet �aeai..

'lhe, tan1.-.1 s , followina the . dlctat•s .of the Int•rnational.

aarpcl �h• rank and ft 1• to -.ol'k . taward . t�• C.Ollp let.e di.sintearat �� of i!Q&o
•lav:ia..

'111• party ,adopted th•· •loaan "1el f-clet•nd.nation until •••••lon·" at

th• req•at ot the Collln tem.

.

The popularity of the party did no� 1111prove with

thi• n• show of party.. pa4eur and autonOll)' ..
In

.1932. M. ao.•tc

wu · �•ot•cl tb•·�.,new party .ie•r to replace ,.avrak .

A11on 1 the rt•c.-n ei.ctecl to. � new central co11 1it.tee wu one Jos. Tito.

farty fortune. now beaan to rise i
nvt.v•l ·

A nUlllbe.r . Gf factors. can be ct tetl :for this

The policy of atmd lnaurnotl0a .was abudo11ed , and · a nubei- o f Coa•

IRllli• �• .W.o had "'8 uiuted ln the early years of Alexander'• · reip · were
released ·fr,oa prl•on� th•· .h•lpin1 1 to fi l l the now all but ·clepleted· party fold.
The released prisonen peatly

lnQeaed

the effi clency ef the party.

Yuaoslav

pri1ons di� not �reat political pr.lsonen along th9 , .... atanctardt .followed
for normal oon-Yict• •

ft• uny concea1ion1 1tven to the prisoners enabled

the Co�ifts to turn the penitentiaries lnto what Tito

called

•••cbools of

Nars1.••Len�n1••t "
'lhe E'A--' •'•
union field •

.

""

now . able

t.o

lncreaa•

their 1trenath in the. tnde

lut •wn llCllW p1"0pe11 wu not fat 1nd often lltlblo to ·1etback1.

A�akmmic · say• tllat the total n-..1' of wozkln1 day1 lost thl'oqh strik•• ln
the 11.JO • •· do" not even . appnach .those lost in the
11 o.ltedby Avak umov
tc, Op.cit . ,
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.:the· followtn1 table

p. 103.
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1929
1930
1931
19J2
19S3
1934
1935 .
1936
I

1937

'jI[n

iii1iarm a
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ii,H7

48,528
14,204
4,076
13.IS7
40,523
265,860
1 ,355 ,952
91 1.071 .

1 u1• :: ·

Sl
Th• S.venth Conpea1 of th• 1Mri Iatematlonal w.. ' held iJI A\llUSt ,
Th• pollcy

...

10Yin1 c.loth•• .

•• bepn

1935.

of Wl"tpplna lurope1n Covm••• in democratic and peace'

ft• CPY 1-dlately retreated froa it• policy of "•elf·detend.na-

In 1tJ7 Goftlc •cl the Central C.-.ttee of th• CPY wu called to No1cow.
Gont.c v• ......ked u an •••" and th• puty pur19d.

Tb• oaly party leader

net to be owtecl wu th• •• Moscow nYOy an4 nwly clalpatecl S.cntuy·Gen•ral
of � CaLImt.at Party of Yu,oelavia, Joa• lroa-n.to.
Id.tie. npudiate4 the policy of the party

1eparatloa in order to follow the

an

l•M ••t by the Coldaten to counter th• Ii•• 8Dd threat
Thu yeu IW'b tlae be,tmdnJ

.,

ft• n• Central eo...

ROW

poaed by Hitler.

the 10.called popular hult tacti cs .

The pep\Jlar frcat tacti • ••• by Tito tawlftd att911pt1 to reach 1ome
type of a1ree•••t ·•ith o�r political or11A11atloaa to ouat th• Stojad1novtc
mists •t with botb 1ucoe11H ad
fall.... .

ly 1917,

u •""• tile

Yuc•lav .Ca• ml1 t P arty .

45

year old Tito heltl the le..tina p09ition in the

Only people with unblnlshed Stallnl1t records were

_. beln1 1ppot.ated to fonipa posts .

Tito wu a perfect mode l .

He hu nterecl

tit• party • a. b•l• of bla 1tq ucl lndoctri1a•tl• ia the SoYiet lmlGD ancl
tU.d aot haw a lodal Dnowatie bacltpoun4 :

he had bMn bra.aaht up a Croat

la the old AU1tro-Hun1art• B•ire , wu c.,tund u m AmtN-HunaarS.an •oldter
by t.be Rulaians la World War I , mcl had wltneased md then joined th• lolshnU:
lnoluUm.

He wu, above all. not an intel lectual .

wontaa clu1 orialu •d backpomd.
to take th• party flnly ln hmd.

He wu of pea•t ••

In 1121 b• had 1ppHled to the cOlllntern

In Stalin'• er•• h• wu th• ideal type of

C
0t
num l 1 t l•aar th• si tuaUon call•d for ln 19S7.
Tito llml4lately set to work to rejuveaate the all but d111Hllnated

32

party ranks.

U.ine

clmdestlne •thoct.,

Ti�o acc:o11p li1h•d in

�.•

a s)Aort period
,•

what his aucceason had never been able to do :
atnctun

vu

rebuilt

and

operatina il leaally within Yugoslavia

important , Tito had •uped

U(µidation by the

to the party prior to 1957.
still nu.noally

iuipt.ftcant

th•

traa•d

popular support, caclfts,

fol lowers ..

party vu no

aroap1 end eould

•od•ty·
for a

and

itt

eotat a.ona

tn •wry aatl•aU.ty

tit• need ataht

'lbe C�1t1 e1plolted ibe

1,n Yug�lavia.

frlnda

of

inll•11ce

defend9n

taa•ll ltJt

they coul.4

at every

Moat

of

th• olcl•lJne

Manat . Mar,tlnovlch.

•d

•tudnta

to

'l'Uenoent

play the

Ca
r
rn-tata

qalnat th•

nl•

Yet pal'ty thoupt

md action

and

Yuaos.lav

�n1 thla

policy of

•ti·Ad• 1ntl•nt

of ennt ..

bad DOW been

Pasci1ia and

of

period th•
Th•

purp4 .

CVljlch ball 1>"9 exclw:IH fl'Oll

tin• pro.t dtna the

level of

well· ·

party••

party wu beCOlll ng

pl"ovicled the Mjority of party ....,.rs mtll

the lntenational lrt1adea of

YUfOllavla,

and

ul••··

party

the Sp�•h

Gerltl� , Mulorich,

th• party

party wu ••11 •-rlcally but yo.mi. 1tron1, m4 lll l itmt.
ftt•nn• of

valuabl•

upon to aupply an elite

apnad to •b• latellectual1 and tbe atudents.
ID fact,

..set •ore

a

of ••ri•nced

of de90a'acy and of th•

the lovtet Unlon11 ally Prance.

•• of youn1 - ·
lt.a.

•

�'

wu

the ...... at the ti•.

apli t into a....rous facti.CJU

wllo could be nlled

110W

th• n1l• 1nd poted.

lon..r

bocH...

•upporten poup1

•nt wh•n·

nvolutloaary

MIODI

bi• lieuteaantt acquire4

C-.mlata thm
Tb•

mon

a coatinual plap

poli ce,

and uninfiuntial

ad

and,

lt 11U1t .be •tn•••d that the party

How•ve•,

But, hoe 1917 to 1141. Tito
fft

The •battered or1ani1attmal

by

llJ9.

ly this

ti• many

Civil War ffn nturning

with •.-rlanced ft&bt•n ad

Nll&lned ad>ael'Yient

The

tor tl!ae dlctat..

of

c:oaanden .

Motcw.

COIMlfIST PARTY OP POLAND:

nm IEGINNINm

The ltot'Y of Polmd'1 Coaunllt Party 1bowe IUCh th• • - influence
of the

<7SU

and Colllntern 11 th•t of the CPT .

In tact , all tlae Co.mnist

partie1 of E•hrn !urvp·e were modelled afte1' tile All-Onion f.o-.dat Party
(loleherik) of the USSR.
ere•• b•ld in
follow.

11\e "21 Condltl ou " of the Collln tem•1 Seeon4 Con·

1'20 •JPlld.tly laid th• rulu which alt other parties mmt

n..e , of course, not only included desaocraUc centrali•• (intra-

party clictatonhlp) but also lmpmltlon of polldee frm 111>1.'0ad (Moscow) .
1be hl1to1')' of the party nulna unclear ml•• one ex.in•• the con
trowny which develop9(f between Rosa LUM""1rg and Lenin.
a aMll, well-diacipll•d elltl1h vanpaJ'd

to revoluttonuy 1uece11 .

who

Lenin advocated

would lead the �letarlat

LUINLUTC bitterly attacked Lenin's conception of

I

a party heade� by a 1eldenhlp lnwsted with absolute powers .

Lenin ' s atti·

tllde njectina the idea t!lat th• proletariat �ld be a actin and cons dous
•aent o� revolvtlonay che1.. ah• conde••d u "'bouraoota" , and bis small
•llt11h nn1taard sh• brlllde4 • "conaptratori al . "

Lenin ' • What t1 to be danef

vae nitt• aaalnst the MenlheYilt• and the laa of Lmnbura.
.

Luxelburg

'

belleftd that a nvolutlonny party ..t be a vanauard for th• pl'Oletari at
Ind cntrally or1•11ed.
• eff•ctiw

ttowewr. 1111- central c:omittee wt be 1d>Jected to

c1'lt!clta ancl eonuol

tiy

th• party ...,•nbip .

of de8ocratlc C91ltraU.•• did not ft t data cr.ltertum.

Lenin's th•Ol'Y

Pollawlng Man' s ideu

mn •.Plioltly, Lu.1lnars •tatff that nwlattenuy aove•nts emnot b• _..,..
fectme• but ..t pow wader tbe rtpt M1torlcal ccHitims.
..v.-t• arl•• cmly spontaneoutly.

levolutiOftaiy

Lenln .and the lolshnik• branded th•••
S3

34
"deviatima" u 01.uaellburgiaa.0

In thl1 hiatoric�l diaput, lAnin penoni-

tied th• .centraliat mtd ev.ntually th• dlotatorlal tendenoy w�i l• Luxetibur1
(.
npruented th•

ane

dellOonUc bent .

AllOftl th• Co...Ustt of Poland Lu�a

bural•• bee- known .. Left-win1 deviationi••·
The �o-c�le4 %'1!W!•O!YM•
a certain Zal...ki who

fo�t
.

or

riptlat deviation acquind l ts n ... frOll

qalut the lbttract COM�ll tan prqsru of
.

,

W.llburg "'d for da• eoope"tlOD betwMn th• two

wii .

wln p

of the Marxist 110ve

Zal..,�ki fomd bitter enellle• in Lu•llhur1 and the S0Sial9a, De!IOkracja

lrol..twa Pol1lr.ie1Q, 1,
&.lthu.nia-SDDlL} .

Ll!!f.l

(Social D•nsocracy of the Unadom of Poland and

'lhe Na'l'xist SDIPlL �d the Polish Socialist Party .(PPS)

split in 1193 O¥er ti.. aaticmal pnbl••·

Th• SD
IPU
• • followtn1 Lux•lt>urg ' s

theory of the "�1•ic incorporatioa0 of the Conan•• Kinpoa o f Poland into
tb• lutailD 1tate, llldttecl tbei1' activities to the Rusalan-controllod part

of th• QO\IDtzy. · Bllphui• wu plaaed on the elos• collaboration betwffn the
Pollah md Ruisi• Co-.mlats.

1'hl• went h•d in hmd with a rejection of

Pol.ad'• independence u a goal . ill ih• atruaal• with th• Tsarist ngi•.
Th• PPS-Lett who bad parud hom th• PPS became of i t1 delire to cooper
ate to •- •...,., with the Rµaalan •o �aH.at llDW•nt and the Russian autbori

u..

4-a�nd ,,

cm the other hand, an all-Pollsh dlaracter which would transcend

th• partlt1.oa trantl•�·

Th• SDIPiL were ltlbelled tniton .

The PPS-Loft would

stop at nothina short of full political lndepe�dence and 1ewnnce of all ti••
with th• Russim E111p� n , b• it Co--U at or Taarlst , vhll• th.SOcial Democrat•
wen ••ti•fi•d tllat with th• tr11Mforution of the Rutalan 1tat• i�to a coutl
tutional aonarchy the cultural autoncmy of Poland would be sati1fied.
.. , of course, owrlooked the deep•rooted natlonalt.atlc sentimnu
The SDIPU
inarained tn the PoUah aaa•••·

Moet Pol•• upirecl to nothln1 lu1 than re1a1n·

ital their cmplet• frMcto. f'roll their fonlp auten .

'nae Pol11h people did

uot joil\ the nau of the SDlPiL ancl th• party wu 1natly weakened.

The ree•rance

of' aa independent Poli•ll 1tate

under

Pil•""-*lti in

Nowllber of 1911 oau,ht both Coe•anl1t aroupt by a mpri •• •

N. Dllewanowski

1ay1 that "It wu like th• 1\ldden appearanc. of s oae one whose death and funeral
they had announced several time with J o, ud rellef. 1

The leaden of the SDIPlL

thoupt that the very 1clea of a Poliah rebirth vu utopian 1nd undasirable.
And for th• l•aden of the PPS-IAft it vu pain ful bocauae they had finally

st11>111sed thelr -.ulvocal p0titl01l by givina up th• pre,ra of . political ind•pendeuce of the

c:ouatry

as no loaaer pncti cable.

either 1roup to cho•• f!'Oll .

There was now 1i ttle for

tmder the mirth of th•lr own state and th•

specter of the lolthevik Revolution, the two radi cal Marxist aroups -.. t
�lr force• and illitat• their Rmsla broehen .
tU Red

•rs•

'Ibey ..t eollaborate with

A.rrff .

Deoed»er,

In

11·1 1 , a Unity Conare11 of the PPS-Left aad th• SDICPiL wa

It · wa

held in Wan•.

qned

tbat tJae· parties should •rae •d fora the

Car.mist .-Orken • Party of Poland (CIPP) •
n- to the Co-..da t Pu-ty of Polend, CPP.)

(In 1925 the party chanpd its
Tho PPS-IAft accepted the pro

ar• of ·th• SDKPi L (the pi'olJ'• of the Bo1•hevib) and •raed into the CWPP.
Dd.ew•owakl
,
1Y

cil'4�

pws •

exmllent exapl• ln m eplp• produced· ln the Marxist

,

•

of .wan., at the ti• vhlch clearly 1--n. lff th• ·maracten in the

•rser :

. The

Manlat drcl.. of Wan aw pl'Odueed an epiaraa constncted in rather
bomp!>ia t•l'N :
the •raer of the SDIPiL and the PPS-Lett wu a
.. raleon' between a peor )'VUDI Mn of good falll ly with a rich
1lri o CIOUbtfUI Teputation. 2
·

'Man�r

Dnewaowakl poinU out

that the

poor youn1 un of good fad. ly alludes to the

lM. IC. Dd.wenowtki, '"nl• Foundation of the eo-m11t Party of Poland,"
�ric• 11•'11 • .... B•� .EU!9!•• Re'riew,, XI , p . 116 •
.

ZJblcl.
-

Social Oe.ocrau scenty fo l lowin1 but con1iaiont Marxist int.mat1 ona11sa,

atrl

while the rich

of domtful reputation allude• to th• social patriotic

put of the PPS-Left •d tu

s cepti �a m

c:ancernin1 the possJ.bility of a radi

..1

ca l nvo lation .

The new party· took frost the SDIPiL both tendeac:le1 to devi atlonlsa:
th• Lu.xellbur11st devi ati on fl'Gll th•

Z•lw11czyina

fro• the rlpt.

left

and the rl1ht 4evi ation or tbe

loth "devi ations"

were sUJhtly leas

torial than the 1tyl• of th•t r Bolshevik brot�fn .

dicta

Both accepted alliance

with the ltusslan 8c$pal Oeaoc:ratic Workers ' Party (lolshevlk) only on tho

'basis of interaal autonomy . ••• both •JqJr••••d the nativo mstTUSt to that

puty.

forelp bol'ft

The r1aht devi ation

vu

born �f national moti vati ons :

the des i re to flnd a "Pollsh road to 1oclal1•••" and the

le ft

devi ation was

born of a desire ·to uintain , evu in th• aiclst of viQl.at \lpbeaval , 10•
sellblence of "prol•tarlan democracy , "

Power au•t be k9'Pt in th• hands of th•

The h�atoiy ot th• Co..unist Part)! of Poland ls l ara�.ly a story

Polish party .

of · th• flaht of Moacow a1aln1t th•• two "here1·t•• · "
The CPP

wu

International.

ortataally

l oo1t•4

•on

u

one of the be1t se cti ons of the

And yet the party raever elai•d 11e>re than 20 ,000 •Jlbers ln

it• eattre .tl1toJ')' . 1

Wi thin ti.. trade unions it

wu

only a weak ainorlty

o011p·ared to th• . co·l 1011 sal fol lowin1 of the Social O.aocrat1 .

The peuant1

wen lndlffenat to U• pal"ty , th• bovpol• wen ho1tlle, •d all clu1e1
wen repe lled becaua• of tMir lona hi1tory of anti-Ru.1lm natianali••·
'"''' pn•ented the Commsl sb boa becoatng a
of

Polmut.

an•t

force in the politics

Wankt-Wuaa•ski , a pollti cal •ll11n to Mo.cow, 1.a up the

cmae1 of th• parties defeat :

lout 1 1w1kl

,

ctuoted in Hi1cock1,

"Droaa walkl UP," Nawe Dro1i , (Nov-Dec, 1941) , p . 148,

Op.�t . ,

p . 1 73 .
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yet utulentmd th• ca\Jles of our m11tak• does not
na� of our defeat ln 1919-1918, u well as our defeat
durlug th• Pollah-S�iet Wn of 1920, end, cons equently , would not com.
pnhend wby the COJlliUnl st Party . ot Poland lost then the ltl'Ul1 1• wl th
the PPS and �· !f1Wl•1•. Th• po as ant aasses and the wsu of petty
bourpoiaie (u well u a larp part, even the aajority , of th• worken) ,
.d tcf aot follow dae pnletarlm nvolut1on , did Dot follow �h• Co.-mlst
Party of Polmcl, became t.�ey •• ln our party th• opponent of the lnde
pen.tence of Poland. '11l•y followe4 the PPS , th• !Yavolfti• and the others ,
the partlu wbtc:b prolll. a•d led to the peuanu and louifi£ uncler th•
hanner of the Poliah state
1

H• who

do.a

••

unde�tad the

• • • •

Ne•41ess to s ay , th• party 1n lts later history learn•d
mlstakes and failures left

a

1 ts

lesions.

These

deep 1l&r1c upon the younpr aetnben of the party

and largely accoWtt for th• aararian policy of the Polish Worton ' Party of
1944

and

1945 • well as

tbe Ratlona11st1c
.

prQP&aanda preached by

durlna the early stares of Coamuni st rule in Poland.
now

the puty
.

Theo·J'•tical purity would

take a far ••c:ond to the p•aQtlcat galnt to b• •ade 1ty th• ••loitation

of Poliah nationalisa.

Opportunl•• and the

w111

to political power wer. of a

1111c:h ·anater priority than e1 ther Ma�xtsa or nationalism.
In Januuy

of 19 19 the 1ov.imaent

lsaued a de�

requf,rina all oraanl•

za�ions and associations to reaister with the authorities.
ct.cUned ,

feel1n1

that cioaplianoe would •• recoanttion

Th• . PPS- Left,

of the new

althoup the lar,er aroup in the newly toned

accept�d th<

pro11'•

included the

cbjecti�

on

'ftle party l•ad•n

of th• SDIP1 L

Bohh•vik l iDH •d

at the �1 ty ConaWtss .

a tate .

OIPP .

had

The prorraa

of social nvolution throu&h proletarillll dictatcnhlp
tbe L'1Dll> ur,�1t

party oppose d the now Pollsb state
1ffll -bourgeot1 structure .

on

'rt\• state

aubversiw oraani1atlon, which

njeetioo

of

lmd

the groundt th.at it

ndiatri.butlon.
was

ntallated by treatina

•ant th•

The

a seai-feudal md

th•

party

u

a

curtailment of all oorul political

acti�tl .. .
The CWPP and lat•r th• a»P were table to take part in tile Ute of th•
l z Pola W-alkt (Proa the Fleld of Battle) ,
quoted in b1lewanow1ki , Op. cit
p . 122.
.
• •

Noa. 5·6

(Moscow,

193S) ,p . 40 ,
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•an•·:

country by two

parll-ntary deputies joined its rm.ks after beina

elected as representatives of oth•r political parties , and a,:�� .politieal
parties wtth siatlar proarus tool part in th• electl-ou ad
of Town

and

llbl• to

nceive 128,000

Throvatt

Countl'Y Proletariat. etc.)
votes

in the elections to tho

tncl durini; the lut re l at i�o ly heo e lections
exerted

his influence .

coa:pares with the

tho•

in

the party receiwd o�•r

.on than 1 ,2JO ,000

vote1

the

•

Dund, and the Independent

many of tbose who vote<l for

were not

these left-win1

· conrincea Co-.lats ad

with other

p�artiea

&eja in Novellber 19ZZ,

uns. · be fore Pilsudski

306 ,000

rec.ived

of th•

are

the

ati-Ruaaian

the Polish Socialist

Socialist Party.

Furthet'llOre ,

OTiani iatlons nllied to the CPP

As ttattd. the parties

There were

many

reuons for this.

feelinp and deeply held patriotic

sen.ti.nu

Put Russian policies of ·i..,erialb• •d conquest

appeanu to be contin� in the a�tions of Lenin Md the Colll9Uni ata.
tho Pol11h-Russ1 1111 War ·of
a

Provi•ionai

bee...

Othewise, the
and;
of

CPP,

LoniD had set \4l in

the

Polisla cl ty

at1tap1i&ed the

In

of

of puppot

Bialy•tot

CoJJamist

natlonal11tic 1entimnts of the Poles.

usociated with an wpatrlotlc and pro-Soy('et 11e>ve•nt.
•·

atnn�

of cours e .

the

1920,

Revolutionuy COmttce for Poland u a kind

aown1ment which areatly
Co�is11

tbll

Howev.r,

by the thrM pa.rtlet

and with the parU.-.ntary proce11 �

118Sles.

PoU.sh

votes.

ld.aht have voted so out of d11ll lu.sion.ent

•lli>enhip never reached more than 20.000.
.
Amon& them

seats (Union

•ans the puty was

affi liatod to the Labour and Socialist Internatloaal :
Party · (PPS)

won

of Poli1h Cathollci1a, the preponderac:e of the Peasantry•

tho state of i lle:allty of th• party contributed to.

the

roj•ation

Other reucas whi-ch n1tricted the parti•• appeal were the Halted

si-a• of the induatrial · proletarla• withla Poland, ud its nletiw quietude .
Molt of its ,rievanoes were snatly llO<lilied by the hiah standard of social
l•111lation passed by the new statet

8

hour day, faetory inspection, and, later,

a C011prehenslve •• propuslve systea of 1od.al insurance.
'nle Unity Coarn•• fai led to quell mch of th• disaeat
b•n.

aon1

its ••

Like all parties• th• CPP wu tom by internal controversy. · Tb• rlpt

wins, led by Adolf Wank ! , M. Walecki , an4 Ven lostraewa, wu in CCJnfiict
with the left, lecl by Julien Lenski , L•• Purun , ad Henryk lalnski.

Wankl

took over leadership of the party but .... the arave 11lltake of 1idin1 wltll
Trot1ky in hl• atrua1le1 with th• tr:luavirate of Stalin, ZlnoYiev aad lamenev.
I'

With Trotsky ' s fall went the riaht , end the Moscow Executive placed the Lenski
SJ'Oup in COlllWlcl.

And yet only 2 years later J.enaki

CDe

lato conflict With

Moscow ad waa tai•elf •epa.ed in July, 1925, bein1 npl aced by the Wanlti

,roup .
But Wanti w u soon. to succt.1111> to failure also.
coup d ' etat a1U.nat the Witos govem•nt .

Th• event wu Pi lsuclstl ' s

Piblidt�1 v at a ncopd1•d hero of

the repmlic whose coup d ' etat. wu 1upport.ed by the Soci al Deaocrats and the
tr.a \.D\lons .

Pilsudski received thell' support not only in order to pnvnt

a "Pascist" coup cl ' etat

fro• th• Riaf\t, but also out of a areat naard and

loyalty to Pilsudski who wu re1artled u a "un of the left . "

The Co.ami1ts

were faced with the decision of atte111>tin1 to e1p1oit an i_.diate revolutiaaary
1ituatlon or of backin1 PlllUdski .
party'• shoulden .

A1ain the odiua of Mescow fe ll upon the
f'

By the early spring of 1926 , Zinoviev had announc:.d th•

p-owth of a revolutionaiy situation in Polad
party .

wh�cb

.. t

be exp loited by the .

At a .•etln1 of the nlarpd Bucutlve of the Co-.nist Intemational

he •aid:

"If there is a countiy where a revolutienuy situation lligbt crystal·

li1e ln a relatively short ti•, it 11 Poland . "1
Wank! •• lt was aot 10 favorable.
lsee Dearas ,

Op. cit . ,

p . 332 .

However, the situation as

A Co.unlit risln1 siwlt11neously qain1t
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both the Witos rep. .. and Pi laudski would fail completely
In th• end

to Puci••·

w .... ded.ded

1t

fu c:is t

wu a

lesser evi l than

fore .

joined wiih the socialist party

•

"

which ultiaately cteci•d the
side by side
forces of

In a

i.n

a 1•neral atrik• a1ain1t the lfitos forces
Commmist1 fovaht

aaain1t the lli litary

Pi laud.ski ' • t roops

fw tlays Pila\lldski

the way

11\e party , there

under Witoa • .

usm in favor of Pibuaki .

ad

opening

bouqeois democracy '81der Piltudski

cliGtatorshlp"

with Soci al Oellocrats

Witas.

that

th111

held poiqr.

His cocta

writes

of

this

/,

•"9ht that:
In aay

1926 they •ade the araw error of aupporU.n1 Pllaudski '• coup d'etat
and thus added to tho odiw. of treason, which wu already attached to
th•• in the eyes of 110lt of thei r fellowcomtryMn. It at once affected
their reputation with the Coaintern ad with a ainori ty of Polish Marxists . 1

Pilsudski d.issappointed

the eo..unists

by rejectin1 any compromise with the left

in strengthenin1 the Seja. Th• Marshal was deterained to set """ a regime of
pe-r1onal power.

The

aovemaent now aoved towaTd a 1ead-Pasc.i1t ldlitary dictator-

ship.
Soon after this failure of the party, Stalin conct.med
as "a very soriom error.
u

had

question

The

II

of

the

party ' s tactics

the coi.p or th• 0aistak• of May '

it wu called, shattered the party . One aroup extolled the belief
erred in May of 1926 while the other believed that he

bad

It

that Waraki

actually acted

correct ly . A split of the move•nt into two parties w as stopped, however, by
(..1r'.· ,
.
Bukharin stated at the Sixth Congress of the Colllmni st
strona . action by Mos cow .
'.

....
.. !'

Intemati 13nal

that

.

�

"if we

had

no't inte?".eded there would

be

two parties in the

'"

.

Polish aove•nt

tod.ay . 112

Wanki

.

was •••lled fro• the party's Central Co.Uttee

. .

and Dhd try Manui ltky and Otto Kwsinen, two representati vet of the Moscow
luiscoc:ks, Op. cit .

,

P • 74.

2see Depa . Op. cit . ,

p . 446.
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Executive , were aent to Wan• to 1vpenis• the party in Poland.

Yet dl11ent

uong the party •••n 11...red beneath th• Moscc:iw cala.
Al. can be

teen, the 0-P, altho•h pro-Soviet at it• foundina and lnter

natlonali1t in lt• tbinkln1. felt no need for doctrinal confol'lli ty with th•
Soviets and, in fact , th• ort1la1 of the party represent j ut t tuch tendencies.
Th• party retained auch of the pl'lcle and yeamln1 for indepenct.nce which had
been voi ced in Rosa Luuabura ' • clala that the SDDiL wu both ••nior to ancl
aon advanced than th• R•sian Soclal-Deaoc:ratic Party .

The party thus not

only differed on several k., potnta with th• luaalau but alao 1apported Trotaky
when th• contnveny be1an between hi• and Stalin.

In the autumn of

1923

the

party ' • Central C�ttee prot.ttecl (alona with the Prencb Comunist Party) Stalin ' s
brutal attacks against Tro�ky .
thus took on the added

Stalin did not foraiv• eul ly.

area• of the Coaintern in

1914.

ly

1932

At th• Pifth ·Con

a precedent wu established when the whole Central

Cmmttee of th• a>P wu replaced by one

1125

All through

odiua of beina th• Polish brand of Ta-ot1kyi1•.

the twenties Moscow atu.pted to brin1 th• party under tow .

And aaain in

Luxelllb uraisa

llOH

con1enlal to the desires of Moscow.

th• Central Co-1 tt•• was s�oned to Moscow and disaiaaed.

Stalin ' • control over the party ••••d to be COllp l•te.

a wina of the party which wu led by haa� :Deutscher and which

But now

counted

about

a third of all party aelDen uona its follc:iwers(it was especi ally strong in
the Warsaw and Loda areu)raised its head to oppose

Geraui

Moscow'•

policy toward the

Social Oeaocrau inthe face of the Nan aenaq and to advocate a united

front of left-wina parties ad trade mions qainst Pilsudakl and Puciaa.
libeled Stallnisa as a cS.generate fon of Comunisa.
hold topther u a 1roup.

1937-l�JI,

And yet they fai led to

Deutacher ad his supporters were accused of Trotskyis•

and expelled fr• the party in
In

They

1932.

at th• heiaht of the Stalinist purses . a tragi c event occurred
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to th• party and to iu •lli>•n .

ship

w as

At this ti• a larp nmber of the a>P ulli>er

in the Soviet Union either on party buain•••

Pollah police .

Ol"

u nf\Ja••• froa the

Many othen wen e1pecially 1ummned to Moscow.

On

Stalin ' s

orden the party w.. :j>uqed of "Trotakyist police 1pie1 ancl apnt.1 provocaten . "
TbOU1ands wen arnated and el ther eucuted or deported to prison cups.

Al1101t

all of the party leeden, both ri1ht and left win111 i•cluclin1 Wan11W1ki (Warsld ) ,
Les1csyn1ki (Leuki ) , ad loatn•• md sewral hundred other key ••n wen liqui
dated.

Gowlka eac11pecl the purp by beina in the 1afe1t plaa at th• .,..n t, in

prison in Poland,
in May of 1938.

The party wu finally quietly dlasolved

by

Collint•rn de cne

TITO AND nm CPY RISB 10 PROMINliNCB

Jotip aro.,.T1to wu a Croat •t•l·worker of ·peasant stock.
by the Austrian

He wu mobili sed

Antf durlna the Pint World War and •••t to · the eutem front

where he wu captund by th• Rusians ad then converted to

th• nvolution .

C�unlaa clurina

The convert had ·•110 acted aa an offi cial of the Coaintem for

a period in Moscow prior to hi• •turn to Yuaoslavia in 1958 to take control of
the party .
The

.,..Rt

IH•d acl•antageoua to the new party leader.

Yugos layia

had

I

suffered ft.nt from a ahu parli aaentarisa and then frOll open dictatorship.
With the as1 u1inaUoa of Una Al•un4tl' an4 th• 1pproach of war. both
and 1Fasti1t1 •• tbelr chances ,
of nationall••
one

Coa
11ml1 ts

Out of thia chaos aDd the eveT 1-anent esplo•ion
I

in th9 state JNW two predollin•t •ff81ftts, one Co1111Uni 1t and

·

aationalist.
Colonel Nihailovi c: , a S.sb offi cer of the old Yu1os lav

resistance aov.•nt which beaan to

l'.. ist

Anq .

fonned a

th• ijaa.is well \afore the Gentan

invasion of 1Ws1i a md befon th• C:O..uniats be1an th•ir fiJht.

Mihailovic

and his Chetnika, as tl\ey were called, resisted flnt and yet fought at a dis
advantage .

For the Chetniks not only fou1ht agains t the Axis but also to

restore the olcl and discredited centralistic ad dtctatorl al

real•.

Mihailovic

and the Comw1i1t-1 wen allies for a ti•• but polittc·a1, ideological llild tac
tical d.is aarHMnta proved insumountable.

After the German invuion of th•

Soviet Union, the two nsistance wove•nta not only fought a1ainst the Germans

but also qaln1t each other.
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While the Cl•tnika fo.ht to restore the old regi•, the Comunis u ,
led by Tito, p
democratic

t'(fe•••4 to. be

fighting for· the establishment of a new and

Y':1P5l•ri• OJ!lanit.ed

comp let.e equallty if
t

,u

on

a federal and a multinational buis with
But the voioing

its national and regional units .

of these- edlfyin1 pbru•• did not blind the Partiamu, as the . C011J1unlst resisters
u
t
. ling deback lo .
became known, to ·the political , slpific.ance of: the ilf)•
Partisans med th� resistance to 1.et power into tho1r

own

hands .

11ie

The use of

patriotic slo1an1 in ti• of dire national need, Tito; Go111dt a. and Stalin were
to learn, could· 1am•r nch more suppol't than any social revolutionary s logan
in time of peace..

At th.is ti• .the ce.unlsts . hoped· that liberation would

brlna Co•W1i1t clictatonbip or at leut a areater re>le played by the party in
Par froa playina the great patriots as they

the aovemMnt than previous ly.
professed, the C-.uni•t•

fint -duty
a-t %aareb

u
an

wn

actually

1triYin1 to l>rin1 power into thei r own

e1peunclacl by Tito at the Pifth Party Ccmgn•• whtdl •t in secret
Octobe-r ef 1940 wu t•

war at all coats.

,�.,

Yug011 lav1a out of the "i111p•'ri•·li•t"

Tito, of course, wu •nly . following th• Coaintem line.

On Aprt.-1 6 , 1941 , Geraany attacked Yugoal&ri·•·
Tito for the party oraanlsation 1howa Tito
any opportunity to fu.rther their

awn

A ••cret directive drtnm up by

and the Co..unl1t1 � to eJ1ploit

came in the countty .

1be directive is

as follow• t
1.
Th• Y1i11o tlav COW1unist Party 11 now in a position ·to take an acti••
part in the overthrow of the preaent 110Darchical re1i11e, and to this
end will render assistance to all ele•nta , n1ardles1 of ·their ideo.. ,
101ical outlook and character, which are bent on the , ... purpos e .
Yu101 .1avta, aus t lint be di1solftd into iu ••veral component parts, ancl
the party will then be Ible to pursue its work within each of the• in
accordance with the directives already issued.
2.
Party -.b•n who aay be called � to the any willhave the following
tuk1 to ·perfona; flatly·, di1or1w1• the reaist•ce of the Yu1oslav
•1111 by cnatina confusion uona•t officers and Hn so that defeat appears
to be the result of the incompe�eace of th• officers' cozps whose authority
wi l l be �strayed once and for all; ••condly , co l lect all araa and war
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ectuipMnt wb1ch uy be thrown •ay in panic and convey them to safe
hiding places for later use ; thirdly , collect infomatlon reaardine the
indiVidual offlczan and •n who do not b•lona to aur aovement but Who
may be of Ule tq us ii:i the event of the USSR entering the war.
In the perforaance of these tuks. ful l use should be made of our
mderaround oraani &ations on the ho• front who wi 1 1 work according to
the .... plan.
3.
Render any usistanc. necessary to the Ustase, Macedonian, Albanian
and other aatlCJDalist or1ani 1ation1, in so far u they aay contribute
towards th• speedy overthTOW of th• present regime. Help should also
be 1lve• to the Noatene1rin Separatists i f they adopt an anti-royalist
line in Montene1'1'e.
4.
Geraay will ,,.•dily crush Yugoslavian reaistuce and·, with the
help of Italy, introdu� the Uttue real• in Croatia and possibly
similar separatist re1i•• ellewhere. Steps nat therefor be taken to
infiltrate our own people into the new adainistrations for intelligence
and other purposes .1
The countJY wu divided

1 Ge:naany and her satelltt.. , Italy, Hunaary,

mon

and Bul1aria, with Croatia indepen4ent.

But the real cantnl rested with -th•

Germans .
·

The �mists haw lona bou ted that they took up uu in defense of

Yuaoslavia before the Geraan attack on the Soviet Union .

And

it is true that

the Cmmuni1t party did not directly collaborate with th• Genaans or their
pupp• U after the invuion of Yugoslavia.

However, parqraph

2 of the above

directive calll upon Co•natists to ndi1organi1e the nsi1tanc:e of tho Yusoslav
Anr.y'1 :ln the face of the Geraans , and parqr1ph l calls for Co•unltt1 to
"render all usiatance to all ele.enU" in order to overtlrraw the present
': ....

The Com.mists sllbotapd the puppet rep•• ("infi ltrate our

reai• •

people into

the

but th� only

&eW

th'IW

own

adllinistra'tlons for intelligence and other pul'poses") ;
thelr all into the struagl• after the USSR wu 'attacked.
'

They •n·ly obstructed, aabotqed, and infiltrated the puppe t rep•• in Yugo1laYia

as

they bad don• with ewry 1ovem•nt in Yuao91avia since thtil stat• ' •

inception.
The ·Yugoslav Comlunist resistance 110ve1Mnt vu ce>11posed of a po�ulli of
lQuot•d in St")'hen Cllssold, WM t,lrind: Art Account of M&nhal Tito•s·
1 U6rary . 1956), p .21.
to
Power (Nev York : Philosophlca.
Rise
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social classes.

The Comuniat prot.saional revolutionary in the Balkans , as

elsewhere,_ was a cai.eaory outsi de social classes. .

n

that workers played little part. �
took the field in J.t•l .
sants.

However, . i t CaJ> be said

the llOYeMnt ex�ept for those who first

The great aajority of nsistance soldiers were pea

Clissold •tat.. thati

aajoriq

The 1reat
of •llben of �· llcneMlltl • • • wen persons of
no fiacl political ,ict.u , who aay lMlv• p.>tM for one party or another in
prewar electiau 1nat had ne.wr eurds•d any political influen ce .
Now

· thr�h �· Llberati.�>n Pronu they wen broua,ht into po.U.,clcal life for

lut

the first ti•.
ttlelr political ener1i•1 were su�l:eaafully canau·sed
l
.
by the Cmmunlst party ' s cadres .
In Yugoslavia the COlllUli
l st-led re1isters were also nationally diverse.

After the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Comunists had proclai•d the
s logan of the unity of all peoples of Yugoalavia qainst the invaders and
their puppets . whether the�• were S.rbian, Croati an , Slovene, or Macedonian .
By thit ti• the peop le had sickened ot the national hatreds which had
rqpant for to aany yean across the state.

run

They •• in the Comrunist move-

ment and their pro1r• salvation from their pliaht .

Th• national policy of

th• CPY, based on the Soviet doctrine of nationalities,

wu

a aajor cause in

the success of the Coaunlsts .
The Germen invasion of the Soviet Union brought fre1h Coaintem instruc
tions ·to the unresisting ColaR.mists .

The raclical change in policy appeared

in the followlna M•••ee to the party :
It is absolutely essential that you should take all .. uures to support
and al leviate th• 1trua1le of the Soviet people. You auat start a
11e>vement with the 1 loaa of a uniteci national front, indeecl of a united
intenatioaa1 front, to · fiaht the German and Italian Pud.st bandits. 2
All

...r..ncy

se11ion of the Y•oslav Com"*liat Centl'&l C<uaittee 'ook place
It wu decided at this tiae, at the nquest of the above •1sa1•.•

i_.diately .

l ibicl •
-

•

2q...oted

p.215.
aoslavia (Camriclg• e
in. Stephen Clbaold. A Short Hia�o;ry'9,f Yu

Cubrida• University Press , 1966) ,

p . 213.
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to take 1n active rol•
The fo l lowlna

in the resistance

proclaaatioo was

drmm up

by

proceetlin1 with a pnoral uprisine .

md circulated throup th• party ' s secret

channels :
Proletari.ana froa· all parts of

Yuaosl avi a .: .. to axu:
Rally round
your vangua!'d. the Comtunist Party of Yugos lavi a .
Pulfi l l your pro

letarim duty without fear or falteri.ag. Make nady for the final
fateful stna g l� . You can not stand idly by wh i ls t the precious blood
of th• heroic people of Sori.et Rua .t a 11 ala•4. Nebllise ell your· strength
to prevent our country from beln1 turned into a base to supply the Fascist
hordu who haw •leuhed theiT turf on th• Soriet ua101a. our dear a od.al l st
Patherland. our hope , the beacon to which the eyes of your folk throughout
.
th• woTld are tl&ftlad ia lonatn1 • • • • 1

Now, for
CPY

the f1nt ti• in 1 u his tory , the 1..cliate ai• •d endeavors of the

were at one with tboae of the people• of Yu101 lavla.

C�i• • and

patrioti•• to th• homland fi• appeared.

s lari a could now
own

Yugoslav nationali••

To my Y-usos lav Comuni1t1 ,

Yuro-

Comaunisa and patriotic

Apd

Th• Coaunist

Yusos l o patriots .

well it dicl not at the .,..n t.

However.

Lope preseated
�he

seeds

of

cnfiiet with Moacow wen b•l•1 aown.
Th• CPY

vu numrically too weat to

cany th•

In Tito'• Prop-9•• 19port to the Colllntem of
for

Comunl sts of

woulcl •rae int o on• inseparable cause.

th•••lws as both Smet D4

no prcibl...

later

Th•

flpt for Comamil• uncler the baner of patriotls• to their

destiny, the party•s .

the•

confueion b•tween

Th•

1be two were now U•k•d la tile YV10Sln Co•uni1t Party to one

countty.

leaden saw

-

burden e>f the nvolt alone .

Ava•t 15, 1941 .,

the

strenath

the party wu 1iven u fol lows a
Pull Party Me••n -- l l , 179J
Meabers of the eo-uni• t Youth
"Syapathi aen" -- 200 ,ooo·2

Tbe latter

ftaun Tito said

·-

14,873;

vu Oll lf a 1neral eatiute but ult llipt be con

ftdeatly expeeted to increue�ttJ

!quoted

in Stephen Clisaold, W)lirlwincl, Op•.cit •

2

P • J4 .

tb!d. ,
-

3Jbid.

•

pp . 30-Jl .
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Tito ' s confidenc. wu b ase d on a nUllber of positive factors which wen

now on hi• side.

First, and most i11portant, the imtediate al1111 of the party

were now at one with the 1oala of the auaea .

Second, Russian entry into the

war had psycholoaically find th• traditional pro-Russian 1y11pathy of the Yuao
s l av pe ..antry.

1hlrd, th• C#Y , unlike any other party in th• atate, had 20

yean •J1P9rienc. in clmdntiae aptation to their credi t .
had

Fourt h , the CPY

m efficient appal'atus built around a close-knit, clisci.plined leadenhlp .

No other party CC>Ul41 count ao web in their favor durina th• forthl!Ond.na 1truagle.
Wlth the invuion of the Soviet Union by Genumy, Moscow had dn•1T•ted
socialist revolution to a far second behlncl an all out curpaign for survival
qainst the Puci1t1 .

A ••rmdJ• to Tito •Jlhoru the Coaunist leader to

"re•li>er that at thla stap what you

an concet'IMd with is liberation fro11

Fucist oppression and not aoeiallst nvol\ltlon. n l

Tito repeated this to his

c011rade1 in an order . of th• 4ay:
The political Un• of the Partlaa Detach•nts
must be a National Liberation Anti-Pudst Pront of
s lavia n1ardle11 of party or nllpon. I n fon:ina
lt is e1sential not to he narl'OW•llinded but to give
2
tlw and ute1pl'i•• of ewty kin4.

lays dow that there
al l peoples of Yugo
Partisan Detach.ents
wide scope to initia

Such a clear- cut prost'• of acticm involYin1 all the people• of Yuaos tavia
aaainat the forei an oppressors vu quit• in hanony with the popular mood.

cow demanded unlimited · aamfic•. aa4 the popl• were eaaer to comply.

Mos

In

CCllltrut the Chetniks of MihailoYle had tendnated aost of their auerl lla warfare , fee line that lt wu criainal folly

to .rUlt reprisals on the au1es vhlch

in this ·cue laid ao1t he aYi ly in th• 1CJWU mad dti• fros which the Chetnik•
found their suppo rt.

th..e

The ' Co miace had no acnapln llbout th• repris als , u

destroyed their capi taliatie eneaies .

1<luoted
2tbld.
-·

in Stephen Clissold.

A

Short History of Yugos lavi a, p . 216.
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Unlllli.ted

1acri. fl ce was

tunity to convert a
the

minority

an e xactin g dell8nd but

also a splendid oppor

1roup lacking popular support and aspirations into

spearhead of a popular national resistance •oVftlent.

CUssold s ays that:

the next 1 years thct two currents of patriotic fervour and loyalty
CNecl of social revolution directed froa Molcow aerged their impe
tus and eventual ly carried the Colll!Rmists to victory at the head of a
atate reeon1titut•d on MarJdst lines. 1
For

to

•

·

·

ly

late

the

p•triotlc fervour carri•4 by

·folk poetry· refl•ctln1 tho

A new
lips

19-'l

o-f

the pegple.

·Tb•

content

new

the party

had· •nau.Ifed th e

1'9vo1utlenuy-patrioti c

vu new

!'If.hither has wy sweetheart fledf 0
''To the BobhevUt.s,"' they said.
Three 1.ona Nntht and aore had put
Sinca I • • ., ••••theart lu�.
So I asked th• Mountain sprite :
"Hut thou • ••n ., heart ' s cl4JUghtT0
"Yesterday ,'' he answer gave.
"I behe ld thr:: sweetb•art brave
On the slopea ' of Dunai.tor
1'1left thy swfftheart 1>11ave I 9 aw
'Monist th• Bolsheviks so bold.
And I aarvel le4 lo behold
How each eweetly 1ene4 t.h• o ther
Like to s is ter or to brother,
How before a silent crowd
Lenin ' s words ••re. nad aloud,
How thy · swee�beaTt up and spoke
ncast away thy tyrat ' • yok• t "
Mow there 1Ust>ened ovel'head
H._.r, si.ckl•• star blood-red,
How, the warriors ' Call\' above •
Gleamed tb• n ... of Molotov.
Stalin' s words I too did see:
"Now the • l •••• shall �11 be frff l �
Then. whe.n briptly d-.med the day
11�oa the '90\lftt I specl way.
Bade the Bolshevik ad1e1,1 · ·
Stalin'• wanior,.wm•n tl'U9•"2
.

.

·

.

libt4 .. . p.2i3.
�
-

�·ed

spirit was on

ad nvolutionuy yet the mold was

tradition al '

-

.uses .

in 5tephe'n Clissold, Wh!rlwind, p . 80 •.

·.

the

so

This patriotic fervour did 11ot cloud th• eyes of the party lewrs to
th• expedient use of . their
so• fut-.n day.

...uury

allies with en eye to thei r demise

Ultlaate political power wu their v.ltiute

tactics cou.ld be ••4 to add.eve thla end.

oa

M.y

concern,

Here again the party •rely fol

lowed tbe aeneral 4lGtates laye4 down by Mo1cow.

An •XUl'l• of audl covert

d•lieity 11 Tito's aecnt dispatch of April 8, 194'2, to th• Co--.nist leaders
1n Croatia warn.ins th•• to be on their auarcl aga1n1t th• British, who bad iln.11
far aided the n1i1t1na auch aon than the Sovieta i
In plill.1·l i c , the allian• between tlM Soviet ""1on, Britain ud the ·United
States .ust continue to be 1tns1ed, an4 the latt.er two Powen are to be
depicted u our allies.
But th•il' •1•nU an4 pau iuide our ceuntsy
aist be. eppoaed, jmt a we oppose the bench•& of tbe invaders ancl the
•n•lliu of the people who an out to Cl'Ulh our strual• for national
liberatlon . 1
.

•

The s aile ••• ie at.1ht have been ••nt in

of the Soviet Union

a

e arly 1941 but with the 1ub1 titution

the enemy encl invader.

n.e· Comnmi1tt wished to ditpe l l all fears of the populac. and the alUe1

of any ulterior fut ure r.volutionary chana•• which 1"11ht be planned.

Tb.is wu

in accord with nto•1 dispatch of April 8 and Mo&cow'1 policy of stressing the
allim�
thne

w!dt the alll•• for l ts -political end ailituy advantages while apposina

su. alliea covertly.

The so-cal led lit.ac or no-funda•ntal-change Mani-

t..'to wu th• result of the first ae•1ion of the en.mist proviaional le1islative
bod)r: known as the Ant1-Pasci1t CoWicil for the Natlanal Liberation ot Yugoslavia

(AVNQJ) which wa fol"Md Nowllber 1942 in lihac, losnla.
mari 1e the ahas of the Partlsat\
of �· -al liie1 ...

IM>YeM.nt

It wu MUlt �o

and waa calculated to al lay th• fe ars

The unlfesto was bl'Oadcast over a .seCNt radio st ation which

the Soviet Gowm.nt had readily put at th• dlsp�•l of the Parti sans . .
ran u fol lows :

ltbid •
,.-

•

111 u.-

p . 17 .

It
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In view of the calumies and s lander which the invaders , the Ustue
and the Otetniks of Draza Mlhai lovic have been spreading mbout the National
Liberation MoveMnt and its ai m , it is dee•d necessal'Y to issue the
following stateaent -The Yugoslav N•tional Liberation Move•nt is cmposed of all true
patriots irrespective of political or religious convictions or of national
ori1in. Its·� aiu are as fol lows :
The liberation of the CO\Dltl'Y fro• the invaders and the achievement
1.
of independence ad true deaoc:rati c rights for all the peoples of Yugos lavia.
2 . The inviolability of private property and the providing of evel'Y possi
bi lity for individual initiative in industiy , trade and agriculture.
3.
No radical chmges whatsoever in the social life and activities of
the people except for the replace11111t of r:eactionaJ'Y villaae authorities
and gendanes who aay have gone over to the service of the invaders by
popularly elected representatives truly de11ecratic and popular in character.
All the llOSt important questions of social life ad State organisation wi l l
be settled by the people the..elves thr�h representatives who will be
properly elected by the people after the end of the war.
4 . The National Libaration Move•nt which is fighting for the freedom of
the people and for their social md democratic riaht• renounces any kind
of coercion or lawlessness .
5 . Officers who join the National Liberation Arrq are usured of their
rank and a position C01181nsurate with their abilities.
6. The Naticnal Liberaticn Move•nt fully recognizes the national rights
of Croatia, Sl ovenia, Setbia, Macedonia, and all other regions. It is a
11oveaent which is u auch Croatian as it is Slovene and Serbian. It
guarantees that the national riahts of all peoples of Yugos lavia will
be preserved. I
The proaru wu both inspiring and reassuring.

Tito offered not only democratic

ri&hts , the capitalistic virtues of individual initiative and private pTOperty ,
md representative govem•nt, but also held out to the allies an existent
free territory within Hitler's European fortress.

Tito appeared to be a true

resistance leader who held the key to the Yugoslav naticnal problem.

The Coa-

intern-trained conspirator had now apparently aiven up the radical policies of
social and economic revoluticn through violence and coercion .
hood and democracy.

He offered brother

Little wonder that individuals from all cluses , creeds .

nationalities , and political persuuions rallied to his banner.
Tito' s publicly proposed goals and •thods are YeJ'Y edifying, but his
actual plus (Moscow ' s ) , do not appear quite 10 glorious.
l�• •

pp. 114-115.
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•ain directives to the Yugoslav Comuni1t Party, the "1ospel" of the party and
Tito, were well laid and meter way prior to the Bihac Manifesto.

A anat con-

tru� is evident between the Manifesto and the "Directive for Puture Work"
dated May 9 , 1941, and containina the 1eal of the Executive Comittee of the
Coaintern.

The directive is a blueprint for the sovietlzation

df

Yugos lavia.

The dlrective in part reads as fol lows : 1
1 . The ti• hu co• when deci1i ve new steps mat be taken along the path
to world revolution. The obstacles to be overco• are sti 1 1 fo1'11i dable
and call for a new tactical flexibility which must be carefully worked
out and boldly practised along the following line :
a. The Co..unist world revolution •ust be presented u a series of
•asures to achieve ' true democracy , ' and all political and llilitary
leaders of the Co1111Unl 1t Move..nt llUlt depict their activity in this
llaht . Up to 30 percent of Party ..llbers uy co• out into the open as
' front-line fiaht•rs for democracy • in the eyes of the au•••·
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. ..•
. . .
. . . . . . .
.
. . . . . .
e. Once power has been seized by the Party, foreign policy wi 1 1 be
laid down by the diploaatic representatives of the USSR, who will receive
the necessary directives from the Coalntern • • • •
f. 1 ...diately after seizing power, the Central Colndttee will set
up a new govem..nt. This body shall be representative of the broad aasses
of the people and preserve every 11ppearance of de•ocracy • • • •
Opponents of the new adllinlstration, especially tho1e who sti 11
I•
enjoy so• prestige uongst the people and those whose participation in
th• revolution u.y have given th•• access to the secret records of the
Co•wist Move•nt , should be re11e>ved as soon as possible, but in "de110cratic" fuhion: by being broupt to trial before a regular court or
a People's Court. 'nle latter should co11pri1e one known ..llber of the
Party and two secret •llben or reliable 1y11pathisen • • • •
.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

4. Traitors to the Party are to be liquidated without trial once a ful l
report confiraing their treachery hu been Imai tted to the Party organi
zation to which they belong • • • •
S . • • • Consider8ble difficulties uy be encountered in the 11pprehension
and destruction of intemal opponents and class enellies. No ti• should
be lost, however, in placing the• wder restraint and placing foraal
chars•• against th•• to justify their detention in the eyes of the de110cratic world.
2
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Tl to was to "present" the "11ppearance" of a de110cratic leader offering democratic riahts (Bihac Manifesto) while covertly preparing for the destruction of his
lPor a COllpl•t• text see Annex, Doament Number 1 .
2tbid. , pp .239-241.
-
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enellles an d these ripts.

This "tactical. flexibi lity" would lead to the sei zure

of power 1nd the tr1n1foraatlon of the Yuaos lav state.

Of ccxane , the Soviet

t.nion would detenlne all forel1n policy and continue to 1lve advice in the
do•stlc area.

These stat-nts clearly reveal th• underlyln1 dlscrepency and

duplicity between public state•nts issued by the Comunlsts and their secret
col'l'espondence and covert activity.
In Novellber of 1943 the Com1ci l of National Liberation held its second
sessi on , thi1 ti• in Jaj ce , Bosnia.

The principle purpose of this second ses

sion was stated by Tito:
Today the ti• hu co• to create an executl ve oraan in the fon of a
provisional aoveruent cap8ble of concluctin1 all of the affairs which
a real national aovern•nt .. t direct. l
The Jajce Declaration of Novellber 29 thus ·Set up a provisional aovern•nt , the
Comlttee of National Liberation.

It also denO\mced the 1ov•rn991lt ln •xi. le,

forbade the Kina to retum until "the people had decided ," and announced that
Yu101 lavia would be reor1ani1e� u a federal republic.

The fonal resolution•

are contained in the follawina declaration :
!.
That the Antl-Pasclst Comcil o f National Llberatian o t Yuaoslavia
be constituted as the supre• le1islative �d executive representative
body cf Yu1oslavia u the supre• repreaentative of the sovereipty
of the peoples of the state of Yuaos lavla u a whole, and that a National
Comlttee of Liberati on of Yuaoalavia be ••tablishecl as an or1an with
all of the features of a national aovernmnt, throuab which the Anti
fascist Council of National Liberation of Yuaoalavla will realise its
executive functions ;
2 . That the traitorous • aovern•nt • in exi 1• be deprl ved of all rlaht1
as the leaal aovem•nt of Yu1oslavia , · particularly of the riaht to repn
aent the peoples of Yugoslavia anywhere or before anyone ;
3. That all internal treaties and obligations concluded abroad in the
n- of Yuaoslavi a by the • aov•rn•nt• in exile be reviewed with a view
to their invalidation or renewal or 11pproval , •d that al 1 internal
treaties and obli1ations which the so-called ' aovern•nt• in exile aay
eventually conclude -'>road in the future nceive no recoaniti on ;
·

1Nichael B . Petrovi ch , "Th• Central Govem•nt of Yuaoslavia," Political
Science Quarter l , LXI I , p . 506, quotina Tito, "DevelopMnt of the Liberal
Struule of the eopl" of Y•oslavia in conM ctlon vi th International Events . "
Sec�d Session of the Anti-Puci1t CoUnci l of National Liberation of Yugos lavia
(Zaareb . 1945) , p . 13.

�
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4.

That Yugos lavia b e established on a democrati c federal principle
as a st ate of equal peoples ;
s.
Th t all these re1olution1 be f'.01'11\llated i n separate decisions by
AVNOJ .

f

This resolution indicates that as the Partisans becaae settled their program
became increasingly more radi cal.

By this time, of course, the aoveaent held

considerable areas in which a basic civil ullinlstration had to be set up and
supplies organized both for the any and civi lian population.

Because of the

position taken by the Comtmists on the national question, they were able to
pro�re valuable recruits from the local populati on .

Local persons o f abi lity

were recruited for the new adainistrative tasks thus releasing a great new
source of energy and talent, especially among the mountaineers of Bosnia and
Montenegro who had never before held responsibility.

These people were , of

Th e platform of "national

course , now finily tied to the Co-..ni st caus e .
'

equality" and of •:the right to self-determination includin1 that of separation"
was decisive in securing support for the Partisan cause .

'Mlese principles

were also set forth at Jajce in the proclaation of the federal principle
which ensured "full equality to the nations of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina," and that the "national mnorities
of Yueos lavia wi l l be secured all their rights . "

I n accordance with this fed-

eral organi zation of Yugoslavi a "organs of the people's authorities have been
established in different lands of Yugoslavia in the fona of National Liberation

.

Com!ttees. and Provincial Anti- Fascist Councils of National Liberation . n2
The principle of "sel f-determination includ.ing that of separation" was forced
upon the Yµgoslav Communists by the Collinte� but was never seriously entertained .
The former principle was bp lemented in the future govemll81lt but was probably
the result only of a

co9llOl\sense

appraisal of Yugos lav 1'9alitles , to its success

l tbid . , pp.506-507, quotin1 "Declaration of the Second Session of the
Anti-Fascis t Council of National Liberation of Yugos lavia (29-XI- 1943) , Offi cial
Gazette , No. l , Peb 1 , 1945.
2
Joseph Prankel , "Fedet'alis11 in Yugoslavi a , " A•rican Political Science

Review, Xt.IX. p . 420.
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rather than to its "correctness . "
Th e AVNOJ now conferred the title of Marshal upon Tito and, on Novemer

30, 1943, the Presidium appointed a National Comli.ttee to act as the executive
arm of AVNOJ .

Ti to was made acting Prellier and acting minister of defense .

'Ihree vice-presidents an d thirteen acting ainisters were also appointed.
From Novellber

�g ,

1943, until the adoption of the Constitution of the

Federal People ' s Republic of Yuaos lavia on January 3 1 , 1946, all territory lib
erated by the Partisans was govemed by the new provisional govem•nt.
An analysis of the war shows that Yugoslav Co•unist resistance began in
Serbia and in Montenegro after the Gel'll8Jl invasion of the Soviet Union.

The

Partisans were driven out of Serbia at the end of 1941 and reorganized their
forces in the aountains of Bosnia during 1942.

Meanwhile Mihailovic had been
The government

appointed Minister of War of the Yugoslav govermaent in exi le.

held al legiance from the Serbian national forces throuahout the country which
were being drawn into close mi litary coll11borati on with the Italians and some
In the spring of 1943, Mihailovic's men

ti•s the Geraan occupational forces .

I

took part in the operation qainst the Comunist force or Partisans.

The Com-

IRDlists , however, survived the heavy enemy attacks in the spring and S\lllller of

1943.

Co•\D\ist propaganda now called the Serb nationalists , or O\etniks, quis

lings , an4 with mch justification.

At the ti• of the Italian surrender, the

Partisans held considerab le territory.
the struggle.

This proved to be a tuming point in

They were now able to acquire large stocks of weapons with which

to continue the struagle.

During the fol l owing year the Geraan forces often

attacked the Partisans and inflicted heavy losses , but they were never able to
attempt their co11p lete destruction .
On J\D\e

16, 1944, an agn...nt wu reached between Marshal Ti to and the

Premier of the Royal Govemment in Exile, Dr. Ivan Sw>uic.

The agreement
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considerably strengthened Tito' s position.

Tito agreed to postpone the question

of the future of the monarchy tmtil the end of the war in exchange for Subasic's
proaise to organize a cabinet which would cooperate with tho National COlllli ttee. 1
Subuic consented to the agreeaent at the request of the British .

The British

had, by early 1944 . tel'lllnated all aid to Mihailovic in favor of the forces of
A letter fro• Winston Churchhill to Tito sent on 8 January 1944 states

Tito.
that "I

a

resolved that the British gove maent will give no further

support to Mihailovic 'and will only 1ive help to you
says that "It is

111

• • • •

lli li tary

" 2 The letter further

110St earnest desire to 1ive you all aid in human power by

••• supplies , by air support and by

andos

eo1111

• • • •

"

The British request to

SW>asic was thus in line with the current ai lltary policies of that state.
On

Novemer 1 , 1944, a second Tito-Subasic agreement was concluded in

the newly liberated YU1oslav capital of Belarade.

This a1ne•nt provided for

a coalition govern..nt pending the election of a constituent assembly which
would determine Yugoslavia's future form of govern•nt .
King Peter I I now i11ued a decree fraa London transferring his royal ,
powers to a regency pending the final decision on the aonarchy to be made by
the future constituent assembly.
The talks between Subasic and Tito skidded to a halt
agree•nt on the details of the coalition could be reached.

as

no s atisfactory

However, reco•

•ndations were soon forthcoaing fro• the Big Three at Yalta which settled the
controversy.

The "recomendation" to Tito and Subuic stated that "the agree•nt

between thea should be put into effect i-diately and that a new govemMnt
l For the text see Michael B . Petrovich , Op.cit

p . 508.

• •

2
stalin 's Correspondence with Churchil l, Attlee Roosevelt and Truman,
1941-Ui4S· {LOndon: Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), p.l8!
•
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should be formed on the basis of that agree•nt. ul
Both Subasic and Tito now sli>llitted the resignationa of their governments to three regents appointed by King Peter.

The regents appointed a new

counci 1 of ainisters which was headed by Tito md consisted of 28 llinisters ,
23 of whoa were Partisans.
Th• National Liberation Move•nt now found itself in
position.
Yugoslavia.

an

extn•ly strong

They had alaost total control over the only legal govem•nt of
The Yalta "rec�ndation" wu never ccmpletely carried out relating

to the total m•ber of non-Partism representatives in the new govem•nt. However, a sienificant nuD>er of non-co..unists were allowed to join thus serving
u a testi110nial of the 1tren1th of the Partisans. Sli>uic, Milm Grol, md
other non-Colllllftist representatives fro• the Yugoslav Govem•nt in Bxll• joined
the Tito govemaent but were veritable prisoners in their
The new govel'lment pused a

1111

own

llinistries.

on Auaust 21, 1945, known u The L• on

the Constituent Assellbly, which included the following provisions on the forth
coming e lection of a Constituent Assellbly :
That the peoples of new Yuaoslavia llight •lq>ress their soverei1n
will re1ardin1 the buic question of fora of govem•nt, they will elect
at free elections , by direct and secret .ballot, representatives to a
Constituent Assellbly, the supre• representative body of De11e>cratic,
Federal Yuaoslavia. The Constituent Alseilbly will establish the Consti·
tution of New Yu1oelavia, l•• in ccnnection with the Constitution , md
decisions on all business concluded by the Anti-Fucist Council of National
Liberation of Yu101 lavia and its Presidium or the National Provisional
Parliaaent of De110crati c, Federal Yuaoslavia. 2
The elections themelves were carried out amidst a widespread fear created
by the govem•nt '• Popular Front. This , coupled with a sense of defeatis•
and fat alls a en1endered by the war, alon1 with a deepening disappoint•nt of
lMichael B. Petrovich , Op. cit. , p.509, quoting Joint Coamunique on Cri•a
Conference, Pebrul.%y 12, 1945.
2 tbid. , quotina Official Gaiette, No.594, August 24, 1945.
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the West, clouded the election horizon.

Many were now dependent upon the

aovernment for their livelihood while others admired the exploits of Tito
and his solidarity with the USSR.
1be oppo1ition partie1, laraely because· of disunit� and the realiiation
that they would fail in the impending elections tmder the present adverse cir
cumtances , decided to abstain fro• the elections.
resianed from the clblnet on August 18.

Vice-Preld.er Milan Grol

This abstention and the resignation

of Poreian Minister Ivan Subasic who had been held in c011aUDicado since early
September, prior to the Novellber u . 1945 , elections wen aade to druatise
Belp-acle 's dictatorial excesses and stimulate lut-llinute allied intervention
on their behalf.

No allied help wu forth COiiin g.

The elections were held on Noveli>er 11, 1945 , but the �nal resulU did
not appear until NoveJlber 24.
percent cast bal lots .

Of the registered 8.383,455 voters , 88. 4 3

No opposition •llbers were present at the counting of
/

these votes of which the Popular Pront received approxiutely 90 percent .
'Mle Coutituent Assellbly convened in Belgrade on Novelllbe r 29 and declared :
I . Democratic Pederal Yugoslavia is -proclaiaed a people.!s repUblic under
the n.. of the Pederal People ' s �epublic of Yugoslavia.
The Pecleral People' s Republic of Yugos lavia i• a federal people ' •
state repmlica in fora, a c�i ty o f equal peoples who have freely
expressed their wi l l to reaain mited within Yugos lavia.
I I . With this re1olution the monarchy in Yugos lavia is finally dis
established in the nae of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, while Peter II
Karadjordjevic with the whole Karadjordje dynasty i1 di yested of all
ripts appertaining to him and the Karadjordje dynasty.
A

nmber of reasons can be cited for the Co1111R.1Dist victory in Yugoslavia.

'nle pre-War governments in Yugoslavia did not reflect the popular wishes of the
Yuaoslav people.

Parli ..ntaris• had been a fai lure, and the dictatorial

policies of the royalist govern•nt were detested.
l�

• •

The Chetnik leader Mihailovic

p. 518, quoting Politika, Novelli>er 30, 1945, p . 1 .
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Furthermore , Mihailovic

fought for the restoration of these pre-War principles.

wu a Serb leading a purely Serbian movement in a state boiling with nationalism.
In contrast , the Coamunist oraanization included cells in every subdivision of
Yuaosl avia.

By

1943

they were attracting followers from all over the co\D\try.

The only qualification for •nbership was usefullness .
Coma.mist move•nt was also far better.

The leadership of the

The a-Y wu the only Communist party

in Eastem Europe prepared when the war came to engage in lli litary �erations .
This was , of course, a result of their policy set as far back as

1938

the fo\D\dations for the armed struggle against their

A number of

own

state.

of laying

veterans of the Spanish Civil War and several recruited career officers of the
Yugoslav army, including Tito's Chief of Staff General Arso Jovanovich , bolstered
the quality of JRilitary leadership.

Perhaps the Historian Adu Ulam best cites

tho reuons for Tito's success :
The success of Ti to was due to an unusually fortuitous anangement of
events and personalities . All Yugoslavia was divided and seemingly
incapable of regeneration. Whatever else the Partisans were, they exem
plified energy and purpose. Durina the war they acted, talked, and so•
times even thouaht as free revolutionaries rather ·than as servants of an
. alien aovom•nt. It was no accident that they attracted so many of the
yo\D\1 uona the former ruUna class of their country. Tito's versatile
secretary, Olaa Ninchich, was the daughter of a minister of the Yugoslav
aoveruent-in-exl le . Drazha Mihailovich 's tragedy is underlined when it
is reflected that his own chi ldren left hi• during the war to join the
Partisans . In contrast to the continuous wrangling which went on amng
the Oletniks , excellent 110rale pervaded Ti to' s headquarters . 1
Furthermore , as the struaale increased, the social consequences of the war bec
more important and aave to the Coma\D\ists further advantaaes .
The guerril la warfare carried on by the CoJIJl\D\ists, as seen , led to repri
sals which fell most heavi ly on the town and co\D\tried propertied.

This , of

course, weakened the Couaunists' .future rtvals and drove many into collaboration
with the invaders or quislings in order to •rely maintain soae selllh lence of
1

.

Adam B. Ulam, 0p. cit . , p . 36 .

60
l aw and order.

The Communists welcomed this as they could later argue that

the ruling and a large part of the middle class were helping the enemy.

The

Communists could thus attack the bourgeoisie and the rich peasants in the name
of patriotic fervor.

In Croati a and Sloveni a the pre-War democrati c parties

gave so• support to the

Geram or

Croatia fas cists who they believed would

be a less serious ..nace after the allies defeated them than the Coanunists .

11\e Communists could thus carry on a civi 1 war here in the naM of patriotis11
also.
The midergr«md cells of the Co-.mists also pTOved to be extnmely
iq>ortant in the party ' s success during the war and after.

The ce 111 served

u the nucleus for the Partis an llOVemen t , thus gl ving the Co-.ilsts control
and direction in accord with their own intentions ad aspirati ons.

With the

gradual expansion of liberated territory, these cells laid the foundations for
their own preconceived future Yugoslav govem•nt .
The physical condition o f Yugos lavia also favored the gueri l l a tactics
carried an by Tito.

The invaders controlled the aaln cities , rai lroads , and

part of the pl ains , whi le the resisters held the mountains and raided the enemy
garrisons and lines of Cmimmlication.
And, finally , the intematianal situation at the end of the war was also
favorab le to the Yugoslav C01111UDi st1.
the cau.e of Tito.

111• Yalta decisions actually strengthened

t«>S<X>W AND

mE

CPP RISE

TO

PROMINENCE

The dissolution of the CPP in 1938 is to this day shrouded in 1111tery
and the sW>ject of mch controversy.
Soviets c- in

1939

The only official announcement by the

at the Eipteenth a»su Conan•• where Manui lsJcy , speaking

in justification of the act, stated:
In order to split the Comunist 110W•nt� th• Pucist and the Trotskyite
spies attempted to fora artificial ' factions• and ' groups ' in some of the
Collll.lill st parties and stir up a factional 1trus1le. . . . (The party that
wu) moat contudnated by hostile ele ..nts was the Comaunist Party of
Poland where aaents of Polish Pucis• managed to 1aln positions of leader
shipo These s coundrels tried to pt the party to support Pil1udski 's
Pucist group in May 1926. When th\s fai lecl they feigned repentence
for their 'May error, • llade a show of self-crlticlsa and �eceived the
Coaintern . . . . The C0111i1m 1t parties • • • hav• investigated their lead
in1 workers and removed those whose political honesty was questionable.
'nley have cli11olved i l leaal organisations which were particularly con
tulnated, and have begun to fora new ones in their place. 1
The CPP wu thus full of hostile, sW>venlve ele•nts but , nevertheless , was
able to aake one last effort , the effort

to

dissolve itself.

or1ani1ations were then prepared for the future.
auted for the dissolution of the CPP.

./

New and sounder
'"'

Other reasons have been

·�-

The,.. historian Korl>onski examines the

IM. l . Dziewanowski, "Stalin and the Polish Coamnists," Survey, No. 35,
(Jan-Mar) , p.63, quotlna World News and Views, 6 April 1939 , p.!482.
4-1938 "On Inadequacies of Party
Stalin ' • speech durin1 the Gnat Purge of 193
Work and Meuures for Liquidating Trotskyist and Other Dom le-Dealers" given
before the P lenum of the Central Comitt•e of the a>su on March 3, 1937 and
1ppearin1 in Pravda, March 29, 1937, should be COllp&red to the above and the
reasons atven by Stalin for the precipi tation of the Yuaoslav...sovtet split in
1941: Cotn'ade1 : PTO• the reports and discussions of the• heard at this Plenum
it 11 obvious that we have to deal vi th the following three buic facu . In
the first place, the wnckin& and cliversionary-spyin1 worlt of aaents of foreign
states , uon1 who• a rather active role hu been played by the Trotskyite1,
hu touched to one clepee or another all or al1101t all of our oraani1ations ,
adllinistrative and party u well u econollic. In the second place, agents of
foreian states , includln1 Trotskyite1 , have penetrated not only into the lower
or1ani1at1Gll , but even into certain responsible pos u .. In the third place,
certain of our leading co11rades, at the center u well u in the provinces,
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followin1:

first, the elildnation of the C'P as a pos1ibl• cbstacl• to the

conte11plated Sovet-Genm r9roch•nt ; second, Trotlkyit• influences in the
<PP ; third, intemal aplitl encl quarre ls within the party ; and fourth, the
a>P ' • participation and behaYlor in th• Spanish CiYll War.

Korbonski says

that none of th••• are caaYlncin1 u reuona for th• party ' • d111olution.

The

•- nuona , he 1ay1 , would have 1pp lied to a nUllber of other C:O-..ni st partl$! :
Czechoslovakia , Genany , act Yuaoe lavia.

None of the• were di110 1ved..

1

Dalewanowski , in a section<' of his book The eo.....tst Party of Poland enti•
tled "A �•t•ry

Wra1ppecl

in Bnipa," llsu the thne nuons for the dissolution

of th• party enumrated by Manul llky and "parrotted by others : "
tion of the party , infi 1tratton of the party
contalnatton of the party
nfutati• .

by

by

the disintegra

provocateurs md spies, and

Trot1kyit• lnflmnces .

He then proceed• wtth a

The party vq not d11tni.aratln1 at the ti• but wu actually

•Jpllldln1 both numrically ad influentially in the citi•• and in the country·
side.

Rural •ftPloymnt, the C:O••imi 1t sponsorship of boUJ'l•oi1ie aararian

refon , C:O-ist infiltration of nca-C01m1ni1t and • fellow travelin1' 01'1ani1atlou , an unyieldin1 1tn11l• aaalut Nall Gen_,, ad th• exploitation of
patriotic 1lo1ans all contributed to the party 1atn1 .

Eneaies of the party

bid penetrated into the lower lewla of the party apparatus but never, e1peclally
after the early 30 ' 1 , into the inner

con

of Trotskylt• penetration 11 found vaam.

of CPP leadership.

The pejorative

At the ti• there were no aarked

sips of activity by •lllben of this faction in Polmd.

The real reasons for

have not only been unable to see the real face of these wreckers , diverslonl1ts •
1pie1 and mrdenrs , but have provecl to be carelff1 , inclifferent and naive
about 1 t , md not mcomcn ly have cooperated in promtin1 agents of forelp
1tate1 to 10• re1ponsible po1t or other. . . . quoted in Robert V. Daniell, ed• •
A Documsatuy Historr of Comunl1• (New York : Randoa HoUle, 1960) , pp.54-55.
1
Por th• COllp lete cli1cus1lon '" Andrsej lolbon1kl, •'The Poll1h Co..an i�t
Party 19S8-1942," Slavic Review, No.3, Septellber 1967, pp . 430-444.

.

the dissolution are now given .
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By 1937-1938 the possibility of revolution in

Poland see11ed further away than ever.

The Great Depression was over and had

not been sufficiently exploited by the CPP.

Stalin probably thought that in

the event of another revolutionary situation arising in Poland the Red Arfll'f
would do a 111ch better job.

PurthenM>re , the CPP was not iaportant in Comintem

calculations except u a translll ssion belt to Geraany .
the hopes of any such upheaval vanished.

With Hitler's triumph

Now it was felt by Stalin that Poland

might serve as a diplomatic and lli litary bridge to the Third Reich .
lution of the CPP acce>11p lilhed three things :

The disso-

one, "discarded an ineffectual

and unreliable instl'UMnt of policy;" two, 0waaing preventive war against a
potential opposition ;" and three , "ptting rid of the remants of domestic
opposition. u l

An

infonied observer of tho Soviet scene during the Stalin period

writes that he
heard the declaration , made as far back as 1933, a few months after
Hitler came to power, that the only possibility for Russia to survive
as a Power was to 11ake sure that the conflaaration in the West should
break out before the fire in the East. I have authoritative infomati on
to rely upon , that in 1937 the question of making a possible compromise
with Hitler at the expense of Poland was already becoming more concrete,
and Stalin wanted no internal opposition in cue of a comproai se with
the Gemans ; not only was bourgeois Poland to cease to exist , but also
the Polish C01111Unist Party . Z
The CPP was one of the first victi• of the Stalin-Hitler aaree•ent.

Poland

itself was theoretically re11<>ved when , on August 23, 1939 , the Nazi-Soviet
Pact wu signed.
At the official rehabi 11 tation of the CPP in 1956 , it was fotmd that 11The
evidence (for the dissolution of the CPP) had been faked by a gang of saboteun
and provocateurs whose real role was only brought to light after Be.ria was
lM.

K.

Dziewanowski , "Stalin and the Polish Commmists ," Op.cit . , p.64.

2tbid. , quoting "Interview With an Bx-Insider," Soviet Survey, (July
Septellber, 1960) .
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urunasked.

111

This s tatement does not explain the dissolution of the party.

It

does not tell why nor who the above "saboteurs" and "provocateurs" were.
The dissolution of the CPP and the alliance with Hitler crit'P l•d the
Polish CoM&mist move•nt.

The party wu deprived of its leadersh i p , the rank

and fi le's Marxist faith was strained, th• antagonism of non-Marxist Poles
against Couunis• and the Soviet Union was aaeravated, and no attempts at
founding a new Polish Co-.mist Party were forthcoaing until after the German
invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

Stalin's actions sti nulated the patriotic

emotions 8llOD I Polish COltllUfti sts and resentment against Soviet pretens ions .
The effects would aaain come to the fore in 1948.
ntree groups of Polish Co1111unists can be distinguished at the time of
the dissolution of the party in 1938.

The first and 111ost nmerous group was

located in Poland and wu composed of the rank and file of the party.

It w85

in a state of disorgani zation because of the ban on C0111Dun ht activities by
the government which forced the Politburo to locate and diTect operations from
Pari s .

As seen ,- during the second half of 1937, all the i11portant leaders were

summoned to Moscow .

Second and third ranking officials of the party including

Gomulka , Bierut, Och ab , and Zawadzki were in Polish j a i l s .

Only two members

of the Central Comal t tee of the CPP survived the purge , Alfred Lampe • in a
Polish j ai l , and Julian BrWl, living in France un t i l 1940.

The rank and fi le

within Poland refused to believe that the CPP had been disbanded.
that it was a plot by the Polish governmen t .

ntey he lieved

However, special Comintern emi s 

saries we,re sent t o Poland calling for the strict adherance to the Comintern
resolutions disbanding the CPP .

During the second half of 1938 all organi zed

Communist activity in Po land ceased.

t

l tbi d . , p . 6 4 , quoting T buna Ludu,
rezo lucJ'8:-I I I , pp.46 2 and 59
�
5
9
9.

19 February 1956 ; also KPP Uchwaly i
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The second grouping of Polish Comaunists was in Spain .

In the fall of

1938 the international brigades were lar�ely withdrawn and aost of the Polish

Co1J111un
1 ists crossed the frontier into France by January of 1939.

_

I t was from

these Polish Coamunists in Prance that Moscow apparantly planned to form the
nucleus of the new party.

In January , 1939 , a special "initiative group'' for

that purpose was established in Paris composed of the veterans of the interna
tional brigade s .

Th e group w as ordered t o send some o f its members from France

to Poland in order to rebui ld the party .
The third broad grouping at this time was located in the Soviet Union.
After the disappearance of the top leaders of the CPP and the Polish officials
of the Co11intern , the remaining subordinates were arrested and sent to prison
camps throughout the USSR.
part of World War l I .

Most of these remained in prison unti 1 the latter

Others were freed only after the war upon the · request

of the Polish Co--.mist authorities.
On the eve of the War the Polish Commmi st RtOvement was to all practical
purposes nonexistent.

The dissolut i on , coupled with the foreign policy of the

Soviet Union , had tendnated all work.
On Septellber 1 , 1939, Germany invaded Poland from the West .
later Soviet forces began occupying the eastern part of Poland.

Si xteen days
By September

29 Poland was divided between the Soviet Union and Germany according to the

secret additional protocal to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and
the USSR signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939.

The protocal concerns the delimi-

tation of Gel'1lall and Soviet spheres of interest in Eastern Burope and reads in
part :
In the event of a terri torial and political transfonation of the
territories belonging to the Polish St ate , the spheres of interest of
both Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of
the rivers Narew , Vistula, and S an .
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The question whether the interests of both Parties make the main
tenance of an independent Polish St ate appear desirable and how the
frontiers of this State should be drawn can be definitely determined
only in the course of further political dove lopaents.

In any case both Governments will resolve this question by means of
a friendly undentanding. l

With the collapse of the fo!'ller Polish state , the USSR and Geraany "consider
it as exclusively their
ies •

own task to restore peace and order in these territor-

• • •"

When the Red Aniry troops arrived in Poland on September

16-17, 1939 ,

they treated all the people they found there as Soviet citi zens subject to
Soviet l aw .

A protest of the Polish Govern11ent sent t o al lied and neutral

governments on February 2 1 ,

1941,

states that :

Tile Soviet authori ties acting now on the Polish terri tories occupied
by - the USSR are proceeding to register the population and are forcing
Polish citi zens , under threat of reprisals , to renounce formally their
Polish nationality , to cease all activity aimed at the restoration o f
the independen ce o f Poland, an d to declare that they wi l l hence forward
consider themselves loyal citi zens of the USSR, 2
·

Soviet forces occupying Polish territory considered the land as an extension
of the Soviet Union.

It was not looked upon by the Soviets as a 11ilitary

occupation but as a legal take over.

On March

1 3 , 1940,

in the House of

Comaons Mr. Hannah asked the Prime Minister whether he could make any statement about the present conditions in the provinces of Poland occupied by
Russian troops .

The reply came from the Under-Secretary of State for Poreign

Affairs Mr. But ler:

My honorable friend wi l l appreciate that information llbout conditions

in this area is necessarily difficult to conft r11 .
Such reports u have
reached his Majesty ' s Government indicate , however, th at , as a result

1 1nstytut Historyczny imienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Documents on Polish
Soviet Relations 1939-1945 (2 vols . ; London :
Heine•ann, 1961), DoCUMnt 3-2 , p.40.
2 1bid. , DocUJ1ent

83,

p . 102.
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of the Soviet occupation, they are p,radually approximating to the con
ditions generally prevai ling in the Soviet Union. 1
Upon the official incorporation of these territories into the USSR in November,
1939 , the people became subject to all Soviet laws and regulations including
the so-called "counter-revolutionary crimes . " Polish forces did, however, continue to resist in considerable nu'llbers .

Captured Polish soldiers were treated

as ''bandits" and "criminals . " Edward Rozek states that:
From Septed>er 17, 1939, to Jt.me 194 1 , 1,692 ,000 Poles , Jews , Ukraini ans ,
and Byelorussians were forcibly taken from their homes and de�orted to
Russia. This number includes 230 ooo soldiers and officers of the Polish
aray; 990 ,000 civi lians , who were deported because of their 'nationalistic
bourgeois backgro\D'ld; ' 250 ,000 political class enemies ; 210 ,000 Poles
conscripted into the Red Arfl1f and then sent deep into the Soviet Union ,
and 12 ,ooo other Poles gathered forcibly from the Baltic area. AJBong the
deportees were 160,000 dhi ldren and adolescents . 2
..

Most Polish officers who became Soviet prisoners of war at this time were , as
wi l l be seen, either executed in Katyn Forest and elsewhere
after the Polish-Soviet Agreement was signed on July

30 .

or

1941.

"amnestied"
Apparently only

the Soviet Union denied that a state of war existed between their state and
that of the Poles .. or even that a Polish state existed. On 2 1 August 1940, the
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the British government , Mr.
Butler, announced that :
Since September of last year the Polish governMnt have left his Majesty ' s
Government in no doubt that they could only regard the violation of the
Soviet Union of the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact as p lacing them in
a state of war with the Soviet Union. 3
However, a speech by Comdssar Molotov on the partition of Poland and Soviet
foreign relations made at the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Council of the USSR in Moscow on October 31 , 1939 .. left little doubt

as

to the Soviet

l waclaw Jedrzejewicz, Poland in the British Parliament 1939-1945 (3 vols . ;
New York : Jozef Pi lsudski Institute of America for Research in the Modern His
tory of Poland, 1946) , pp.412-413.
2edward J . Rozek , Allied Wartime Diploma�:
John Wi ley and Sons , 1958), p .46.
lwaclaw Jedrzejewicz, Op.ci t . , p . 434.

A Pattern in Pol and (New York :
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position.

Molotov says that :

Everybody realizes that there can be no question of restoring old Poland.
It i s , therefore , absurd to continue th present war under the flag of
restoration of the foTmer Polish State.

y

·
This Geraan-Soviet partition of Poland virtually finished the CPP off as
a politic�l force .

Nad -Soviet cooperation forced the Collintem to abandon

its plans to reestab lish the a>P on the basis of the "initi ative group . "

The

leaders of the group left Paris for Moscow in early 1940 t� be shipped later
to Poland.

Upon their arrival in Mos cow they were told that current Nad-

Soviet relations made the rebuilding of the party i l ladvi sed.
In the areas annexed by the USSR, Polish Comnmists were regarded with
suspicion , hostility, or indi fference.

The reestablishment of tho party was

as yet banned.
The CoJlUl\Dlists that had remained
not , were treat�d little better.
Russians , the

under Geraan occupation , and most had

Although having been ostracized by the detested

CoJllllllD'li sts were s ti l l treated by the people as traitors to Poland

and puppets of Russ i a .

The offi cial Mos cow line called for a friendly neutrality

with the Germans which only meant collaboration by the Conmn.mists .
behavior in the former Bastem Poland

Soviet

only sened to further co"'otmd the

hatred fel t toward the Polish Commun i s t s .
The situation began to change · after the defeat o f Pran ce i n the S\.lllmer
of 1940.

Mos cow had been rude ly awakened by the Gennan threat.

A number of

forMr CPP meni>ers were now sent to the Comintem school at Pushkino (near Moscow) where they joined the Paris contingent.

Most of the rank and fi l e , most

of the men who would play major roles in reconstituting the party , remained
outside this smal l beginning made by Mos cow.
1

Relations between Polish C0111111Uni sts

1nstytut Historyczny imienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Qr.cit . , Document
66, p . 6 6 .
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and Moscow were thus little better at the outbreak of German-Soviet hosti lities.
Unti l the s wmner of

1940,

former CPP ment>ers remained for the most part

aloof from any fol'lla l organizations .

This was the result of the Comintem

directive of 1938, a fee ling of hopelessness and betrayal engendered by the
Soviet actions , and the fee ling of helplessness created by the general ostra
cism of a l l co..tmists in Poland.
The three most iq>ortant groups to emerge after tho defeat of France and
the call to reestablish by the Comintem were the Union of Worker-Peasant
Cotmci ls (Zwiazek Rad Robotniczo- 0\lopskich) , The Association of Friends of
the USSR (Stowarzysienie Przyj aciol ZSRR) , and the "Bulletin Group" (Biuletynowcy) .
These groups a l l operated in the Warsaw area.
The Ge rman invasion of the Soviet Union in Jtme,
political isolation for the Polish Communists.
neither the German nor Soviet authori ties.

1941,

meant the end of

'nley would now be ignored by

The imediate result of the inva

sion was the early infil tration and elimination by the Gestapo of the Union
of Worker-Peasant Counci ls and the Association of Friends of the USSR.

The

Bulletin Group was the sole s urvi vor.
Most of the Polish Co1111Uni sts in the Soviet part of Poland retreated with
the Red Army before the Germans .
cia, including Gomulka.

Some. however, chose to remain in Eastern Gali

Four separate groups of Polish Co11111Un i sts existed in

the USSR after the GeT11an invasion :

Co11111Rmist1 and leftist intel lectual s . many

of whoM were enlisted into various propaganda agencies ; those Poles drafted
into the labor batallions and attached to the Soviet Army ; those drafted for
work in industry and agriculture ; and those assembled at the special Comintern
school in Pushkino.
Nowotko and Molojec.

AlllOng this l atter group were Paul Finder and Jakub Berman ,
At a meeting between the Polish group and Dimitrov , the

Secretary General of the Comintern, the latter announced to them that they were
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to form a new "initi ative group" which was to be the basis o f the new party.
Thei r immedi ate tuk wu to prepare a manifesto announcing the foraation of
the Polish CoJ111i
1Urt s t Party and its prograa.
This new party was to be known as the Polish Workers• Party (Polska
Partia Robotnicza, or PPR) and was to emphasize a broad anti-fascist front
with the working class playing the leading role.
On Decellber 27, 194 1 , the initi ative group was dropped in the vicinity
of Wars aw .

Yet not until the middle of 1942 wu the consoli dation of the val'i -

ous CoDlll\D'\i st groups accoq> lished.
Al1101t immediately after the Geraan invasion of the Soviet Union , Poland
not only made peace with the USSR on July 30 , 194 1 , but also concluded an
alli ance on DeceJllber 4 , 194 1 , and decided to effectively cooperate with the
...

Soviet Union.

This ,

of course , •ant that Polish so ldien and civi 11 llJl9 who

had suffered for nearly 2 years at the hands of the Russian Cormnunists would
now be fighting at their side.
The Polish-Soviet agreement annulled the Soviet-Geraan treaties of 1939
relating to Poland, restored mutual diploma�i c relati ons , and created a Polish
Army on the territory of the USSR.

A. Protocal called for the amesty of all

Polish citi zens deprived of their freedo• on Soviet soi l .

The text of the

agreement , which was si ped in the British Foreign Offi ce, is as follows :
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub lics recognizes
1.
that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 relative to territorial chU'ges
in Poland have lost their validity.
The Government of the Repub l i c of
Poland declare.s that Poland is not bo\md by any Agnement with any third
State directed against the USSR.
2.
Dipl omatic relations wi l l be restored between the two r,overnments
upon the s i gn ature of the Agree•nt and an exchange of ad>ass adors wi l l
follow immediately.
3.
The two Governments mutually undertake to render one another aid
and support of all kinds in the pTesent war against Hit lerl te Germany .
Th e Govem•nt o f the Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics expresses
4.
its consent to the formation on the territory of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Repub lics of a Polish Army under a commander appointed by the
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Govemment of the Repub lic of Poland, in agree•nt with the Govemment
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub l i cs .
The Polish A.rM'f on the Terri 
tory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub lics wi l l be subordinated in
operational 11atters to the Supreme Comand of the USSR on which there
All details as to coaand.
will be a representative of the Polish Army.
organization and eq>loy•nt of this force wi 1 1 be settled in a subsequent
Agreement .
In a Protocol it stated that :
The govem•nt
a111esty to all
freedom on the
other adequate

of the Union of Soviet Sodalist Republics wi 1 1 grant
Polish citi zens who are at present deprived of their
terri to
o f the USSR either as prisoners of war or on
grounds .

11

On August 1 2 , 1 9 4 1 , a decree by the PresidiUll of the Supreme Counci l of the
USSR granted this &111esty. 2

A few prisoners were released i111111ediately , such

as Sikorsti • s newly appointed Col8ander-in-Otief of the Polish Arrl/'f to be
formed in the USSR, others 110re slowly, and llOSt not at al l .

A note from Am-

bass ador Kot to Deputy Colllllssar Vyshinsky concerning the ineo111p lete fulfil lment
of Soviet obligations towards Polish citizens delivered on October 1 3 , 194 1 .
states in part that:
The eubusy is in possession of information that there are sti 1 1 in a
nUllbe r of prisons and cups thousands of Polish citizens who were not
informed of the Agreement concluded on July 30 , 194 1 , or were infonned
that the provisions o f this Agree•nt and of the Decree of the PresidiUll
of the Supn• Council of the USSR of August 12 did not apply to th••· 3
The note then listed nu•rous e�les of h1prisonaents within the USSR.

As

late u Decellber, 194 1 , similar notes were still being written. 4
In April, 1943, Polish-Soviet rel ations were strained to the breaking
point when the· GeT111n1 announced the discovery of mass graves in the forest of
Katyn near Saolensk.

The Germans clai•d that they were the bodies of 10 ,000

Polish officers aissing since 1939 and that the Soviets had 11&Ssacred them.

l ibid . ' Docu•nt 106, pp.141-142.
2

Ibid. , Document 1 1 0 , p . 145.

3

.!!?!.!· ,

4 Ibide

t

Documnt 129 ' p . 176.
Document 159' pp.232-233.
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The Polish Govern..nt in London i ...diately rett uested an investigation by the
Intematlonal Red Cro1 1 .

The Soviet Govel'ftMnt broke off relations with the

Polish Covem•nt in Bxile claimn1 that aovem•nt of "collusion with the
Hitler aovern..nt."

On

2 1 , 1943,

Apri l

the fol lowing secnt •••age was sent

by Prellier Stalin to President Roosevel t :
The Hitler authorities , havin1 perpetnted a 110111 trous crime against
the Polish officers , an now stagin1 a farcical investigation , using for
the purpote certain pro-fascist Polish ele•nts pi cked
the•elves in
occupied Poland, where everything is under Hitler's heel and where no
honest Pole can open hi• mouth .
Both the Sikorski and Hitler Governments have enlisted for the
' investi 1ation ' the aicl of the lntemational Red Cross , whi ch . under a
terror real• of gallows and wholesale extend.nation of the civi l popu
lation, is forced to take part in the investi1ation farce directed by
It is obvious that this ' lnvestiaation , ' which , 90reover , · is
Hltlero
beln1 carried out behind the Soviet r.ovemMnt•s back . cannot enjoy the
confidence of anyone with a sellblace of honesty.
The fact that the anti-Soviet cupalgn hu been started simultane
ously in the Gena and Polish press and fol10W9 identical lines 11
the
indubitable evidence of contact and collulon between Hitler

by

·-

Allies• enemy -- and the Sikorski Govern•nt in this hostile capal1n • •
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

For these reuons the Sovi t Govern•nt hu decided to interrupt
f
relations with that Govern•nt.
'11le President replied on Apri 1

26 , 1943,

o .

•

•

that :

I cannot believe that Sikorski bu in ay way whatsoever colla
In my opinion , however . he has ernd
borated with th• Hit ler 1anpters .
in takln1 up this particular question with the Intomational Red Cross .
Purthenon , I u inclined to think that Pri• Minister C\urch l l l wi l l
find a way of prevallin1 uron the Polish C'.ovem•nt i n London in the
future to act with more cmmon aense. 2
Meanwhile , on 25 Af'rl l Coaissar Molotov had presented a note to Avbassador
Ro.er 1everln1 relations between the Soviet and Polish aovem•nts .
Apri 1

26

3

On

Ro.er sent a note to �tolotov statina the reuons why the Pollsh govem

•nt refused to accept the Soviet note of April 25 severing relattons o 4
1stalln'• Correspondence with O\urchi l l Att lee, Roosevelt and Truaan ,
,
1941-1945 (LOndon : Lawrence and Wlshart ,
bOCU11ent Ao, p .60o

l9S8,,

2�. ,

Document

81, p.61.

ltnstytut Historyczny illienla Generala SikorskoiRo. Op� cit o , Document

c!lli· .

Document
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313.
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On

July 2 . 1952, the United States House C01111i ttee Report on the Katyn

Mus acre found uwaniaous ly" that "beyond any question of reasonable doubt
• • •

•

the Soviet NKVD (Peoples Comissariat of Internal Affairs) cOllllli tted the

mass murders of the Polish officers and intellectual leaders in the Katyn
Forest near S80lensk , Russia. " l
It is interesting to point out that Stalin stated that the ''Hitler
authorities

•

•

•

perpetrated a 11e>n1trous cri• against the Polish officers ."

This statement was ude to Roosevelt in 1943.

However, on Docemer 3, 194 1 ,

in a conversation held in the Kremlin between General Sikorski . GeneTal Anden ,
and Stalin, the following exchange took place regarding these sue officers :
Gen. S . : It is not up to us to supply the Sovlet Govem•nt with
accurate lists of names of our peop le ; however, conplete lists are in the
p011es1ion of the commanders of the ca11ps . I have with • a list con
taining the nues of approxiaately 4 ,ooo officers who were deported by
force and who pre1.ently sti 1 1 re111aln in the prisons and labor camps .
Even this list is not COllp lete , since it contains only nanes which we
were ab le to take froa •110ry. I ordered th at checks be 1111de whether
they are in Poland, with whom we have steady contact. It has been
proven that· not one of thea ls there, likewise as in our prisoner of
war cups in Ge rmany. These people are here. Not one of them has
returned.
Stalin : That is impossible, they have escaped.
Gen . Anders : Where then could they escape?
Stalin : Wel l , to Manchuria. 2 ·
The officers were either in Russian hands , as Sikorski stated, or in Manchuri a.
u Stalin sta.ted, but not in Genan hands .

Ulti111ately, of course, they were

at rest at Katyn . 3
With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Polish Govern
ment in London and the Soviet Union in January of 1942

•

the way wu clear for

lJedr1ejewicz, Op. cit. , p . 181 , quoting House Co.Uttee Report , July 2 t 1952.
2 tnstytut Historyczny hd.enia Generala Sikorskeigo , Op.cit . , Doc\Ulent 159 ,
pp.232-233.
3see also : Janusz K. Zawodny , Death in the Forest : The Story of the
Katyn Porest Massacre (University of Notre Dame Press, 1962).
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the recreation of a Polish Comamist Party .

The new party , newly designated

the Polish Workers ' Party , was now fo\D'\ded with Marcel i Nowotko u Secretary
General.

The party differed fJ'Oll its predecessor in the exclusion of the word

''Colllllli st" froa its title (the word "Comaunist" had by this the become thor
ough ly discredited) and in its strongly voi ced patrlotis• (the party e11phas i 1ed
the close relationship between the strug1les for national independence and against
socialist e xp loitation) .

lb-..l ka and other party leaders strongly concurred

in this attitude for reuons of convi ction md also in order to disarm the sus
picions held by uny Poles aaainst Co-.anisa.

By this means they were able to

extend the support for the party by identifying it with the 111ajor desire of the
people , the restoration of national independence.
In the sprin� of

1942,

the party established an ar11ed organization , the

People ' s Guard . and beaan to carry out lhdted acts of sabotage and terror
against the Geraan invaders .
During March of 19.. 3 the Union of Polish Patriots was formd in Moscow
with the Polish writer Wanda Wasilewska as chairaan .

In J\D'\e the Union held

a congress in Moscow which was to si gni fy Polish -Soviet unity and to strengthen
relations between the two nations .

'n\e progr.. of the Union called for liberal

reform in Poland after the war, acknowledged the territorial claim of the
Soviet Union in eastern Poland, and demanded as compensation new territories
in the west fro• Germany .
By this t i.. the Soviet government had begun to train Polish fighting
units to cooperate with the Red Army .

The Poles were recnd ted from those

who had been deported to the Soviet Union during the first few months of the
war.
Poles .

The units were led either by Soviet officers or by hand-picked pro-Sovi et
These units were grouped into the so-cal led Berling Anry named after

thei r commander General Zypunt Berling.

The first. foraation which went into
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action was called the Koscius zko Division after the Polish hero of the nati onal
uprising of 1794 .

This technique wu in line with the nae given the new Co11-

ll\Dlist Party, the Union of Polish Patriots.

The Co..unists were p l aying with

the nationalistic senti•nts of the Polish people.
A list of important post-War Conn.mist Party leaders who were associated
with the Union of Polish Patriots and the Berling Antf includes :

Jakub Beraan ,

Hilary Mine, Stanislaw Radkiewi cz , Edward Ochab, Aleksander Zawadzki , Roman
Zubrowski , and Stefan Pedrychowsld .

His codts observes that :

The first two secretaries- general of the PPR, Nowotko and Pinder, who
were parachuted into Poland to work for the Party, were also Moscow
trained, as was Boles l aw Bierut who, in 1943, wu sent to supervise the
pro-Soviet organi zation in Poland,
They and their colleagues who accoa
panied and followed them, were thoroughly indoctrinated in the Soviet
point of view and thereafter normally looked to Moscow for orders .
They
therefore c&M to be known u "aas covi tes , " though many of them pri ately
resented the treatment they had received while in the Soviet Union .

y

Occupying a contrasting pole were the so-called ''natives" or patriots who
spent the whole of the war in Poland and had never been to the Soviet Union.
These included Gomulka and his best-known col leagues Zenon Kliszko, Marian
Spychalski , and Wladys lef Bienkowsk i .

I n 1939 Go111 lka and his colleagues had

sent a note to Moscow fro1t the Soviet-occupied area of Poland asking whether
they llight not join the Polish national resistance against the Nazi invaders .
This gesture was seen by Moscow u being clearly premature .

From this period

on Gomlka and his group reaained out of favor with Mos cow.

With the outbreak

of hostilities between Genany and the Soviet Union , the group had retumed to
German occupied Poland.

Here they took part in the undergro\Dld activities of

the Comunist movement .

The "natives" were JRUch less popular with the Soviet

authorities than the "auscovites . "
upon the•

Moscow realized that they could not rely

as they could the "11U1covites , " but they neverthe less appreci ated

lHtscodcs ,

Op.cit . ,

p . 83 .
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their usefulness .
In November of 1942 Nowotko was shot , and a year later his successor,
Paul Finder, was captured by the Gestapo.

At this time Comulk a , a strong

Polish patriot in contrast to the Soviet trained Nowotko and Finder, assumed
the post of Secretary-General of the party.

Gomulka was appointed at a time

when co111111m i cations between the Party Central Cammi ttee and Moscow h ad evidently
broken down thus leaving GoJ11Ul ka' s coJDrades free to choose their

own

secretary.

The party now clearly stressed national independence as one of its main objectives .
On July 4 , 1943, General Sikorski wu k i l led in an airp lane accident over
Gibralter.

Stanislaw Mikolaj czyk , Vice-Premier in Sikorski ' s Cabinet and Speaker

of the Polish Parliuent in E xi l e , was appointed Pri• Minister after his name
had been chosen for that post by the Polish underground leaden in Poland.
eral Sosnkowski replaced Sikorski as Comaander-in-Otief.

Gen-

O\urchi 11 said, on

Mikolaj c1yk 1 s first official visit to him, that :
I w i l l fight for the freedom of Poland. I w i l l fight for a strong
and independent Poland , and I ' l l never cease fi ghting for i t .
We ' l l have •any troti>les with them (Russia) , believe me . But also
believe me when I say that I ' ll always be on your side. 1
At the Tehran Conference on OeceJllb er 1 5 , 1943, Stalin had a�ain stated
his policies in regard to Poland.

He says that :

The Soviet Govern•ent considers the Polish GovernJnent-in-exile to
be agents of Hitler and charges its representatives inside Poland of
murdering partisans engaged in fighting the Nazi s . Before the Soviet Gov
ernment would consider reestab lishment of relations with the Polish
Government-in-exile it must order its agents in Poland to cease fighting
the partisans and must utilize its troops and call on the Polish people
to fight actively against Nazi Germany . The Soviet Government , provided
it is given the northern part of East Prussia including Konigsberg and
Ti lsit, is willing to accept the Curzon Line , thereby returning to Poland
those areas primari ly inhabited by Poles. Although the clty of Lwow is
admittedly aore than half Poles , it is in the centre of a definitely
lstanis l aw Mikolaj czyk , The Rape of Poland:
(New York � Whittlesey Hous e , 1948), p .41 .
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Ukrainian area and could not be returned to Poland for that reason.

Tho Soviet Government is prepared to help Poland achieve a western
frontier along the Oder River. I

On January 1 , 1944, the Soviet radi o announced that meni>ers of the PPR
had met in Warsaw and set up a National Counci l with Boles law Bierut as chair
man of its Presidium.

The object of this Co1111!lun ist move was to set up a pro

Soviet ''representative body" which could claim poll ti cal authority as the Red
Artry "liberated" the Polish state.

However. the Counci 1 was not "representa

tive" as the Comunist controlled Presidi t.111 decided what orp,anizations could
nominate representatives and h ow aany they could nominate.
of course, possib le.

No e lections were,

The Council was to act as a legislative body until a

parliament could be delllocrati cal ly e lec·ted.
Government had just decided to set

up their

At this same tiae the London
own

Comc i l o f National Unity on

Polish soil thus providing another cogent reason for the Co111111Uni st •ction .
'Mle National Hoae Counci l . in its declaration of appointment , sent its greetings
to al l allied states :
The National Home Council as the sole democrati c representative and
expression of the wi l l of the Polish Nation sends to al l leading organs

of the Allied States and Nations the assurance of its resolution to
mobilize all the forces of the nation in order to intensify the struggle
which should accelerate the co..on victory over the s avage Hitlerite
hords . 2
The Lublin Committee , as the Co1.Ul d l was later to be called, was not yet officially recognized by the Soviet Government .
By January 1 1 , 1944, �foscow had reinterated 1 ts declaration on the que!
tion of the Polish-Soviet frontier 81\d had again stated that the Polish Government in exile was "incapable of establ ishing friendly relations with the Soviet
union," a prerequisite to the interests of both nations .
1
p. 105.

Instytut Historyczny iftd.enia 09nerala Sikorskeigo,

2 Ibi d. ,

Appendix No.

2,

p . 644.

Furthermore , "the

Op. cit . ,

Document 64 ,
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emigre Polish GovemMnt" is nisolated froa its people" and "has proved incapable of organizing an active struggle against the German invaden in Poland
itself . " 1
The ColDlci 1 of National tkli ty and the De legate P lenipotentiary in Poland
answered the Soviet statements by asserting on January i s 2 that "the only lawful and legitimate representative of the interests of the Polish nation is the
Polish Government in London

•

•

•

•

"

The ColDlci 1 declared that a l l classes , ci rel es ,

political parties and aroups had rallied mder their banner "with the only excep
tion of insignifi cant groups sponsored by the Soviets /' and that the Polish
people, fighting the I I I Reich while the Soviets had been in their alliance,
would not "consent to be used as a tool for the plans advanced by the Soviets
who, again , strive for a new partition of Poland and aim at imposing Communist
regime on Poland . "

The provinces of Poland in the ea5t which the Soviet Union

now wishes to dominate are the same which she had doainated through agreement
and cooperati on with Genaany and which she fonally disavowed in the PolishSoviet a l l i an ce of July 30 , 1941 .

''The Polish nation

•

•

•

wi 1 1 never agree

to new annexation of any part of Poland . tt
The National Council on 25 January drafted a resolution to accept the
Soviet proposals relating to the estab liih•nt of a new frontier between Po land
and that state.

The resolution was quite in order with the Soviet demands and

reads in part :
The declaration of the Government of the USSR proposing the settle11ent
of the Polish-Ukrainian-Byelorussian borden by an agreement with Poland
is accepted by the National Home Counci l in the name of the Polish nation
as the basis of a settlement of the question of the frontien between the
nations concemed. 3

l tbi d . , Docwnent 74, pp . 1 33-134.
2Ibi d . , Document 78, p . 139.

3!lli· ,

Appendix No.
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p . 645.
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On

15 February 1944 the Polish Government formally rejected the Soviet

demands regarding the Polish frontiers and changes in the composition of the
Polish Government :
The Polish Govern•nt is \Dl ab le to accept the demand pressed by
the USSR that they should agree to the Curzon Line as the future Polish
Soviet boWldary .
Personal changes in the composition of the Polish Governll8nt and
the Supreme eo-and of the Polish A1'118d Forces cannot be made dependent
on the deaands of a foreign State. l
On February 16 , 1944, Stalin, in a note to Roosevel t , again demanded a
"radical improvement in the coaposition of the Polish Government • • • • "2
By February 2 2 , 1944, Cll urchi 1 1 and the British Government had made a
complete reversal in their collllitmonts to the Polish Govem111en t-ln-Exile
which had been outlined most recent ly in O\urchi l l ' s talk with Mikolaj czyk .
Speaking before the House of Co111M>ns , Olurchi 1 1 declared his sy111p athy to the
Polish cause and his backing of the Russians :
Russia has the right to reusurance against future attacks from the
Wes t , and we are going all the way with her to see that she gets i t ,
not only by the miaht of her arms but by the approval and assent of the
l.H .

The liberation . of Poland 11ay presently be achieved by the Russian
armies , after these armies have suffered millions of casual ties in
breakin& the German •ilitary machine. I cannot feel that the Russian
demand for reasurrance about her western frontiers goes beyond the limits
of what is reasonable or just. Marshal Stalin and I also agreed upon
the need for Poland to obtain conpensation at the expense of Gemany
both in the north and in the west . 3
This statement is in direct contradiction with a statement •ade by Church i l l
i n the House of CoJ111n
10 s on the non-recognition o f any teTritorial changes effected during the war on Septeni>er

S,

1940:

l lbid. , Document 100, p . 176.
2 tbid. , Document 104 , p . 188.
3Poland, Official Government DoCUllents , Vol LVI , Document 62 , P . 32 1 ,
quoted in Edward J . Rozek,
.Cit . , p .206 .
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We do not propose to recognite any tet'Titorial changes which take
place during the war, unless they t ake place with the free consent
and goodwil l of the parties concerned. l
A note sent by Mr. Eden to Minister Zaleski on July 1 8 , 194 1 , reinterates the
British resolve not to recognize territorial changes during the war:
On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet Agreeaent of
today 's date , I desire to take the opportunity of infonain g you that,
in conformity with the provisions of the Anglo-Polish Agreement of August
25th, 1939 , His Majesty ' s Government in the United Kingdon have entered
into no undertakings towards the USSR which affect the relations between
that cotmtry and Poland. I also desire to usure you that, as has been
publicly stated by the Prime Minister, His Majesty ' s Govern11ent do not
propose to recoRJlize any tet'Titorial changes which take place during the
war unless they take place with the free consent and good wi 1 1 of the
parties concerned. 2
Hitler iJ11111e diately began using Oturchill ' s February speech over the Ceman
radio to urge the Polish Anay on the Italian front to stop fi ghting:
land has been delivered into Stalin 's hands by Churchi l l

•

•

•

•

"Your

you have no place

to which to return when the war is done . "3 Hitler was correct in stating that
the Polish Ar7lff would not be safe within its
ties had ordered the demise of the Hom Arrq.

own

homeland.

The Soviet authori

In a letter to Eden and the US

Charge d' Affaires , Mikolaj czyk coq>lains that he had received a telegram from
the Commander of the Polish Underground Army which informed him that an order
from Moscow to the Soviet partisans operating in Eastern Poland had fallen into
his hands.

This order is as fol lows :

On the instructions of Comrade Nozenko , all partisans are ordered
to disarm Polish detach..nts. 'nlo1e resisting are to be shot on the
spot. Al l Polish underground organizations are to be exterminated and
their leaders executed. �

The co-ander then relates

p.97.

an

incident in which the above orders were carried out.

l tnstytut Historyczny illienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Op. cit. , Document 79,
2�. , Document 10 2 , pp . 138- 1 39 .
3stanislaw Mikolajczyk , Op.cit. , p.ss.

p. 143.

41nstytut Historyczny illienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Op.cit. , DocWll8nt 8 1 ,
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In March of the , .. year, Stalin �and the Polish eaten govem•nt
wlth th• isolated Yuaoalav Royal Govem•nt. l

On Jm1uary 4 , 1944, Soviet troop� crossed th• pre-War Polish-Soviet fron
tier and in July crossed

�·

Curzon Line (the Soviet recognised eastern boundary)

and i1111ediately raised the question of political authority in the liberated terri 
tory.
Radio Mo•cow

an

July 2 2 , 1944, announced that the Polish COllld ttee of

National Liberation had bHn foJ'118d in Chel• the day before.
tive body aoved to Lublin a few d8)'s
Comd.ttee . 2

This new execu

later and hence becu. known u the Lmlin

11le Co-1ttee was C0111p01ed of •lli>en from the IMlion of Polish

Patriots , the National Counci l , and left-wina groups fro• other parties who were
'nle Lublin Collmittee did not

prepared to collaborate with the Co...,i 1t1.
resellble the L"*>lin Govern•nt of 1 9 1 8 , tho

fint revolutionary govomment of

free Poland of course now used for ratriotic reuon1 , but the Bialystok Com111. ttee of 1920, which the Red ATfllf had set up under Ddenhinski when Tuhachevskl
wu sweeping into Polando

'lbe COllalttee vu to function u a pTOvisional cahi

net , asswdng the aanage..nt of the nation ' s affairs until the Polish State could
be formally reestablished.
That sue day the National Ho• Council decreed that the Lublin Comi ttee
would be the sole Polish representative body and that supre• comund of all
Polish fightin1 units were now in its hands .

3

A day after the Lablin Co1111i ttee

had been set up , the followln1 note was sent by Stalin to C\urchi l l :
Wo find ourselves confronted with the practical prob le� of adminis tra
tion of Polish terri tory. We do not vant to, nor shall we , set up our

�

lstalin ' s Co
rres ondence with Olurchi l l, Attlee, R�osevelt and Tru•an p
3.
1941-1945, Op. cit. , p. 1
2see Annex , Docu•nt No. 2 for the decree of the National Hom& Counci 1 ,
July 2 1 , 1944, appointing the Polish Collllli ttee of National Llberationo
3

1n1tytut Histcnyczny ildenla General• Sikorskelgo, 2J!.cit . , Appendix
No. 6 , p . 650.
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own adllinistration on Polish soil � for we do not wish to interfere in
Poland's internal affairs . That is for the Poles themelves to do.
We have therefore, seen fit to get in touch with the Polish Coamittee
of National Liberation , recently set up by the National Counci 1 of
Poland, which wu fomed in Warsaw at the end of last yea!', and con
1
sisting of representatives of democratic parties and groups
• • • •

These so-called representatives of democratic parties and groups had, for
the most part , been hand picked and trained in Stalin's

own

school.

A memo

randUJ12 was handed by Mi'kola) C&yk to Oturchi l l on 24 July conceming the setting
up of the Polish COlllllli ttee of National Liberation in Chelm and its ul th1ato
purposes, stressing the nature of Soviet involvement , the unrepresentative co•position of the Comttee , and the Co•ittee's attacks on the London govemment
which wu declared to be a !'self-styled authority , bued on the illegal fucist
Constitution of April , 1935 . " The •110randU11 goes on to say that the declaretion by the Colllllli.ttee that the London govemaent is "il legal" gives rise to
the fear that the Ho• Army , who have fo�'1t the armies of Hi tier for S years
thereby aiding the war effort of the United Nations , wi 11 be bTolcen up and per
secuted .

The Committee announces that it intends to put into force its

own

political , econolli c, and social programme in the territo:ry occupied by Soviet
forces , includillg reformation of the courts of justice and the citizens ' mi litia,
and the formation of their own local administrative conmittees .

The me110randum

ends by asserting that:
Al 1 this is happening contra:ry to the repeated assurances of Marshal
Stalin that he desires tho restoration of an independent Poland. Such
moves , enacted on the territo:ry of Poland, especially if the announced
intentions of the Polish Collllli ttee for National Liberation should be
realized, constitute an attempt against the independence of Poland. 3

�

lstalin 's Corres ondence with Olurchi l l, Attlee, Roosevelt and Tnanan ,
1941-1945 , QP.clt . , p . 42.
21nstytut Histo:ryczny imienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Op.cit . , Document
pp.293-295.
l tbid.
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On July 24 the offi ci al protest of the Polish Govem•nt in London .against
the setting up of the Polish Comittee of National Liberation wu issued. I
General Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin wu appointed the Soviet Pleni
potentiary to the Co-1.ttee in Lublin.

On July 26, 1944 , Osoblta-Marawski

signed an agreement with the Soviet Govemment in Moscow by which the Soviet
Union recogni zed the Lublin Conaittee.

The Soviet Co1111a
1 nder-in-Chief was

given wide powers on Polish territory so long as mi litary operations continued.
That same day Molotov stated that :
1he Soviet Govern11ent does not intend , to establish its own adainistrative
bodies in the territory o f Poland, considering this to be the affair of
the Polish peop le.
It has decided in view of this to conclude with the
Polish Colllld ttee of National Liberation an Agreement on relations between
the Soviet Co!lllan
l d and the Polish Administrat i on .
Th e Soviet Government s t ates that i t does not pursue the aia o f
acquiring any part of Polish territory o r of chan1ing the social order
in Poland, • • , 2
The London Gove rnment again protested but to no avai l .

As the Soviet

Army drove the Germans to the wes t , the Comaunist controlled Lublin Colllli ttee
and National Home Counci l , the only two Polish authori ties recogni zed by the
Soviet Govemment , fi lled the politi cal vacuwn.
On 31 July Mikolaj czyk arrived in Moscow at Stalin's invitationo

He

was received by Molotov and curtly told that he should see the Lublin representatives as Stalin was bU5y.

Mikolaj czyk declined saying these representatives

should not be excluded from the talks but that he preferred to see Stalin firs t .
Wh i l e he waited the Warsaw rising began on August 1 .
The Polish Local Home Arsy commander had been told by the London authori ties to aive assistance to the Soviet

Anry in its advance across Poland.

It

often happened, however, that such assistance ended in Soviet forces disaning
the Polish underground troops and giving them two alternatives , j oin the Herling
ltbld . , Document 165, p . 296.
2 1bid . , DoCW11ent 170. p . 30 1 .
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Arur:t , or be iq>risoned (1181\y officers were shot) .

In September the London

Govemment estimated that 2 1 ,000 Mn had been arrested in this way (the worst
example of Soviet duplicity , however, w as to occur in connection with the
Warsaw rising) .

On Augus t 3 , prior to seeing Stalin , Mikolajczyk received

the f�l lowing telegram froa his deputy in London :
'nle latest reports from Poland describe the attitude to our �dergro\D'id
Anti/ as fol lows :
Everything east of the Curzon Line and the river S an is treated as
1.
an organic part of the �SR.
Our units of the Underground Arrtrf located
in these areas are faced with two alternatives :
(1)
co.., lete disaTnd.ng,
(2)

inclusion into the Berling Array . I

'nle Soviet authori ties , throughout the war, had accused the Home Anq,
which was loyal to the Govem•nt-in-E xi l e , of fai lure to resist the Nazis. 2

On July 29 and

30 ,

1944, the Moscow radio station JCosci us zko broadcast an

appeal to· Wars• to rise in _ arm against the Nazi s . 3
forces of the Ho• Arfl/ rose against the Nazi s .

On Aupt 2 , 1944,

the

The decision was made on an

estimation of the Soviet-German front,. the abi lity of the Genans to quell such
an uprising, and the positive te1111per of the people of the city.
A few days after the

Hom

Arm'f rose in revolt in Wars aw , the Red Artflf

ceued military operations on the outskirts of the city.

On August

S

a dispatch

froa the delegate of the Govemaent and the O\airun of the Counci l of National
Unity was sent to Mikolaj czyk infond.n1t him o f the cessation of military opera
tions by Soviet troops on the Warsaw front . 4

Mikolajczyk immedi ately sent a

letter to Stalin requesting assistance for the people of �ars aw .

On August

16

Stalin sent a telegram to Mikolaj czyk refusing any assistance , remarking that :

16

..

lPoland, Official Govemment Documents , Telegram No. C , Vol.
quoted in Rozek, op. cit . .. pp .236-237.

VII •

Document

2see Moscow Declaration of January 1 1 , 1944, above .
lfor the text of the appeal see Andrzej Pond.an .. The Warsaw Rising (London �
1943) , p. v i i .

p . 324e

4 1nstytut Histot')'czny imienia Generala Sikorskeigo, Op.cit . , Document 184 0
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11 d's
'lbw Warsaw action, which had been started without the Soviet Co1111an
knowledge and without any contact with i t , is a reckless adventure causing
use less victi• uong the inhabitants • • • •
In view of the foregoing the Soviet Co11JD&nd decided openly to dis
claia any responsibility for �e Warsaw adventure because it wst not
and cannot assUM responsibility for the Warsaw affairo 1
Of course Stalin ' s telegram is in direct contrast with the continuous broadcasts
issued from Moscow calling on the population of Poland to drop all caution and
to start a general rising against the Geraans.

The broadcasts of 29 and 30

July had exhorted the population of Warsaw to rise iD111ediately u "the hour
of action bu already arrived . "

On the 20th of August Roosevelt and Churchi l l

demanded that Stalin assist i n the Home Army ' s struggles in Warsaw.

On 22 August

Stalin refused, sayina that :
Sooner or later the truth about the handful of powerseeldng criminals
vho lamched the Warsaw adventure wi l l out. Those elements , playing
on the credulity of the inhabitants of Wars aw , exposed practically
unarme d people to Geraan guns , anour and airCTaft. The result is a situ
ation in which evety day is used, not by the Poles for freeing Wars aw ,
2
but by the Hit lerites, who are crue l ly ex�ndnating the civil population.
Meanwhile, the Soviet authorities continued their liquidation of the units
of the Ho• Arsy and organs of the Polish adllinistratlon who had come· out of
hiding.

A note fro11 Cot.mt Raczynski to Mr. Bden on August 24 gives the follow

ing examples :
15 . 3. 1944 Volhynia: Soviets have disarmed our outpost in Pr1ebra1e .
12 ka. north-eut of Kiwerce . Part of the aen were arrested. Others
were shot. On the 9th of March in Rozys &cu the Coaander of the HoM
Arwy Unit and 3 •n were shot, 20 were arrested and taken to Luck where
several were h1nged.
19. 7 . 1944 After a friendly meeting on 15 . 7. between the Connander of
the Wilno region of the Polish Home Arwt and General O\emyakhovsky
Soviet Co•ander of the White Russian front, the Soviet authroities acting
tmder fal1e pretences arrested the 17 Jtme Polish Ho• Army's staffs of
the regions of Wi lno and Nowogrodek .
1 1bid. , Document 198, pp. 346-347.
2 tbid. , Document 205 , p . 356.
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1 2 . 8. 1944. All throughout the country arrests and disandng of the
Home Arsy soldiers by the Soviets under false pretences
Arrests cover
the districts of Wilno , Lwow, Lublin, Nowogrof8k ad Biala Polluka.
60 officers were arrested in Lwow on July 31.
e
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the sue day the Polish Comd.ttee of National Liberation issued a
.

decree , aimed at the Ho• Anly , dissolving all secret military oraanizations
on the territory liberated fro• the Geraans .

The decree was siped by Bierut ,

Osabka-Morawski , ad General Rola-Zymierski. 2
On

the l.tth of October, Mikolajczyk·, analydng the situation which con ..

fronted the Polish Govemment in London, stated that "the Polish Govemment is
eipected to cOllli t suicide of its

own

volition . " 3 The Tehran decisions changing

Poland ' s. eutem frontier were taken "without the knowledge and consultation
of the Polish Govem•nt . " The Soviet govem•nt has brought into being the
Polish Coard ttee of National 1,ib•ration which
Polish Govem•nt.
of lesalization.

is

a "de facto" rival of the

The prerogatives taken by this Comdttee require so• font
It ls thus expected that the legiti•ate Polish Govem111ent

should fuse with th• rival Polish Govemment created by the Soviets .

Of course,

this would mean the legalization of the"Soviet Govem•nt •s \mi lateral decision
of investina Soviet agents with powers of a Polish Govem•nt," the approval
of the •faits acco11plis" created by the Soviet Govem•nt , the ratification of
0a11 activities of the Comdttee in Poland, including arrests and deportations , "
and "the loss o f Poland's eastern provinces" a d "the efface•nt o f independence
in the reaainder of Polad . "
On

2 7 Deceld>er 1944 in a note to Roosevelt , Stalin again voiced his praises

of the Polish National Collld.ttee clailling that the Conmittee 's policies and
l�. , Document 207, pp. 357-358.
2 tbid. , Appendix No. 9 , p.654.
3 tbid . , Docwaent 238,
-

pp • .tlS-416.
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achievements had "led to" the "consolidation of democrati c powers of Poland
and to powerful strengthening of authority of the National Comi ttee among
the wide 11U1es in Poland and amng wide social Polish circles abroad. 11 1

On

31 December the National Ho• Council sitting in Moscow, believing the capture

of Warsaw to be i-anent, transfol'llOd its Polish Colllli ttee of National Libera
tion sitting in Lublin into the Provisional Govem•nt of Poland.

The new

provisional govem•nt was dolli.nated by the Workers ' Party which had been
formed by the Coudntem during the winter of 1941-1942.

Those be longing to

other parties in the new govem•nt came fro• left-wing groups which were pre
pared to col laborate with the Co1111nists.
11J

It consisted offi cially of five 111ed:>ers

of the Socialist and Peasant Parties , four aenbers froa the Workers ' Party , two
meabers

from

the Democrat Party , and one ''non-party" anty general .

of the govemment included the followina:

The offi cials

Bierut (Chairman of the Conmd.ttee of

National Unity) , te�orary President o f liberated Poland; Osobka-Morawski (Head
of the National Liberation Colllli ttee) Preaier and Foreign Minister; Wladyslaw
Go11Ulka (Secretary General of the Polish Workers ' Party) First Deputy Prime Minis
ter; Stanislaw Janusz (Vice-Olai rman of the Peesant Party) Second Deputy Prime
Minister; General Rola-Zyaierski , Minister of National Defense and Commander-in
Otief; Jozef Maslanka (leader of the Peasant Party) Minister for Home Affai rs ;
Stanislaw Radkiewicz (Workers ' Party) Minister of Public Security; Konstanty
Kollbrowski (Socialist Party) Minister of Finance ; Ednmd Zalewski , Minister of
Justice; Edward Bertold (Peasant Party) Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian
Reform; Wiktor Trojanowski (Socialist Party) Minis ter o f Public Works ; Stefan
Matuszewski (Secretary General of the Socialist Party) Minister of In foraation.
Moscow had already given the National Liberation CoJllllli ttee de facto

l Robert v . Danie ls ,

Op. ci t . ,

p . 1 36 .
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authority in the liberated areas of Poland, and now Stalin recognized the new
Provisional Government (5 Jan 45) .

The United States and Great Britain' con-

tinued to recognize the London Govern11ent.

Theoreti cally Poland now had two

governments , one sitting in London and one in Lublin.
On January

6,

1945, the Polish Govem•nt in London issued a protest

declaring that :
'nle official recognition by the l5SR of a Soviet-sponsored Provisional
Government in Lublin constitutes a direct violation of the fundamental
right of the Polish nation to possess a genuinely independent State.
free from foreign intervention, and an infringement of the untramelled
right of the Polish people to organize their intemal existence as they
see fit. l
On January 1 7, 1945, the Soviet !ort!tf captured Warsaw and . two days later ,
the new Provisional Govem11ent J10ved froJll l,ublin to Warsaw thus acquiring the
prestige attached to the capital city.
In February Roosevelt , Churchi l l , and Stalin met at Yalta.
on Poland were held while the military situation favored Stalin.

Negotiations
His armies

had occupied mos t of the territory to be discussed at the conference and were
rapidly moving forward , while the allies had been halted by a German offensive
in the west.

Churchi l l and Roosevelt were also in a compromising mood as they

desired to have Stalin join the war against J apan.

Stalin. on the other hand.

was now standing firm on all issues of vital t._.,ortance to the Soviet Union. 2

At

'Teheran RoOS'evelt and Churchi l l had implicitly agreed to Stalin ' s

setting of the eastern frontier of Poland at the Curzon Line.

By conceding

this , they had hoped to ensure Polish freedom to elect the government of their
choice.

However, Stalin was to win a major victory.

The Western powers were

11nstytut Historyc&ny ildenia Generala Sikorskeigo,

Op. cit . ,

poct.Unent 294.

2eyrtl Black writes that the "chief concern of the American and British
statesmen regarding Eastern Europe wa.s to negotiate a compromise which would
acknowledge the basic Russian security requirell9nts without formally recognising
a Russian sphere of influence. James F. Byrnes later expressed it this way :
' I t was not a question o f what we would let the Russians do , but what we could
get the Russians to do. "' from "Soviet Policy in E a.s tern Europe , " Annals of the
American Academy of Political Science , CCLXI I I � p . lSSo
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prepared to recognize the claims of both the London and the Provisional fD\'ernment of National Unity as long
Government was guaranteed.

85

a free e l e ction of a new and derocrat i c Polish

These demands , however, df!generated into an accep-

tanceof the existing provisional government "recognized on a hroader democratic
basis with the inclusion of de•ocrati c leaders
Poles abroad. 1 1 1

from Poland itself and from

This new provisional govern•nt was to hold, "as soon as pos-

s i b l e , " 0free and unfettered e lections" on the basis of "uni venal suffrage and
se cret ballot" in which .,all de11ocrati c and an ti-Nazi parties should h ave the
right to participate .11 2 Of course the London Government played no part in these
negotiations .and no role was assigned to i t in the formation of this reorganization of the provisional government into one "more broadly based . "
On February

7,

1945 , Molotov proposed to the conference in regards to

Poland that the "Eastern frontier of Poland" with minor digressions should be
the "line of Curzon , " that "some democratic leaders from Polish emigre circles"
should be added to the Provisional Polish Government . that the said government ,
so enl arged , "should · as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the
polls for organization by· general voting of per11anent organs of the Polish
Governmen t . ' ' anJ that Molotov. Harriman , and Kerr. "should be entrusted with
the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government • • • •

01

After a meeting of these minis ters a cOlmlUJ\ique was drafted and agreed upon by
all present and issued on FebruaTy 1 1 , 1945 , in whi ch the demands mentioned above
were initiated. 4

The means employed at the confeirence were in keeping with those

1 1nstytut His toryczny iaienia Generala Sikorskeigo,
pp.5 20-5 2 1 .

gp. ci t . ,

Document 308,

2Philip E . Mosely very aptly documents the Soviet definition o f democracy
in "Across the Green Tab l e From Stalin ," Curren t History (1948) Vol XV, p . 1 3 1 :
"It was Mr. Vyshinsky , however, who presented the classic Soviet syl logism on
'Tilat party , ' he said on one occasion , ' i s most
the definition of ' democracy . '
democratic which fights most strongly against Fascism; the Co1JIJl1UTl i st party is
the most Wl Compromising opponent <? f Fas cism; therefore it is the most demo cratic
party . '
At Yalta and Potsdam Marshal Stalin showed no mislDlderstanding of such
terms as ' free elections ' and ' representative government '
to use them in the Western sense .

and was quite w i l ling

3
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outlined by Litvinov to Hopkins in March , 1943, when discus�ing the future of
Poland and its post-War frontiers.

Litvinov 11fe 1 t that Great Britain and the

United States should decide what was to be done about Poland and 'tell them'
rather than ask them. 115
On February 13, 1945, the Polish Government in Exile deno'Wlced the resolutions adopted by the Big Three at the Crimea Conference :
The intention of the Three Powers to create a 'Provisional Polish Govern
ment of National Unity' by enlarging the foreign appointed Lublin Committee
with persona vaguely described as ' democrati c leaders fro� Poland itself
and Poles abroad' can only legalize Soviet interference in Polish internal
affain . As long as the territory of Poland w i l l re111ain under the sole
occupation of Soviet troops . a Government of that kind w i l l not safeguard
the Polish nation even in the presence of the Bri thh and American diplo
Jnats the \D'lfettered right of free expression. 6
·

Rooseve lt and Church i l l saw the Yalta agreement

as

the best possible settle-

ment whi ch , when executed, would mean Poland' s freedom and independence .

Moscow

interpreted the settlement to mean that the creation of the new Government would
Soviet attacks upon 'political democracy • or 'nU111erical democracy ' becatne collU!lon
place only at a later time, when the Western Powen persisted in reminding the
Soviet govemment of the specific prOllises aade at Yalta."
31nstytut Hi1toryc1ny illienia General& Sikorskei go, 0p.cit . , Document
.
pp .518-519.
4�

• •

306,

DocU111ent 308, pp.521-522.

S Robert E. Sherwood , Roosevelt and Ho kins ;
(New York .
1948) , p . 71 3 . It is interest ng to note
at nne ate y o ow ng t e Yalta
conference the three powers issued a "Declaration on Liberated Europe'' which
ended by declaring that "By this declaration we reaffirm our fai th in the prin
ciples of the Atlantic Charter, our p ledge in the declaration by the United
Nations , and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving
nations world order tmder l aw , dedicated to peace , security, freedom and general
well-being of all mankind. " in U. s . Department of State , Foreign Relations . The
Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: U. S . Government Printing �
Office , 1955) , pp .977-978.
p. 521.

61n1tytut Historyczny imienia Generala SiJcorskeigo, Op.cit

• •

Document 309 ,
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b e only a slight expansion o f the Lublin C'..ovemmento

This is quite evident in

a letter from Stalin to Roosevelt in which Stalin censures the activity of the
Anglo-American representatives in the co..ission for Polish Affairs and states
that the reorganization of the Provisional Polish Govemmnt should be reduced
to the addition of only a very few new 11embers :

"As to the ratio of old and

new Ministers in the Government of National Unity , it Id ght be established
more or less on the saae lines as was done in the case of the Yugos lav Govem
ment. 111

The precedent Stalin 111entions is the Yalta compromse between Marshal

Tito and Premer Subasic which set the proportion of strength in the Yugoslav
Govemment as 25

:

3 in favor of the Co•unists .

On January 19 , 1945 , the co1111ander of the Hoae Anrtf had ordered that

that organization dissolve itself because of the hostile attitude of Soviet
authorities towards undergro\D1d Poland.

In a telegru fJ'Oll Premier Arcis zewski

to Cllurchil l the fomer appealed for intervention in favor of the persecuted
soldiers and 11tnllbers of the Polish underground . 2

On March 8 , 1945 , Church! 1 1

received a letter fraai Premier Arciszewski giving evidence o f the Soviet tac
tics used in Poland.

The following are only a few :

January 22, 1945 , Cracow Province : • • • The Couand of Berling' s army is
strictly controlled by the NlVD. According to a state•nt 11ade by one
of Berling's officers , about 70 percent of the soldiers are in favour
of the Government in London .
February 1 , 1945 , Cracow Province : The Soviet •i li tary authorities take
no accolmt of the Lublin ColllJlli ttee and act independently. The Lublin
ColUd.ttee s l avishly comply with all their demands . A visa from the Soviet
ubusador and the pet'lli ssion of the People's Coaissariat of Foreign
Affairs is necessary in order to travel to Lwow, • • •
February 1 4 , 1945 , Wars• Province: Public security is lmder the direction
of Radkiewicz , who ls dependent on the NKVD and not on the Lub lin Comittee.
The ld.litia in the vi l lages is similarly situated. The Polish Workers '
Party is· controlled by the NKVD and used for political investi gations • • • •
l tbid. , Document 335 , p . 5 6 1 ,
2 tbid . , Docu•nt 304 , pp .516-517,
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Februaiy 20. 1945. Radom Di.,trict: The NKVO is taking 1ystematic steps
to dis�over the whole organization of the Ho11e Arst/ and to arrest its
meJtb"n o ,, • ,,
March 1 , 1945. Bialystok Provi"�� : • • • nie NKVD often •work ' in the uni·
form of Polish officers� Spies and collaborators with the Gestapo were
at first arn1ted by the NKVD-- later. however, they were set fne and
the NKVD employed thea as their own sples • • � . 1
.

On March 10 the delegate of the London Government in Warsaw sent a dia.,
patch to Premier Arciszewski concemlng the arrests of important Polish political
leaders. 2
By

the first of Apri l , Stalin ' s treat•nt of the Yalta ncomendations
In a letter from Olurchil 1

had become well known by the British Govem11ent.
to Stalin the fo1'1Der states that:

We also have learned with �urprise and reRret that M. Molotov's
spontaneous offer to allow obaorven or llisaions to enter Poland has
now been wl thdrawn o We are therefore deprived of all •ans of' checking
for ourselves the lnfonation , often of a •ott aplnful charactei-, which
is sent us almost dally by the Polish r.ovem11ent in London. We do not
understand why a veil of aecncy should thus be drawn over the Polish
scene. We offer the fullest faci lities to the Soviet Government to
send lllaaions or individuals to vlait any of the territories in our •ill·
tary occupation • • • o 3
Stalin had drawn "a veil of secrecy

•

•

•

over the Polish scene...

preted Yalta as giving h1a a free hand ln Poland.

Ho had inter-

The Soviet Union treated

Polish territory as a land of conquest to be exploited and 1ovemed by any
al'bitrary mans Moscow ·IUaht deem appl'Opri ate.

On April S Count Raczynski

submitted the following 111es 1a1e ncetved from the reJrion of Bialystok on 15
March 1945 :
Unheard of m.arders, raping of women, shooting at random at people
on the roads for the joy of 1 t .
All able-bodied 11en and wonen are being deported eastwards for
forced labour. 'nle NlVD and the Lublin Gowm•nt are arresting soldien
of the Home Arwy and their fud lies and are subjecting them to bestial
cro11-ex..inatlons.
Local offices of the Lublin Government aTe staffed either by the
l ibid. , Do cumnt 319, pp�S36-S4 1 .
2�. , DocUDMtnt 322, p.5430
3 tbid� i Document 332 , pp . 5 5 5 - 5 5 6 .
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NKVD or by pro-Soviet eleraents .
The population naains faithful to the Gove nunent in London and
begs for Allied intervention • • • • 1
The real nature of Stalin's 11ethods and the helplessness of the West
was overt ly shown shortly after the Yalta Conference.

At this time officers

of the Red Ar'lllf made contact with •Jllbers of the main Polish resistance 11e>ve
ment.

The leaders were invited to take part in negotiations to coordinate

the activities of the Soviet forces and the national resistance movement during
the last phases of the campaign.

Sixteen leaders of the Polish underground were

flown to Moscow with a guarantee of personal security to meet Stalin.
the leaders were thrown into prison, given

a

However,

pti>lic trial for cri•s against

the Soviet Antf , and 12 were given prison te1'119 from 4 months to 10 years .

'nlis ,

of course , •ant that some of Poland's leading non-Communist leaders were rel'IOved
from the political scene during a critical 111011e nt,
fol lowin g :

Those arrested included tho

the Vice Premier o f the Polish Govem•nt, J an Jankowski (Labor

Party) ; three Ministers of the Polish Government , pennanently in Poland , Adam
Bien (Peasant Party) , Stanislaw Jasuikowici (National Democrati c Party) . and
Antoni Pajdak (Socialist Party) ; the Comander of the former Ho• Anrf , General
Leopold Okulicki ; the Chairman of the secret Polish Parliamen t , known as the
Counci l of National Unity , Kazilderz Pu1ak (Socialist Party) ; eight mellbers of
the chief political parties in Poland, as follows :

Stanislaw Mierzwa (Peasant

Party) , Kazillierz Baginski (Peasant Party) , Josef Olacinski (Labor Party) ,
Franuzek Urbanski (Labor Party) , Zbigniew Stypulkowski (National De11e>cratic
Party) , Ka1ilderz Kobylanski (National Democratic Party) , Piotr Czemlk (National
Deaocratic Party) , and Michalowski (National De11<>cratic Party) .

'nle Soviet

eJCplanation of the disappearance and arrest of the political leaders of Poland
l tbid. , Document 334, p.559.

94
appeared in a TASS comunique of May

S:

General Okuli cki ' s group , and in the first place General Olculicki

hi111 e lf, are accused of preparing and co1111.i tting wrecking acts in the
rear of the Red Army , which resulted in over 100 Red Anty off'icers and
This group of 16 persons did not 'disappear , '
men losing their lives .
but was arrested by mi litary authori ties of the Soviet front and i s \D\der
ex&llination in Moscow.
This aroup is also accused of organillng and aaintaining i l legal
wireless transai tting stations in the rear of the Soviet troop s , which
is punishable by llw .
A l l these persons or soJRe o f the11, depending on
the results o f the investigation , wi l l be collllld tted for tri a l . l

On Apri l 22 , 1945 , Stalin and Bierut signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance , and Post-War Cooperati on .

This , of course , was in direct violation

of the Yalta agreement stating that the Lublin Government was only provisional.
Stalin had put his official stuip of penanence on that organi zation.

The

Polish Government in London i111Dediately issued a protest but to no avai t o

2

On April 28 Olurchi l l sent a letter to Stalin saying that it woulcf be
impossible to recognize a Polish Government deprived of independence .
warned against dividing the world into two antagonistic caaps.

Churchi ll

In reply to

Olurchi l l on May 4 , Stalin said that:
As regards Poland, it is her being a neighbour of the Soviet Union that
llakes it essential for a future Polish Government to seek in practice
friendly relations between Poland and the USSR, which is also in the
• • • we insist, and shall
interests of the other freedom- loving nations.
continue to insist, that only people who have demonstrated by deeds their
friendly attitud4p- to the Soviet Union , who are wil ling honestly and sin
cerely to coopera te with the Soviet stato , should be consulted on the
formation of a future Po lish Govem11ent . 3
Possibly Stalin was not cogni zant of the autonomy of nations and their theo
retical immunity from foreign dictates .
imposing his

own

In fact , Stalin was insisting on

poll ti cal syste11 on another state, thereby precluding any

consultation on the fonaation of a future Polish st ate by those professing
l tbid. , Document 352, pp .587-588.
2.!E.!!· , Docwnent 346, p . 574.
ltbid . , Docwaent 350, pp.584-585.
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nnd p ract i cing <le�ocrati c principlcs . l

His st atement to Mil ovan Djilas explains

sufficiently Sovi e t behavior:
111is war h not as in tho pas t ; whoever occupi es a te rri t ory ahc•
imposes on it his own social sys tea.
Everyone im11oses his own sp
:t�,.,
as far as the army has power to do .
I t cannot be otherwise.

On June 12 , 1945, th� Co&ami ssi on authorized by the Cri�ea

Conference

� as

invited to �1oscow for consultation on the fol'lln tion of n Pol i sh Provi 5 i onn1

Reprc�et:t ati \'es

Government of National Unity based on the fol lowing individuals :

of the Polish Provi•ional Government accol"ding to i n formation receivc<! froP Her·
saw, Boles law Bierut, Edward Osobka-Morawsk i , Wl adys l a.w Kowalski ,

and W l �dy $ l 6w

G0111ulka have beon appointed representatives of the Polish Provi sional r.ovcYnment ;
l)omocratic leaders from Poland, Wincenty Witos , Zygmunt Zu l awski , Stani � l aw
Kutrzeba , Adam Krzyzanawski . and Henryk
abroad . Stanislaw

Mikolajczyk•

Kolod d e j s k i ;

Oo111ocratic

leaders f't'ot�

anc &yk and .Julian Zakowski .

Jan S t

,

The Policy of the Soviet Union in reaard to Poland anc.l the fonation of
this new govem11ent

wu

clearly 111ade by lleputy Premer GoauU:a on June 18 at

a r:teoting of the Polish delegates called in connection with the establishmor.t
of this ROVemment:

11
"We sh al 1 never give up the power . 2

The new government was for1ted on June 28.

It included 21

mini s t e rs

. 16

of whom had been members of the Lublin Collllli t tee or the p re vi ous provi s i onnl

gove rnment

.

The

�

sod alist Osobka-Mo awski re11ained Premier, tl ladys law Cor.iulbi.

became the First Deputy Premi er. and Stanislaw Miko l aj c zyk became S�cond De�uty

Premier and �tinister of Agricul ture and Land Reform.

Of the five ne"'

mini�ters .

only Mikolaj czyk , a me11h e r of the Peasant Party . was detemined to res h t .
other �inis ters either put up no effective resistance or were reAdy to
with the Co1111un
1
i1ts.

cor.cromise

Th e �hole of Polish people were not repres en te d b y tnt�

1 In a report from Avc- re l l

30 , 1944,

TI•L'

Berrl111an to Presi clent �<>c�twf' lt sent �n n.:•-:-!roer

Harriaan stated that the Soviets in Poland and . throughout E as te rn

Europe wcro ·•e!fll�loyinJ.: the w i dtr verlotr r.>f ooens nt their

df.!::!1o� r. !

• ··

c-cc:JP�tion

government.

By July 6 both Great l'lri tai n ond the United St ates had rer.or.ni zoc! thr
At the Potsda. Conferenc" on July 1 7 ,

new Polish Provi sional Govomment .

the USS R , Great aritain , and the United States announced that the Polish coH rn
men t

in London had "ceased to exist . . .

3

Th u.� ended by fiat from abroad

Hit ler and Stalin had hegun in Septelli>er 19 39 .
Eden ' s decl aration in the

House

A l l that remained

of COlllo
ll ns 1nade on June 24 ,

wa�

wh at

Mr.

194 1 :

one

Thon l s
reference I wou l d ask the Hou!u� to l et 111e 111a k(\.
At
a time like this our thoughts go out with heart-felt sy111p athy to our

Polish Ally.
Once agai n , their soil is a battlefield.
Once -a£a1n th� i r
peop le suffer for no fault of their own .
The Polish people have ha<� a
h ard history.
By their courage in a ti11e of unparal leled ordeal , they
have earned and they wi 1 1 red em their freed01n .
That remo.i ns ouT r ledge. 4

e

troops , secret police, local cOllURUn l tt parti es , labor uni ons , sympathetic
leftist organi zations , sponsored cultural societie� , and econo•i c pres�ure

to assure the establishJtent of 1"0li11e� which
•
•
actually depend for their
exis tence on groups respons i ve to all sugges ti ons enianati ng from tho Kreml i n . ' '
T•l•aru of Oec.llber 30 , 1944 , u . s . DepartMnt o f State , Fore i gn Relations ,
Tile Conferences nt Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washinnton :
U . S . C'.ovemsnent Prlr.t
lna ollice ,
p .224.
•

1§5�);

p . 60 1 .

21nstytut Uistorycmy hdenia Gonorala Sikonkeigo.

k

3111scoc s ,

p . 1 12 .

Op. cit . ,

Op. ci t .

,

Noto 362 ,

p .93.

4 1nstytut Uis·toTyczny hdenia General a Si korskel go ,

Op. ci t . ,
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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
AS

RELATED TO YUGOSLAVIA ANO POLAND

The victories of " liberation" won by the Soviet andes in Eastern Europe
during 1944-1945 represented the beginning of a new order in that area.

The

Yalta and Potsdu mandates were carried to these areas at the point of a gun .
Alexander Dallin writes that "the Soviet empire was established , in 1944-1945 ,
at the point of Russian bayonettes and in the wake of Russian tanks . u l

And

Michael Plorinsky says that "the basic factor in establishing Soviet dominion
over Eastern Hurope was mi 11 tary occupation . 112
The mininiu� wartinte Soviet expectations grew as the battlefields shi fted
westward.

Orders to Polish and Yugosl av Communists to aake themselves insepar-

ab l e parts of the post-War political structure , to form popular fronts . was
the very minim� the Soviets originally expected.

However, this gradually

changed to the maximtn warti.e expectations created by the fait accomplis of
the Red Al'IR)'.

Polish and Yugosl av Comm\D'lists now ceased being mere candidates

for partnerships in post-War govem11ents and be e&11e the ent>ryos for such governMnts .
There are a number of motives in this change in Soviet foreign policy.
First, the reborn and rejuvenated Russian nationalism beginning in the middle
)
j

1930 ' s and emphasi zed during the war coup led with the COftUlllD\ ist Messianic
spirit presented Moscow with the ideal of covering the entire globe with Soviet·
like regi11es .

Second, the economc reconstruction of the war·tom Russian state

l Atexander Dallin, "Soviet Policy Toward Bastem Europe ," Joumal of
International Affairs , XI , i , p.48.
2Michael T. Florinsky, usoviet Expansi on , " Current Histo!Y, XXVI , p . 323.
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necessitated the subordination o f the economies of Central and Eastern Europe
to the Soviet economic syste11.

And third, opportunism and political power pre

sented themselves to the Collm.IJlists .

Louis Fischer writes that "Opportunity

knocked at the Kremlin gate , the opportunity to extend Russ i a ' s power.
te11ptation was to great to resist. ttl
with Co1U11Jni st ideology.

The

Opportunisa presented no problems coupled

Oscar Jaszi pointed out as early as 1944 that:

The new Russian ruling class is the exponent of the llOSt unlimited
raison d ' etat theory: the end sanctifies the means • . No ideologic
reservations or moral scruples wil l restrain Stalin
a course which
he regards as of vital interest to the Soviet State.

front

Isaac Deutscher says that Stalin ' s interest in Eastem Europe in 1945
was s ti l l pri11arily strategic and econOlli c.

Only later when opportmlity

knocked would ideological consideration take on an added impetus. 3

This explains

Stalin ' s annoyance over Tito's left-wing deterwdnation to fo1'111 an exclusively
Corm1nmist Government and to proclaim Yugoslavia iamediately as a Coftllftun i!'t State.
The political situation with the West was as yet not opportune.

Furthermore ,

these actions lessened Yugoslavi a ' s economi c contribution to the Soviet Union
while increasing her political independence.

Deutscher says of Stalin ' s attitude

of 1945 :
He was approaching the proble• of the Russi an zone of influence in a
manner calcul ated to 1ati1fy nationalist Russian demands and aspirations
and to wreck the chances of conunist revolution in those terri torles .
He prepared to exact and did in fact exact heavy reparation s . 4
l Louis Fischer, 'llte Great Challenge (New York :
1946) , p . 188.

Duel l , Sl oan and Pearce ,
•

J

2oscar Jaszi , "Central Europe and Russia," Journal of Central European
Affairs , V, p . 1 1 .
3 zbi gn�ew K . Brzezinski in The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict (Cambridge :
Harvard University Press) lists five major areas ofSoViet interest during the
war and isatnediately after which determined Soviet policy: to insure Russian
security by eurting influence over the lands immediately west of the Russian
frontier, thereby denying the area to Germany; to insure that Eastem Europe
would not be controlled by domestic elelllOnts whi ch , while hostile to Genany ,
would also be hostile to the Soviet Union ; to exploit the area for purposes of
Soviet economic recovery ; to deny the area to the capitalist worl d , the potential
enemy of the USSR; and to begin a Communi st ideological offensive into the are•.
41saac Deutscher, Russia AfteT Stalin (London , 1953) , p . 79 .
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There were 11any reasons why the Soviet Union did not absom the Eastern
European states directly.

Such an overt act would have needlessly antagoni zed

the West while also greatly weakening the international Comll\D\i st movement out
side Eastem Europe which -weared very prOll:l s ing at the ti•.

Purthenore ,

it would have co111p llcated the tasks of occupation and exploitation i f not led
to open revolt against the Comamist regi•• •

And finally, national differences

and emities were too great to be so blatently ignored.

Moscow could exercise

domination by llOre smtle •ans.
The •thod Moscow chose to introduce wu one of li•ited toleration.
Such a policy was undatory for a nUllber of reasons.

'nle Commmi st parties in

all states but Yugoslavia fo\Dld themelves in a numerically weak position in
1945 .

To overco• this disadvantage they opened their ranks to uny hetero

genous ele•nts thus swelling the party wl th untrained and unreliable amli>ers .
Purthenore , anti-Cmmmi st (and often anti-Russian) feeling wu so formidable
that any overt attack would likely plunge a state into civil war.

Also Russian

pledges to the Westem Al lies ude a gradual develop•nt much more preferable
to an abrupt halt.

And Pinally , the national Co-.mist situation , especially

in Prance and Italy where Comamists were courting left-wing socialists , pre
cluded any police state •thods .
Brzezinski outlines three varying patters of CollllLlfti st activity pursued
to obtain domination .

The first w u consolidation of power, already obtained

through Soviet occupation by 1945, and the initi ation of domestic refol'lllS not
necessarily doctrinaire in fon.

'Ibis pattem wu fol lowed in Bulgaria, Rumania,

and Poland. ·The second pattem entailed efforts to obtain poll ti cal power
through participation in the political process and through active encouragement
of intemal reform.

This process wu followed in Czechoslovakia.

The final

pattem wu the consolidation of power obtained by local COlllilUft st efforts, and
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the la\D\ching of a radical totalitarian revolution .
Yugos lavi a.

This was followed in

H\.Dlgary presents a marginal case.

Thus in Yugos lavia (also i.n Albania) Comunist forces had attained power
largely through their

own

efforts while the native non-CoBD\D\ist revolutionary

movement wu defeated by Soviet foreign intervention and international arbitration .
By the sUllUle r of 1945 , Soviet military forces had occupied all Poland,
�'UJlania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czecho!ll ovakia, and the Collll\.Dli st sector of Geraany.

During this period similar types of regi•• emerged in these territories,

and for some years in Yugoslavia.

The govemaents which emerged were offi cially

called "Popular Democracies. 01
The four political forces interested in shaping the Eastern European
states each saw so•thing different in the hybrid fo1'111U l a of "People ' s Democracy. "
Stalin 's policy at the time was one of wait
tion with the Western Powers .

and see

with his

new .. fotmd collabora-

He thus viewed the "People's Democracy" as a

transitional form of govern11ent during the years of collaboration with the allies
which would ultimately lead to integration into a great European Co1111\D'l
1 ist
doainion of Soviet Russia.

In the case of Yugos lavia, Stalin did not want to

antagonize the West with an overt dictatorship of the Communist Party in Yugo'

slavia nor to imply, however sywibolically , that Yugoslavia was another repd:>l lc
of the USSR.

Thus while pressing for a closer all�gnment with Rumanla and

Poland, he wu indifferent to Yugoslavia's clai• to be a CollllUl\i st state and
a meri>er republic in the ful ly of the USSR.

'M\e Western powers saw in the

constitution of these states the •ans by which all parties could reassert the•
se lves and take part in the govern•nt , while the anti-COtftllunists thought that
they would be reasonable free politically lDlder the constitutional frmnework
of the "People's Democracy. "

And finally, the Comunist parties and leaders

in Eastern Europe saw in the "People's De11e>cracy" a systea by which they could
1Tito was the first to cal l the state he 'was about to foni in
i>emcracy.
11

1945

a "People 's
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occupy the key positions of state and thereby actually govem.
placed on the sovereignty of each "Peoplets Demcracy . "

Emphasis wu

The very title itself

suggested that the new states were not Co111Uni st republics and would , in fact ,
act u barriers to further Soviet integrationist 11e>ves .
However, in the cue of Yugoslavia, such claim of sovereignty concealed
two assertions :

that Yugoslavia, as a dictatorship of the proletariat and a

state with a Commnist ideolo11 , should not be treated as a junior partner in
need of ' guidance ; • and that Tito, who had won political power lar1ely through
his own efforts , should shan power, at least on paper, with other political
forces and parties in Yugoslavia.

Tito objected directly to any such sharing

of power -..d to the -Soviet intervention in •atters which she had given no prior
auidance nor help in solidifying.
"People's Demcracy" •ant many things to aany interests , yet, as Neuaann
10 aptly puts it :

Deprived of its excess verbiage , the concept of the people's democracy
boils down to two simple criteria. It is a state in which the classless
society hu not yet been achieved, but in which the Comamist party
has the upper hand and has beg\D'l the tuk of liquidating its op
ponents &
It ls also ·a state which fol lows the lead of the Soviet Union. l
The "People's Democracies" were only on the threshold of social development.
Thus , even i f the roads to socialisa varied, the more advanced USSR still enjoyed
the position of aulde.

The seeds of futun ideological amordination were thus

b1pllcit in the concept.
The

cons

titutions of these "People's Deaocracies" were actually mdeled

on the Soviet Constitution of 1936.

Parli .-n ts were elected by direct , equal ,

secret, universal suffrage, but then wu only one list of candidates in most
instances , and the parll-nts •t for only a few days every year.

Between

l Robert G. NeU11an n, "Constitutional Documents of But-Central Europe •"
Joumal of Politics , XII , p . 626.
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parli...ntary sessions legislative business was carried on by the Presidima
whose •llbers were even more rigorously selected by the Co-.niats than for the
parli-nts .

Local authorities were selected sillilarly and silli larly controlled.

In other words , the governmental app aratus was strictly s\i>ordinated , u in the
Soviet Union, to the central authorities.

11le judicial branch was also fil led

with party nollinees elected by the correspondina levels of the political hier
archy .

Co-.mists also controlled the police, any , aus organisations , and

education.

The pnss, ..boob , broadcutin1, etc. , were used by the party for

propaganda to indoctrinate the population.
11le "People's De•cracies" were thus a tactical and practical aaneuver
to let Co..uaists 1ain and

coasolidate

power in order to llOVe on to a more

drastic staae while at the s ... ti• aaintainlng strict party subordination
to Moscow.

The purse trials , rapid colltctivi zation, and reliance upon th•

the Soviet Union probably c... sooner than expected by local Communist leaders .

By 1948 what had been "correct" in 1945 wu "treuoneble."
Accordlna to Hush S.ton-Watson l then were three phues in the esteblish
mnt of popular democracy in the But European states :
the boaus coalition, ad the mnolithic block.

the genuine coalition,

Poland's post-War history

beains in the second phase where several parties nomnally shared power ad
possessed an independent orgal1ation but where in actuality the leaders of
the aovern•nt were chosen not by thea but

by

�he Communi sts.

Yugoslavia

skipped the first two staps and found herself in stap three where Co-.mist
leaders not only laid down lines of polley but centrally controlled the organi
zation and discipline of the survi vina non-Co•unist groups .

During this

stage socialist parties wen forced to fuse with the Co..unist party and all
overt political opposition wu terainated.

Poland ' s transition fl'oa stap two

lHu&h Setaa-Watson, 'lb• East Europea Revolution

1956) , pp . 167-171.

(New

York :

Pruger ,
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to three began in the autum of

1947 with the flight of Mikolajczyk to the

Wes t .
Seton-Watson lists five ..jor aspects o f Stalinization in the Eastern
European countries :

Pint, th• Comllunist attitude to th• peasat and socialist

parties ; second, the role of the Soviet lll litary including political and econo
lll c intervention; third, levers of ·pawer used by the Co....ai1t1 ; fourth , the
ellploltatlon by Moscow and local Co..uni1t1 of national confllcta ; and fifth ,
the significance of differences in the social structure .
The peasat parties were the first objects of Communi st attack .

During

the suppression of the peasant political oppositioll the violence of the Coaunists reached its climax.

This was due to a n\lllbe r of reasons.

The peasant

parties represented, in reality or potentially , the aajority of each nation
and the strona••t deaoeratlc forces in the

1tatu • 1

Purthenore , the peuant

parties possessed riaorous progr... in opposition to those of th• Co111amists ,
nvealin1 the existence of an unbridaeabl• ideological difference between
th• Co-i•t� and peuant1.

These parties mat , therefore , be discredited
'

ad split by th• Co-.mist1 in order for the Coll9Uftists to achieve unchallenged
power .
The socialist parties were newed u necessary tools ln the transition
1ta1e of the "PeGp1le ' s De110cracy . "

When their worth had been expelled, their

life spana would be teninated with a fusion into the ideologically pure Coa,

mnist Party .

Absorbtion of 1ociall1t parties into the ColR\B'list parties occured

throuahout Eastern Europe in
December

1948.

Poland's socialist party wu llbsorbed on

15 , 1948.

There were three type• of Soviet intervention into Eastern Europe :

"direct

political action based on the threat of military force , " "indirect political

l por a brelkdown of urban and rural population in Poland md Yugoslavia
see Annex, Table NUllber 2 .
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action," and "econolll. c actlon . " 1
Direct political action bued on the threat of lll litary force and its
actual use wu especially important, u hu been seen, in the cue of Poland.
Bxaplea in that state are numerous , rangin1 fl'OJI the creation of the Ld>lin
eo.ittM ln

1944

to the nOllination of Soviet Marshal Rokossovski u Co•ander

in-0\ief of the Polish Arw, in
Soviet lli.lituy force , and

•Yen

1949 .

In Poland Stalini1aticn wu due .,re to

leis to internal factors , than in any other

country, especially Yu1os lavia.
Indirect political action ls represented by the systea of treaties enac
ted betwMn the Soviet Union md the 1tate1 of Eutem Burope.

'ftlere were

seven political tnatiea in that period signed between the Soviet Union and
these states , coupled with tho1e between the Eut Buropea states the•elves .
'nlese political treaties are supp le•nted by eoonold e and cultural conventions.
The post-War objectives of Soviet econolli.c policy hinged upon the pro
cure•nt of u mch econollic aid u possible hoa foreign countries, especially
those occupied by the Red Arsr, in order to speed Russian economic re construction .
Between

1945

and

1947

capital goods , aachinery, rolling stock , and li�stock

were appropriated froa Red occupied 1tates and sent back to the Soviet Union.

By 1946

llOSt of the trade which had preYioU1 ly flowed to Western Europe wu now

rechann,dled to the Soviet tmion.

The goal vu the eventual lntearation of

the econOllles of the Comunist dOlllnated countrie1 with that of the Soviet Union.
Butern Burope wu exploited econolli. cally by the USSR larply through
three •an• :

"joint" or lliud Soviet-local companies which, in fact , were

aanapd exclusively to the benefit of the

msR and siphoned off the resources

of these countries directly into the Soviet Union; inequitable pricing arr1nge
•nts in trade a1ree•nt1 which gave the Soviets special oriented prices (such
lsetao-Wataon ,

Op. cit.
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u the agree•nt with Poland in Septellber, 1945, by which Polish coal wu to
be sold to the Soviet Union at a price one tenth of that offered by Denaark) 1 ;
and lut, looting and pillaging during the initial war years .

As

one writer

put it, even the Molotov Plan of January 1949 ''is not only an econold. c proaru,
but ultiutely an instrument of power politi cs . "2
'nle Com.mists i..diately seized the levers of power within the state.
All key positions were occupied, especially the Ministry of Interior which
control led the police (in Polmid the Ministry of State Security) , and the Min
istJy of Justice.

All broadcuting wu i-diately seized, and Co�ists

were placed in key positions in the unap..nt of national factories and in
trade unions .
port .

In Poland land reform wu a key tool in gamering peasant sup

This consisted in the ellpropriation of Geraan peuanu in the westem

borderlands and its use u patronap for the Comnmists.
also reaodeled along Soviet lines.

The govemment was

In Poland the C:O-ists got control of

the local aovemmntal power only after, with Soviet support, they had seized
power at the center, while in Yugos lavia the Partisas of Tito used their
cells to attain power on all levels without direct Soviet interference.
Co-..nists in both Poland and Yugos lavia treated national probleas in
their respective

countries

in an opportunistic way.

11leir ultiaate concem wu

to reduce all nationalities to the saM level of subjugation to Moscow.

I f it

was to Moscow ' s advantage to exacerbate national conflicts , then all else ,
including national concems , took second .
In Poland the national hatred of the Poles for their Genaan neighbors
wu deliberately aagnified by the Soviets in order to widen the gulf between
lPor COllplete details see Mikolaj czyk ,

0p. cit. ,

pp. 158-159.

2
Anon . , '"nle Molotov Plan : Bconold.cs of Soviet I111perialisa," News fro•
Behind the Iron curtain, I , ix, p . M .
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them.

This was done in order to force the Poles to look for defence in the

Soviet Union mid place the• at the .. rcy of Soviet foreign policy.
In Yuaoslavia it wu to Tito's advantage to parade under the baner
of the unity of all nationalities in the state.

By so acting, Tito could

exploit the wishes of the majority of the population who were sick of national
hatreds and conflicts so prevalent throughout their history.

Attention can

here be placed on Lenin' s recipe of apporttnis• on the national question stated
on May 12 , 1917 that "In Russia we must stress the right of separation by the
subject nations , while in Poland we must stress the right of subject nations
to unite . "

Tito was very ingenuous in his use of the national question as a

tactical step in his rise to power.
Communist progras in both Poland ad Yugoslavia were most opportunely
tied to the national interest .

This , of �une , posed a dile•a for the poli

tically active non-Comunis t national elenents .

In both countries the opposition

was split by these methods , reminiscent of Caesar's divide et •'!'era, into
three aroups.

The first aroup was composed of the undergro\D\d resistance and

wu known in Poland as "Preedom and Independence" (WIN) and "National A1'118d
Forces" (NSZ) .

In Yuaosl avia scattered Chetnik elements reaained after the var.

By 1948 most of the above had been liquidated.

'nley had counted on war between

the United States and the Soviet Union, and it had not been forthcoming.
The second and laraest group wu composed of those who attempted to work
These

within the framework of the system and who oraanized democratic parties .

groups , largely composed of the peuet parties, depended upon free elections
and Western backing.

Neither were forthcoming.

The third group col laborated with the Comun ists.

They justified their
'

actions by pointing to the domestic progr&111 of the Communi sts.

This group

included the left wings of socialist parties and radical agrarians.

Disi llusionment
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with COlllllDli st programs soon followed as radicalization progressed from the
policy of distribution of large estates �ng the peuan1' through the NBP stage
to the liquidation of the kulaks, the collectivization of agricultul!e_, and the
socialization of industry.

As

wi l l be seen , this radicalization caused con

flict between Moscow and her Comunist leaders in both Poland and Yugoslavia.

COtl'OSITION OP THE CO,....IST
PARTIES OP YUOOSLAVIA AND POLAND

There were a nud>er of •ajor groupings of Colllli
lUll sts in Eastem Europe
at this ti•:

opportunists who had jumped on the bandwagon when they set that

Coan\D\isa was the "aove•nt of the future ; " idealists who had joined th• move11ent seeina in it a future social transformation and ultimate reign of justice;
fascists who through the revolution had been converted from brown to red (included
many opportunists) ; conservative bureaucrats who had been needed to fill key
positions and who had been blackui led into submission ; and finally the toughs
who had been of use in the yean of "persuasion.

ul

R. V. Burks dia.etrically categori zes the co11position of a typical party .
The outer circle , or "soft periphery ," he says , is composed of opportunists,
auerri l l as , fellow-travellers, voters , and front memers .

It is this circle

which is needed to oveiwhel• the opposition during the first phases of the take"'
over.

Quality at this ti• is sacrificed for quantity.

Occupying the inner

circle are the party activists who are centered aro\D\d the hard core o f leading
cadres .

Fluctuations in the party strength of leading cadres , activists , and

opportunists will vary relative to the particular condi tions faced .

In Yugoslavia

the situation could be i l lustrated by the chart on the followin1 page.
In the first few years after the war, the Comrunist party in Poland was
also not h0110aenous .

Durin& the period after "liberation ," the period of

strugale for political power, the party had needed quantity in order to overawe
l Por the percent of the total population belonpng to the Coaunist parties
of Eastern Europe in 1938 and 1948 see Annex, Table Number 3.
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YUOOSLAV PARTY M:MBERSHIP

P
robable status of
Year

Historical situation
Newly organized, the party hid
the third laraest electorate in
the country

1920

1923

Melll>enhip

The party was driven underground; mch of it• •li>ershlp
wu in prison

1932

Abandon•nt of parll ..ntary
aovern..nt and e1tablish11ent
of a royal dictatorship; police
pressure incnued

1941

The party achieved 1elli.- legal
status and was increasingly popular u a foe of Nazis• and a supporter of Czechoslovakia

1945

1952

60,000

the bulk of the
•ll>•nhip

Activist

6,000

Leading Cadre

200

Leading Cadre

12 ,000

Activist

After a bloody civil war, tho
party e11erged u the •aster of
Yuaoslavia

141,000

Activist

After seven years of power

179 ,000

Opportunist

Source :

its opponents.

20-30,000.

-

re ,

R. V. Burks , The Dynudcs of Comunis• in Butern B
�
(Princeton : Princeton unlvenlty Preas , 1§61), p .1

Durina early 1944 Polish Workers ' Party •lllbenhip was only

However, with the ireat influx of Soviet-Polish Comunists and through

local recruit•nt the party numbered 235,296 by the end of 1945 .

By 1946 this

total had reached SSS,888; and by the end of 1947 the party had swollen to 820,786. 1
But with power finaly restina in the hands of the party , the uny heterogenous
and "unreliable" ele•nts could now be safely purged.

Quality would now replace

quantity .

p. 316.

lA. Iwanska, ed. , Conte or
112 ary Poland

(Hwun

Relations Area Pi lu , 1955) ,

YOOOSLAVIA:

A SPECIAL SITUATION

Yugos lavia represented a special situation after the war.
party could comt on enthusiutic support
the population .
its

Here, the

fr• at leut a large llinori ty of

Furthe1'110re , the superior average quality of its Mnbers and

lelders attained during the war was not sacrificed for quantity iJ1Mdiately
Tito viewed any dilusion of his party with disaay.

after.

The aus recrui ting

which wu undertaken by the People ' s Front, the Comunist-controlled "110nolithic"
8Gllopoly political oraanization, reaained in that organization while the party
itself kept in the backgromd.

'nlis wu one of the things that Tito would be

reproached for by the Coainform in 1948; it was one of the major reasons for
his aaintainence of 1overei1nty during that conflict.
Tito ' s victory in Yu101 lavia wu won by his own indigenous party apparatus
in an armed struagle against the fucists and de>11estic c:ompetition. l
wu treated u first

aaang

The CPY

the Co..unist parties of Eastem Europe u late u

-

1947 and the cnation of the Collinfon .

The Yugos lav party and state appeared

u the IM>del for all other Butem European Commmi st parties .

As late u March

31 , 194 7 , Yugoslav Preaier Josip Broz-Tito in his foreign policy report to the
National Assellbly stated:

· Yes , Yugos lavi a , and the other countries of the But as we 1 1 ,

are going
to��ther with the Soviet Union, but they are going with it precisely
We
because they know that it does not threaten thei r independence . . . .

are 1oin1 with the Soviet Union because from there we constantly hear
2
voices of peace , and that corresponds to our aspirations • • • •

l For a discussion on the importance of Soviet assistance to the Partisans
Praeger, 1952 ) ,
in 1944 see Harry Hodaklnson , Chal lenge to the Kremlin (New York :
pp . 47-48.
2

Yugos lavi a, Ministarstvi inostranih postova.
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White Book , (Beograd , 1951) .
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No other Comumi1t party in Butem Europe following the end of the war went
u

rapidly down the road to CoD\D\i1a and one party govem•nt u did Tito's

Yugoslavia.

The elections for the Constituent Alseli>ly had been held on

Novellber 1 1 , 1945. without an opposition list but with a separate box in which
anyone wishing to risk repstering a protest vote could drop his ballot.
six percent voted ''yes . "
the West.

I t chal lenged the aovem•nts and public opinion of

It tried and executed Mihailovich.

republic after abolishing the mnarchy.
non-Co..unists.

Nlnety

It established a Soviet pattemed

It quickly suppressed the remaining

The "people's aeaocratic phue;• i f there wu one, ended for

all practical purposes in the early fall of 1945 with the resignation of the
three ''Westem" mellben of the Cabinet.

And, final ly , it was overtly defiant

in its attitude on the 1\i>ject of Trieste.

Vaclav Benes writes that "It wu

not Tito's 1•1ging behind, but the fact that he wu trying

to

catch up with

the Soviet Union too quickly, that annoyed Stalin. ul
The Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation
sianed with the Soviet Union on Apri l 1 1 , 1945, wu the first treaty signed
by the new government and actually occurred before the war was over.
treaty wu signed in a spirit of accord and coaradeship .

This

However, it is inter

esting to note , u Sergius Yakobson points out, that "the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty
wu the only one
vide '

�gainst

aaon

g the Soviet pacts cligned during the war which did not pro

interference in the intemal affairs of the signaton . ' "2

As hu been noted, relations with Moscow were not as saooth as gleaned
from the surface . 3

In

a

speech delivered in Ljublajana in May of

1g45 •

lvaclav Benes . Eastern European Govemment and Politics (New York :
and Row, 1966) , p . 197.

Tito
Harper

2ser1ius Yakobson, 'tthe Soviet Concept of Satel U te States ," Review of
Politics , XI .
3As early u March of 1942 Tito, in a letter to Pijade, .h ad showed a ten...
dency to refuse even remote control: "I have not aade much atte..,t to argue it
out with Grandad (Moscow) . I have, however, told hia t?1at he had drawn quite
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definitely aroused Stalin ' s w�ath by stating :
It ls said that this ls a Just war, and we have considered it such.
Howevex-, we also seek a just end. We demand that everyone shall be
'
•uter in his own house. We do not want to pay other people • s bills.
We do not want to be used u a bribe in intemational barpinina. We
do not want to pt involved in a policy of spheres of influence . 1
At this ti• Tito wanted Trieste frOll the West , but the Soviets were unwi l ling
to back hi•.

On June S the Soviet ui>assador delivered this fonaal adaoni tion

to the Yugoslav Poreian Office:

"Tell Colll"ade Tito that i f he should once again

permit such an attack on the Soviet Union we shall be forced to reply with open
criticis• in the press and disavow hi•. 112

'11\is is the first threat of excomu-

nicatlon froa Moscow.
Turning to an analysis of the Yugoslav Govem..nt itself one finds that
the Constitution of 1946 was a near facslllile of Stalin ' s Soviet Constitution
of 1936 and bon little or no re1ellblence to previous Yugoslav constitutions.
A new political structure had b�en transplanted from Russian to Yugoslav soi l .
The Constitution dealt not only with the political structure but also with the
socio-econoaic upects of society.

I t included a bi ll of econollic and political

rights, but its use "for the purpose of chanaing or _disturbina the constitutional
systea in an mti-deaocratlc sense" wu proclai•d "illegal and punishable."
It also proclai•d the principle of federalisa "includin1 the riaht of secession ,"
only to uke it ineffective by a broad definition of the powers of the central
govem•nt.

'11\roup the fusion of the judicial and lepslatlve powers and cen

trali zation of public prosecution , it guaranteed that there would be no delay
wrona conclusions from my reports , for the situation is quite different froa
what he iaaglnes lt to be." fro• Harry Hodgkinson, Op. cl t. , p. 45.
lQuoted in Huilton Pish A1'111 trong, Tito and Goliath (New York :
Macail l an C�any , 1951) , p.64.
2 Ibid. , p.65.
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on the road to "socialism. nl

Benes says that the Constitution of 1946 served

a dual purpose :
It wu a docu.ent of Yugos lav proaress towards the Soviet llOde l , way
ahead of all other peoples de.,cracies, and it facilitated the take ove1.'
of reaainin1 private property and the use of various radi cal •thods to
speed up industriali1ation and transfora the social structure of the
coun try. 2
Tito, boating of this Constitution in 1948, proclaiaed that it
has only confi !'lled , or rather codified , what was won during the war• • • •
Now we are in the possession of the buic el..
nts for building socialism
in our comatry. Let ua once aaain see what these ele•nts are:
(1) The state authority which rep laced the old bourgeois authority is
a real people ' s govemmnt • • • •
(2) The A'rW/ is a C011p letely new, people's amy • • • •
(3) The state security , the Militia, the OZNA (secret poli ce) , etc . , are
organs of the people's authority ; their task is to keep a strict watch
and vipl • • • •
Consequently , we have a eo11p letely new state aachinery , which is a vital
condition for further develop•nt in the direction · of socialism, that
is to say, the political conditions for that deve lop•nt have been created.
(4)
Radical nationaU.1ation • • • thus basic aaterial conditions·, have
been created for builClin1 socialisa in our country.
(S) A united standpoint h u prevai led uong the vut aajority of people,
rallied in the People's Pront • • • • 3
Three e lemnts stmd out in the political sphere of the constitution:
repmlicanisa, federalisa, and·· the separation of church and state.

The first

wu ai•d against th• monarchy , the second wu incorporated to p lacate the
desires of the differing nationalities , and the third wu ai•d at the re lipous organizations of the state.

The federal structure was pattemed after that

of the Soviet �ion and thus vu not a true federalisa, except possibly in
its ethnic and cultural autonomy.

In fact , it wu a fon of administrative

decentralization, a quasi- federalls• at best.

The Yugos lav govem•ntal struc

ture rested priaari. ly on a sup.re• central 1ovemment.

Each of six repti> lics,

lvaclav Benes , Op.cit
� , p . 203.
2!!!!,!• •
3

Ibid. , p . 19 1 , quotin1 Tito, Selected Speeches and Articles, 194 1 - 1961
(Zaaret>:-Yaprijed, 1963) , pp . 83-84.
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Sezt>ia, Croati a, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro , and Macedoni a , had
its own government which was patterned afier the central or federal govern..nt
and which had its own elective assellblies and cabinets with jurisdiction over
certain local utters .

Bach wu also represented in the Co\Dlcil of Nationalities ,

the second chuber of the bic-ral legislature.

The Constitution was so arranged

that al � national antagonis .. llight be lessoned and eventually extinguished.
EconOlli cally the Constitution e11phaai1ed state planning and socializationo
However , it specifically stated that the state would protect in particular "the
owners of 1aal1 and •diua-si1ed land holdings . "1
only on a certain tolerable
tance of cooperatives .

amount

Tito's object wu to ellbark

of experimental collectivi zation and assis

As will be se�n , this cautious pace wu later conde111ed

by Moscow during the split.

However, by fol lowi1;11 the rmical Soviet line of

collectivi1ation , Tito would have estranpd more than one half of the population .
This , of course , would have led to the euy overthrow of his 1overn•nt , a step
Moscow wu anxious to take in 1948.

The steps in such a process

are collectivi

zation, the opening of hostilities with the peuanu , the cessation of food
'

.

supplies , econollic standsti l l , overthrow of Tito, and replace•nt with a Soviet
stooge rep• siltilar to those in other Coamnist CO\Dltries of Butem Europe.
The smvenion of Tito'• rep• by Moscow had to begin with the two aain
ele•nu of his power:

the CPY and the Yugoslav

political oraanization itself) .
the control of Tlto.

Any (in actuality a quasi

The Aftl/ and the CPY were, however, firmly in

Al 1 •llben had attained and were aaintained in power by

fo llowlna Tito and would be quite unwl l lln1 to atv• up this basis.

In fact ,

aany soldiers and party offi cials looked upon the Soviet Union in dismay for

past acts .

One reason cited by Mosha Pij ade wu that frm the beginning of

the war down to 1945 when actual contact vu aade between the Partisans and

}quoted

History,

in Jovan Djordjevi� , ''Yugos lavia's New Constitution," CUrrent

X , p . 423.
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and the Red A'n/f, Soviet Ru11ia had provided no uteri al or llili tary aid to
Tito. l Purthenore, the struggle during the pre-Stalingrad period when Moscow
had been fiptina for its existence had placed all ldeolopcal aspects in a
secondary status .

Por Tito, however, the struggle vu simply a new form of

the fiaht for Co.-misa.

during this period the Soviet govern•nt feared of

endangering its relations with the Western allies and thus tried to quiet
Tito �y emorting hia to present himelf u a pro1T911ive nationalist.
aanisfestations of love for the lBSR and Stalin were to be stilled.
inco..,reheuible to Tito.

His

'Fhis see•d

'Mle Soviet Mntality is reflected in the following

cab le froa Moscow to Ti to' s headquarters on March

S , 1942 :

Revievina all your infonation one gets the i11pnssion that with some
justification the fol lowers of England and the Yugoslav govern•nt believe
that the Partisan aov••nt is u1umn1 a coaunist character and that it
intends to sovietize Yugos lavia. Why , for instance, was it necessary
to organize a s�cial prol•tarian bri aad• when the buic and i1811diate
task consists now in the unification of all 1nti-Hiter elements in order
to cruch the o�iet' ad achieve national liberation!
•
•
•
is l t
really so that, besides the C�ists and their followers, there an
no other Yuaoslav patriots with whoa you could fi ght against the eneayf
It 11 difficult (for us) to agree that London and the Yugoslav government
are collaboratin1 with the invact.r--there must be 10• aisunderstanding.
We beg you to review seriously your tactics 1nd actions, to check whether
you did all you could to create a united and real national front of all
enellies of Hitler and Mussolini in order to defeat the conqueror and
invader, and i not, to take quickly the necessary steps and to infon
us about th••·

f

'Ibis doCUMnt not only reveals the Soviet •ntality at the ti•, but also the
tactics used by the Partisans.

Not until February , 1944, did the Soviets send

their first llission to Tito's headquarters.

'Ibey had .,re than once before this

ti• attempted to establish liaison with the forces of Mlhailovich .

As early

u May, 1942, allied delegates fro• Cairo had been with the Partisans.
lAdu B. Ulu, Titoisa and the Collinfora (Cubridp:
Presa , 1952) . p . 74 .

Harvard University

') of Soviet
Help in the Yusoslav
1
th
i
abl
i

2tbid . , quoting Mosha Pijade, 'lbe Sto
Uprialni:ln Serbo-Croat (Belarade, 1950).
see Paae 1 1 1 , Pootnote 3.

or

Tlto

1 react on to

s c

e
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E111nity within the party fold was also felt against Moscow for its unwi ll·
ingness to push the Yuaot lav case for Trieste with any kind of firmness (see
above) , and its sabotage of Yuaos lavia's plans for a Balkan Federation.

This

federation , long a d�u held by Tito, called for the union of BulgaTia and
Albania with Yusoslavia under the leadership of Tito.

Tito saw hi11Self as the

Stalin of the Balkans , the leader of a huge South Slav Confederation of Co11111U
ni1t states .

However, in an article in Pravda on January 28, 1948, all federative

or confederative plans including a customs \D\ion were denounced.

The Soviet

Union would not tolerate any developaents which might have increased the bar
gaining power of the But Central European region with the Russians.
the question was one of political power.

In essence,

Stalin could not accept any "little

stalins" who lliaht question his sovereianty .
The three •ain elements in the backeround of the diaputo

u

it unfolded

were the Soviet attitude toward the Partisans during the war (the Yugos lavs
now set Soviet policy

u

motivated by purely selfish considerations) , the

Soviet duplicity conceming the Balkan Confedera�ion and Yugosl avi a's role in
it , and the question on the rapidity of proceeding with radical collectivization.
These, the aain ele..nts, rest upon the dispute itself, the Soviet attempt
to destroy the l�adenhip of the CJ>Y and to fill the Yugoslav Ar.,, Co•unist
Party , and the Govem•nt in general with Soviet agents.
The �SR' s agent of party control outside the Soviet Union , the Collintem ,
had been dissolved in May of 1943 ostensibly on the grounds that l t no longer
served the interests of the worldng-clus 110ve•nt in the different states.
This anti-revolutionary gesture, however, occurred at the height of the Nall
advance into the Soviet Union and durln1 the sue period as the preceeding
cable to Tito, a period when victory over Geraany superceded any revolutionary
work abroad and when unity and assistance from the Westem allies was a
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necessity to survival.

On May 2 2 , 1943, the Presidit.111 of the Executive Co•

mittee of the Colllwa
l ist International issued a resolution proposing the disso
lution of the Collintem.

The following is an excerpt fro• that resolution:

The Pre1idiU11 of the Executive of the Comaunist Intematlonal calls
on all supporters of the Communist Intemational to concentrate their

eneraies on the whole-hearted support of and active participation in
the war of liberation of the peoples and the states of the anti-Hitlerite
coalition for the speediest defeat of the deadly enemy of the working
clu-. Md toi lers- -Genaan Fuels• and its associates and vassals . 1

In a cha�acteristlc reply to vhy the Ca.intern had been dissolved, Stalin
stated to Harold King, Reuters correspondent , that the disso lution was "proper"
because it exposed "the lie of the Hj tlerltes to the effect that 'Moscow'
alleaedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to ' Bolshevixe' thea.''

It also exposed the calt•ny that the "Comamist parties in the

various countries

•1j8

al legedly acting not in the interest of their pe�le but

on orders froa the outs id&."

It faci litates the work of ail the patriots in

the uniting of all progressive forces "into a single caq> of national liberation-for unfo lding the struggle against fascism , "

•

•

•

"thus clearing the way to

the future organization of the co11panionship of nations based upon their equality . " 2
By 1947, however, international and Eastem Buropean deve lopments precluded
any such "companionship of nations based upon their equality" and aade the for
ution of a guiding agency mandatory to Moscow.

The West had instituted the

Truaan Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in order to stop the spread of Comaanism
from Moscow.

Any veil of post-War allied unity had now been broken .

President

Truaan stated that "It must be the policy of the �ited States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed llinorities or by outside
ln.e Strategy and Tactics of World Co111M1Di sa (Washiniton , 1948) , pp. 16S-168.

2w1111a

n

z. Foster, Histo
national Publishers C0111p any,

of the Three Internationals
p.438.

19 ) ,

(New

York :

Inter-
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pressures "1
•

In Pebruary of 194 8 the coup d' etat had occurred in Prague , and

in March Britain , Prance , and the Benelux countries had signed the Brussels Treaty
establishing a Westem Union.

Intemational tension then reached its high point

since the war when the Soviets blockaded Berlin.

In l!astem Burope itself the

nascent nationalistic and independent spirit of the leaders of the •ajor Comunist parties which had appeand durina the transitional period after 1944 took
on added iapetus . Stalin felt that if tbis tendency was left unchecked it would
probably •an the loss of his satellite states.

The Co-.mist Information Agency

(Collinfon) wu thus foned in 1947 to quell this tendency in the Comunist .
parties and to mawer the •challena• of the We1t.11 The Cold.nfon was the syd>ol
for the tendency toward unifonity in the Collilunist block.

It ful ly exerted

its power in 1948.
At the foundina conferenc. of the COJlinfon held in Poland in Septent>er,
\

1947, Zhdanov, reporting on the intemational situation, h..S recast the Co-.anist
view of World War II ad represented the current world situation as a bitter contest between the "1ociali1t cap" and "American i11periali••·" The states usoelated with "the i11periali1t lmited States ad Great Britain an the dangerous
foes of national independence ad the self-deteninatlon of nations ," while
the Soviet Union ad the new democracies an "a reliable bulwark against encroach
•nts on the equall ty and self-detenination of nations

• • • •

" The Truan Doctrine

is "aggressive. " The Marshall Plan 11 a "sche• to create a bloc of states bound
by obligations to the United States ," and the gratina of American credits is
a •n ttnc011pen1e for their renunciation of econOlli c, and then of political, inde
pendence. " Con1iderin1 the state of the

Colllnmi st

Bloc and its leaden , Zhdanov

said that:
Som co11rade1 understood the dissolution of the Coaintem to i11p ly the
elillination of all ties , of all contact, between the fratemal Comnm ist
lQuoted in Hiscocks, Op. cit. , p. 138.
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parties . But experience has shown that such J1Utual isolation of the
Conmmi st parties is wrong, haraful and, in point of fact , unnatural • • • , 1
The fonation of the Cominform had first been urged by the 1ealous and orthodox
Tito (Gomulka was the only leadin1 figure in opposition to its founding) to
quiet all unorthodoxy in the Couamist movement.

However, as Brzezinski states :

What he had forgotten was that illitation within diversity did not imply
the •- political con1eqmnce1 u i•itation within uniforiaity. In the
foner, hd.tation was an act ·of independent decision made in tens of
ones own specific situation . In the latter case, illl tation led to subor
dination to the center and that subordination Tito was not willing to
acknowledp . 2
There was thus no real ideological content in Tito' s position at the ti•
of the break and probably none in Stalin' s .

Tito, speaking to the Central

Co-1ttee session which •t on April 12, 1948, and upheld his resistance to
Moscow, adJlitted as 11Uch when he said:

"Co11ra�s , re•llber, this is not a

utter here of any theoretical d11cuasion . . . .

Comades , the point here, first

and foreJIOlt, is the relations between one state and another."3

"Titoisa"

was thus the first aympto• in the new phue of Commnist political unification
precipitated by foreign and intemal develop•nts .

Diversity in theory and

practice now no lonpr reflected the ti•s and wu , in fact, danprous .

An

editorial appearina in the Collinfora joumal of March, 1948, says that:
The Co111Uni st Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) , created 81\d educated
by the great geniuses of revolutionary theory , Lenin and Stalin, serves
as an exuple to all fraternal Comun ist parties of how to approach the
develop•nt of Marxist theory . . . . 4
The dictates of Moscow must now be followed precisely.
lnie Stratear and Tactics of World Comunisa, Supple•nt 1 , Op. cit . , pp.212-2290
2sr1e1in1ki, 0p. cit . , p . 338.
3 Ibid.
41bid. ' p. 7 1 .

'llfB SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE
The actual dispute between the Soviet Uni on and Yugos lavia is documented
in a nUllber of letters exchanged between the Central Comi ttee of the Co•unist Party of Yusoslavla (CC of CPY) and the Central Collld. ttee of the Coammist
Party of the Soviet Union (CC of CPSU) , and in statemenu and co.uniques made
by the Coldnfora, and their replies by the CC of CPY.

On 1 8 March a letter had been sent frOll Bulganin

to

Tito informing the

CPY that the CPSU would i•medlately withdraw all ld litary advisers and instructors because they were "surrO\Dlded by hostility."

And, on 19 March , a telegraa

was nceived which informed the Yugoslav 1ovemment of the withdrawal of all
civi lian experts in Yvaoslavia.

The reason given was that certain econo•ic

inforaation was not given out when requested by Soviet representatives .

On 20 March 1948 Tito sent a letter to Molotov. I

Tito complained that ,

after investigating the first accusation, no basis was found for the reason
of the withdrawal of the llilltary advisors and that , u to the latter accusa
tion, "your people were told lon1 ago that the official representatives of the
Soviet Govenment could obtain all important and necessary infonation direct
from the leaden of our country ," rather than from the rank and fl le.
economic secrets c1nnot be

gtven

fall into the hands of the

COlllllOll

State

out at randoa byssubordinates as many could
eneay.

Tito rejected any sort of "lack of

hospitality and lack of confidence" towards the Soviet experts and representa
tives.

Prior to this time no co11p lainu had been aade to Tito, who had never

refused to see any of the Soviet personne 1.

Tl to concluded that "the above

lnie Soviet Yugoslav Dispute, Royal Institute of International Affairs,
pp.9- 1 1 .
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reasons are not the cause of the •asures taken by the Government of the USSR. "
Tito then requested to be lnfoned of what the real tromle was .

Al luding to

Hebrang and Zhujovic. he said that "Inasmuch as the Govemment of the USSR is
obtaining its lnfonation fro11 various other people. we feel that it should use
it cautiously• because such lnfonation is not alwqs objective. accurate, and
'

.

given with good intentions . " He ended · by expressing his deepest respect.
On 27 March a letter froa the CC of CPSU to Ti to l and his comrades infoned

Tito of the other "facts" which led to Soviet dissatisfaction and to the subsequent straining of relations between the two countries but which ''were not connected
with the withdr•al of Soviet advisors . " The first fact enU11erated by the letter
c.oncemed certain "anti-Soviet

un circulating uiona th• leading comrades in

ru110

Yugoslavia" such as '"the CPSU ls degenerate , ' " " ' great-power chauvlnis• is
r111pan t in the USSR, "' " ' the USSR is trying to dominate Yugo1 lavi a econoai cally,

'"

and '"the Cominform is a •ms of controlling the other Parties by the CPSU. "'
The letter stated that these slanderous remarks , usually

C&J10

flaged by left-wing

phrases such as " 'socialism in the Soviet Union has ceased to be revolutionary , ' "
and that Yugos lavia is the only true exponent of '" revolutionary socialism' "
have been aade by such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vukmanovic, ICidric,
Rankovic , etc.

Such statements naturally create an anti-Soviet at110Sphere

which endanaers relations with the Soviet Union.

The letter then C08')ared such

activity with that of Trotsky , who also "started with accusations of the CPSU
as degenerate ,

u

suffering from the lbd. tations inherent in the narrow nation

alism of areat powers ," and who caaoflaged his attacks with left s logans of
world revolution .

"It is well known ," cites the letter, "that Trotsky himelf

bee... degenerate , and when he was exposed, crossed over into the caq> of the
swom eneaies of the CPSU and the Soviet Union.
l tbid. , pp . 14-17.

We think that the political
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career of Trotsky is quite instructive."
The second "fact" was the disturb�ng nature of the condition of the CPY.
"We are uazed," it says , "that the CPY, which is the leading party, is sti 11
not COllp letely legalized and still hu a seld.-leaal status.

Decisions of the

Party oraans are never pm lished in the press , neither are the nports of party
assellblies . "

Purthenore , "De110cracy is not evident within the CPY itself."

The Central Comdttee was not elected but "co-opted."
ciaa within the party barely exist.

Criticism and selt-criti

In addition, the Minister of State Security

controls the Party cadres rather than, according to the theory of Marxis•, the
Party controllina all State organs in the country.
...... is thus not on the required level.

'Jbe initiative of the Party

"We cannot consider such an organi

zation of a Commni1t Party u Marxist-Leninis t , Bo lshevi k . "

The <PY has also

been ''hoodwinked by th• degenerate and opportunist th·eory of the peaceful absorption of capitalist ele•nts by a socialist syst••· • • • "

The policy of the class

I

struggle is not being felt in the party , which explains why no action has been
taken to halt the increue in the capitalist ele•nts in the villages and cities
who are now taking the initiative.
The letter then CCJllll> ared the CPY and its People's Front to that of the
Men1hevik1 who had been described by Lenin u "malicious opportunists and liquidaton of the Party :"
According to the theoxy of Marxis11-Lenini1• the Party is considered as
the leading force in the country, which hu its specific programe and
which cmmot •rae with the non-party ...1e1. In Yugoslavi a , on the
contraxy , the People ' s Front is considered the chief leading force and
there wu an atte11pt to get the Party 1ub•rs•d within the Front. In
his speech at the Second Con11"91s of the People ' s Pront, Comrade Tito
said: ' Does the CPY have any other progl"u• but that of the People's
Front? No, the <PY hu no other progl".... , the programe of the People ' s
Pront is its progl"... . '
The letter ends by asking that the · "english spy ," Belebi t , who reuined
in the Ministxy of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia after the Soviet Govem•nt
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had aade known to the Party that he wu a spy, be removed, u the Soviet
Governaent

ot place its correspondence \l\der the censorship of a spy.

cann

,
On 13 April Tito and Kardelj sent a letter• to Stalin mad Molotov expressing surprise at the above letter's tone and contents and smlll tting their
belief that it was the result of "insufficient ltnowled1e of the situation here."
Such information u was received by the Soviet Union was based on "inaccurate
and tendentious inforaatlon" received either fro11 ''known �ti -Party ele•nts
or fro• various dissatisfied persons . "

I t hu become clear that "S. Zhujovic

and A. Hebrang were the uin culprits in providing" such "slanderous and inaccurate information. "

Th••• two "desired to hide their anti-Party work and their

tendencies and attempts, exposed earlier, to break up the \Dlity of the leader
ship and the Party in 1eneral.11
"It is very difficult to undentmd" how attacks for aakina anti-Soviet
,

critlcis• on such popular leaders u Djilas , Kidric, etc. , who have proven
theuelves to the party in •any difficult situations, can be advanced without
•ntioning the source of information.

"These are

ths

s- imn who performed

invaluable services in popularizing the USSR in Yugoslavia and won priceless
renown in the war of liberation."
this popular11in1 activity.
Yuaoslavia.

These •n have spent years in prison for

These are now the hiah-rankina leaders of the new

These people could not "work •to blacken the Soviet . syste•' because

that would mean betrayin1 their convictions, their put . "
Purthermre , the aajority of the •llbers of the CC of the CPY were not
co-opted u alledpd, and the party is now planning to hold a Party congress
in which "a .statute and a Party proll'-- will

be

broupt forth , " and will

"later be adopted in ita esaenti als by the Peap le' s Front at its congress . "
Democracy does exist within the Party.
l tbid. , pp . 1 8-29.

The Minister of State Security ,
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who is also Organizational Secretary in the a>Y, in no case interferes with
the "self-initiative of party organizations . "

Pnedo• of criticis• and self

criticis• is carrie.d out at all regular Party ••tings and conferences.
Al legations of a doruncy in the concept of class struggle in the CPY
and of the growth of capitalist el...nts in the cities "ls completely inaccurate ."
''Where did this information co• f1'0ll , when the entire world knows that since
the October revolution, nowhere in the world have then been such fira, consistent social chanps as in Yugoslari.af"
our party ls a ca11p letely legal oraani•ation and known to "every un in
Yueoslari.a as the leadina force ," not se1d.-le1al as alledpd.

In addition,

All the important decisions, fro• those of the Federal govemment down,
regardina all questions of social and state life , are either decisions
of the Party or ude on the initiative of the Party, and the people \D\der
stand and accept th•• u such.
Conceming the utter of Belebit and why he reuins in the Ministry of
Poreian Affairs, the aatter stands thus :
lardelj and Djilu once told Molotov that we are not all clear about
Beleblt , we never had any proof then and we have none today. 'nle utter
is still under investiaation and we would not care to re110Ve and destroy
a aan on the basis of suspicion.
Tito and lardelj now state the "•any reuons why we an dissatisfied"
with the Soviet Union.

First, the Soviet Intelligence Service is recruiting

Yugosl av citizens into their lntelliaence service in a co\D\try "going toward
socialisa."

These include •any "officers , various leaden , and those who are

negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslari.a."

This has been done in spite

of repeated protests and cannot be looked upon u anything else but detri•ntal
Purtheniore , ''we have proof that certain agents

to the interests of our country.

of the Soviet Intelligence Serri.ce in recruiting our Party •llben cast doubts
on our lemders , sought to ruin their nputation , showed the• u inefficient
and unreliable."

"This work

•

•

•

cannot be called loyal and friendly towards
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our country

• • •

," u it "kills confidence in the leadership, demoralises people,

leads to the co11proaising of leading people, and bec011es a channel for collect·
in1 false information day by day." Tito concludes that these "questions

•

•

•

can be elillinated and explained . "
The reply t o this letter froa the CC of CPSU wu forthcollin1 on 4 May
1948. 1

It announced that the documents and evidence s\i>aitted by Tito and

Kardelj "did not i11prove on the earlier doaments . " In fact, ''they further
complicate aatten and sharpen the conflict." The "tone of the docuaents

•

•

•

cm only be described as exagpratedly ui>i tious . " The documents do not esta
blish the truth , no erron an honestly adlli tted, nor is any necessity for their
elillination proposed. The Yuioslav leaden see such criticls• "u 1111 insult
to the prestige of the

CC

of the <PY and as wderainina the abitions of the

Yugoslav leaden . " "In order to extrl cate th••• Ives fro11 the
ation for which they

are

diffl cult s 1 tu

themselves to blaM," the Yugoslav leaders

the "new" •thod of completely denying the existence of any error.

are

using

Such a

"childish •thod of groundless denial of facts" is "merely laughable."
Furthermore , the accusation that Soviet representatives are recruiting
Yuaoslavs for their intelligence service "is full of hostile attacks aaainst
the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia," and "does not at all correspond to the
facts . " The reprisals taken a1ainst Hebrang and Zhujovic for revealing infor
mation to Soviet citizens is "not only an i11pemissible settling of private
accounts but incompatible with the principles of intemal Party de11<>cracy" and
another e�le of the anti-Soviet attitude prevalent

among

the leaders of

Yugoslavia.
The letter concluded by diaposing the Yugosl av errors as the result of
an unbounded arrogance based upon past successes.
1 1bid. , pp .31-52.

Differences between the

,

.
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two parties should not be studied by CPSU representatives sent to Yugos lavia
u the CPY had proposed in the previous letter but should be discussed by the
next session of the Cominform.
Another letter from Tito and Kardelj to Stalin and Molotov on 17 May
e�res1ed the discouragement felt at the Soviet reply to the docu•nts pre
sented by the CPY. l

It also stated that the proposed discussion at the next

Coainfora session would not be agreeab le as "even before we were informed, the
nine Parties received your first letter and took their stand in resolutions . "
The utter h u not reaained an internal aatter between parties but hu been
carried "outside the pend.ssable circle" with the result of party and country
insults .

And yet the party dee•d itself still within the Soviet fold .

It

called for the liquidation of the accusations throuah the deeds of the CPY • that
is , •we will resolut•ly construct 1ocial11• and re•ain loyal to the Soviet Union,
reaain loyal to the doctrine of Marx, Engels , Lenin , and Stalin.

'nle future

_

will show, as did the past, that we will realize all that we proaise you. "
On 22 May the

CC'

of CPSU cleclared2 that Tito's letters o f 17 May and 20

May only further aggravated "their crude ais takes in utters of prlncip le, the
hanfulness and dan·aer of which the CPSU indicated in its letter of 4 May 1948."
The letter also insisted upon the discussion of the situation in the CPY at the
next •etina of the Coainfon.
On

20 Jme the CC of CPY informed the Cominfon3 of its refusal to· take

part in any discussions on the question because

" from

the bepnnina up unti 1

this ••ting of the Bureau" the disagree•nt ''hu been put on

111

incorrect

basis" through "uneo11radely criticisa," "rude and unjust accusations based on
1,!ll!. , p.53.
2_!ll!. , pp.54-57.
3 Ibid. , pp.58·60.
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isolated quotations and anti-Party elements , " 1 1condelllation without considering
our argwaents ," and a "response with even greater and ' totally unfounded accu·
sations . ' "
During the second half of J\Ule the Information Bureau held a meeting in
Ruaania.

1

At this ••ting it was found that "the CollllUlli st Party of Yugos lavia

hu pursued an incorrect line" both in utters of foreign and do•stic policy.
Approval wu given of the action taken by the CC of CPSU in talcina the "initia
ti ve in exposing this incorrect .-policy," especially in "C011rades Tito, Kardelj ,
Djilas and Rankovic."

The Cominfora then declared in a series of points that

the leaders of the CPY were following an "lUlfriendly policy toward the Soviet
Union and the CPSU," had "filled to follow the Marxist dictates on the theory
of classes and class strugale," were "revisina the Marxist-Leninist teaching
about the Party" by aaintainin1 the belief that the ''People's Fron t , and not
the Co11JmJ1ist Party" is "the uin leadina force in the co\Ultry," had "restricted
inner Party democracy by holding no elections and prohibitina cri ticism and
self-criticisa in the Party ," had fai led to honestly accept the criticis• of
the Soviet Party to correct these mistakes because of a "bomdless ubition,
arrogance and conceit" and instead "•t this criticism with belllaerence and
hostility ," and had "rej ected the repeated suggestions of the fraternal Co-.a
nist Parties to discuss the situation in the Yugos lav Party at a meeting of
the Inforaation Bureau. "

In conclusion, the Cominform found that they were in

conp lete agreeMnt with the analysis of the CC of CPSU.

The CPY had "taken

the path of seceding from the united socialist front aaainst i11perialis• , " were
"betraying the cause of intemational solidarity of the working people," and
were takina up a "position of nationalisa."
l tbid

• •

pp .61· 70.

The Cominform then called upon the

12 8
the healthy 6le•nts o f tho Yugoslav Party to compe l l their leaders to rectify
the above outlined llistakes .

I f such action was not forth cmdng by these leaders ,

the healthy eleMnts · should "rep lace the• and

•

•

•

advance a new intemational

ist leadership of the Party . "

On

29 June a state•nt was issued by the CC of CPY on the above resolut i on e 1

It called upon the Party aellbership to close its ranks in order to realize the
Party line and to strengthen further Party unity.

It appealed to the working

•asses in the Peopl e ' s Pront "to continue to work even more persistently on the
building of our socialist hoaeland."
The Collinfora' • appeal to the Yugos lav Co•unists to overthrow Tito met
with little or no response . 2

In fact , in the face of this b latant Soviet threat,

most of the Yugoslav Comlunist Party and the greater part of the nation rallied
bohind Tito.

Clissold says

that "It wu de•on�trated c learly that the Partisan

movement durina the war had bred a strong nationalist fee ling which provided
the strongest buis for Tito ' s regi• . " 3
question of nationalis• and aade

1t

The Yugos lav leaders played upon this

1ppear to their people that "national

nisa" was the issue involved in the Coainfora expuls i on .

COlll
lU

The Yugoslav plea

that "No matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism the USSR, he
can, in no case, love his country less11 4contained more than national communi sm
or Balkan sentiment or skillful propaganda.

It contained a plea by the leaders

of the Party for their own self-survival , for the maintainence of their own
political sovereignty.

The question, then , boiled down to whether Tito, Ranko

vic, Dj ilas , Karde lj and company were to have control in Yugos lavia.
1Ibid. ,

As

P • 79 .

2stalin had expected little di fficulty in elillinatin1 Tito.

Stalin at one

point had clai•d "I wi l l shake my little finger-:.and there will be no more Tito."
frOll Walter Lafeber, Op.cit . , p . 69 .
3stephen Clissold,

A

Short History o f Yuaoslavia, Op. ci t . , p . 247.

4the Soviet Y� os l av Dispute, Op. cit . , p . 19 .
�
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Brown says :
The fact that the Soviets wanted to exploit Yugos lavia, had just
frustrated Tito's el'panlionist sche•s . 1nd reaarded Bel1rade as
a satellite pawn, was not u importanf'. to Tito as the fact that the
Soviets were undel'llining his control of his party and state apparatus
by dealing directly with whichever of his s\i>jects they chose, and were
encouraging Yugoslav officials at every level to look upon the Sovie
ambassador in Belgrade a1110St u the de facto leader of the country .

}

The Cominfora accusations of doctrinal sins outlined in the above letters
did bear some truth .

·
However, most were less applicable to the Yugoslav Co1191·

nist Party than other parties of neighboring lands and possibly to the CPSU it
self.

In fact , Tito had loyally fol lowed Moscow ' s lead.

It wu Stalin who

picked the quarrel, a quarrel aade necessary by the totalitarian imperative
of the elimination of diversity and spontaneity.

Ripka says that:

Ti to was condemed si1ply because, refusing to be a mere puppet in the
hands of Stalin, he rebelled against having to fulfi l l , without a word
of protest , the Kremlin ' s wishes and orders. Ho was expelled because he
did not wish the Yugoslav Co..unist Party , the adainistration the police ,
�
the Anrt and the economy to come \D'lder direct Soviet control .
The central issue in the dispute , then , was not the Balkan Confederation , nor
nationalism, nor any deviation from Marxist-Leninist theory , but the question
of Who was to have political power in Yusos lavia. 3

All other reuons given

were merely used as em'eellishments , arguing points , rationali zations for the
conflict which were later believed.
lJ . P" Brown , "Polycentrism:

the Balkans , " Survey, 42, (Jun) . p . 82 .

2ttubert Ripka, Eutem Europe in the Post-War World (New York: Praeger) ,
pp . 89-90.

3nie crux of the whole matter, then , was the independence of the Yugoslav
leaders and their insistence, against Soviet advice, of following policies
which they believed were best suited to Yugos lav conditions and which were
calculated to further the end of their own interpretation of Comunist aim
by such methods which would ftlOSt likely keep Tito and his followers in power.

nm POLISH �B
The Polish PTorislonal Govem•nt of National Unity was theoreti cally a
coalition of five parties , the PPR, the Polish Socialist Party , the Peasant
Party , the OelDOcratic Party• and the O\ristian Llhour Party .

In the future

power stru11l•, however, the Democratic and Olristian Labour parties were of
little i11portance.

I t wu the PPR which was to exert its doainance through

Soviet backing md rule the state.
was quite saall (June , 1942:
188.,904) 1

Soviet power wu imperative as the p·arty

4,000; Su...r, 1944:

20,000 ; August, 1945 :

and could count on no support from the people.

provided th• basis of PPR power.
block to PPR sovereignty.

The Soviet Amy

The P1uant Party posed the ••jor stmbling

This party alone wu led by a patriotic Pole ..

Mikolaj czyk , who was prepared to challenge COlllUft lst authority. Mikolaj czyk
could comt on wide popular support in this non-Comunlst and predoainantly
aararian country. 2
been fo\D'lded.

In 1943 the Polish Workers ' Socialist Party (RPPS) had

However, it was too obviously a fellow-travel ling organi zaticn

to suit Co•unist purposes. The party was therefore •rged through the aachina
tions of Olobka-Morawski in September of 1944 at an All-Poland Socialist
Party Conaress in Lublin into a new Polish Socialist Party (PPS) .

Osobka-

Morawski became the chai man of the new party , and Stefan Matuszewski , a aeli>er
of the Union of Polish Patriots , becaae the secretary-general. The results of
the •raer were i._diately felt in the attraction of aany foner •llbers of
lttiscocks , 0p.cit. , p.95.
21he Polish (Co1111m1i1t) Workers ' Party (PPR) counted only 28.2 percent
of its •llh•n u peuantl u compared with 62 .2 percent worken . fro• w. Zaleskip
'n\e Pattern of Life in Poland (Paris , 1952) , p.56.
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the old PPS.

However, the regular party •llbers were handicapped at this ti•

by t_h• abscence of any able leadership.

The llOSt proainent socialis4: leaders

perished during the war, · were in exile, or under arrest.

Dubois and Niedztal

kcwski had been shot by the Genans , Puzak and Paj ak perished in Stalin• s
prisons , Erlich and Alter were executed by the NKVD, and Arciszewski was head
of the free Polish London Govem•nt until his unti•ly death .

the enlarged

llftbership did, though , include a remant of the pre-War socialist leaders who
brought with them

a

diversity of opinion and an attitude of independence which

wu not suitable to Comuniat purpoHs .

Therefore , the left-wing faction , led

by such men as Jozef Cyrankiewicz and Oskar Lange , aradually asserted control
of the Socialist Party and thus prevented it

frcm

aiding the democratic forces

led by Mikolajczyk.
1be aain aia of the PPR at this ti• was to broaden the buis of its
support uong the Polish people.

In order to allay the fears of the Polish

people ifhose suspicions of Coaaunisa and the PPR' • close association with the
Soviet Union were quite deep and widespread , the PPR leaders instituted a
aoderate program and appealed to the Polish people's patriotisa.

As seen , this

was done to convince the Westem Powers that the Yalta agreements were being
fulfil led and to allay the fears md w-ln the support of both Polish people at
home and abroad.

Both Gomulka and his Soviet advisors prefer�d to avoid vio

lence and civil conflict .

Objectives were thus 80dtfied, left-wing parties

were courted, and mppeals were aide to nationalist and clericalist senti•nt .
The Pint Congress of the PPR therefore played down the Conunist charac
ter of the PPR and e..,hasized its links in the strug1le with Nazi Ger11any.
1be Congnss , held in Deceaber of 1945 , passed a resolution which affined that :
1be Polish Workers ' Party is a new organi zation of the working class
and the toiling masses of town md country, an oraani zation bom and
created during the struggle a1ainst the Hitlerite invaders for the
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i

freedom and independen e of Poland, for the rebirth of the
a spirit of deJDOcracy.

ccn.m try

in

The Commmists also tread waryly with the Polish economy, preferrin1
to sacrifice imediate transformation for a gradual pace which would receive
the backing froa both workers and peuant.

The peasant had been propitiated

in September, 1944, throuah a radical land reform which had been first announced
in the "July Manifesto" of the LW>lin Comittee.
aade,hhowever , of collectivization.

No attempt nor •ntion was

Nationalization was not •ntioned but was

introduced and first carriedoout on a lildtted and widely acceptable scale.

On January 3 , 1946, in a l• entitled "Conceming the Seizure of Basic Branches
of the National EconOllf ,'' nationalization was begun in all llining and industrial
enterprises "capable of e11ployin1 aore than SO workers per shift . "

However,

compensation of those dispossessed wu recognized, except for those Geraan owned ,
although few ever received any.

The Govemaent adopted a Three Year Plan of

Economic Reconstruction in July of 1947 to be p laced in effect on January 1 .
This plan created new pattems of econOlli c and social relations .

Gomulka and

his Minister of Industry and eo-rce Hilary Mine stated that the economy wu
to be organized in three separate branches to include those state owned, coopera
tives , and· those privately owned.

'nle foundations for a "People's Democracy"

were thus laid throuah a b lend of political and econoldc policies , throuah terror and reform.
As

sorship.

noted, in 1943 the Peuant Party had been set up under Conunist spon
When Mikolaj czyk retumed to Poland in 1945 , he found that cooperation

with the pro-Couuni st ele•nts of the party was impossible.

Therefore , in

Septeni>er, 1945, he founded a new Polish Peasmit Party (Polski• Stronnictwo
Ludowe or PSL) with Wincenty Witos as chai rman .
l tbid. , p . 347 , note 14.

In October Witos died and
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Mikolaj czyk succeeded him.

By January the party •abership exceeded 600 ,ooo

and posed a chal len1e to the Communists in the fortheo11ing elections .
this appeared to be

1n impossible tuk.

However,

'nle party had no effective support

in the broadened provisional govem•nt , the opposi tion had the strength of
Soviet power behind the•, and there was little that the Westem powers could
do to help Mikol ajczyk.

Even if the PSL did win the elections , the Soviet forces

would almost certainly proceed to overtum the election.
s\l!Uler of

1945

llOlt Poles were weary and tisillutioned .

acquiesced or resigned theuelves to the situation .

Furthel'llOre, by the
Most either re luctant ly

Overt efforts at resistance

were tempered by the fact that the aovemMnt had the full support of the Soviet
Union and by the 11oderate and

current

acceptabi lity of the Co•unist progrus .

A llinority of anti·Comaunist patriots did refuse to acknowledge Co-.mist dollina
tion and continued their desperate and hope less resistance.

'nlese included a

nlllber ..of ri1ht-win1 groups , the so-called "forest detach•nta" which survived
well into

1946

and even later.

But any type of •ajor resistance was durpened

by the security syste11 instituted by the government.
'nle Polish security systea was estab lished under the tutelage of th�
Soviets in order to cope with such irreconcilables u the above and to under
mine Mikolaj czyk ' • Peasant Party .

A depart•nt of public security was set up

\.l'lder Radkiewicz by the LW>lin Colllli ttee and later tumed into the Ministry of
Pm 11 c Security .

Radkiewi cz and several of his col leagues had taken courses

"for adllinistration and security" in the Soviet Union.

Soviet police played

a vital part in the Polish security syste• through training, example, and the
occupation of key positions .
police nuabered some

230 ,000.

According to figures cited by Rozek
Rozek breaks his figure into

police staffs spread over the country,

l Rozek , Op. cit.

100 ,ooo

1

90,000

the security
special

organized in for11al mi 1i tary
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units , and 40,000 plainclothesmen.

In addition to the above , a Citizens'

Militia and an Intemal Security Corps were set up in the autum of 1944 and
the spring of 1945 which cooperated with the security police and nUllbered
120,000.

The Mini1try of Public Security thus had nearly 400,000

disposal during the critical period between 1945-1947.

aen

at its

It should also be

pointed out that the Red Any in Poland numbered 300 ,000 and the Polish Army
and NICVD 200,000.

The govem•nt stated in its organ If Wale• in 1946 that:

The security oraans u a whole are healthy and very dedicated in their
work , and as such we will defend the• against all \Dljustified and false
accusations . For the security orams are a sharp weapon in the hands
of Polish de110cracy in the strugle against reaction. We wi l l not allow
this tool to be wrenched fTOa us . 1
During this period wholesale executions and b1prison•nts were conducted
aaainst the opponents of the govem•nt in a llOSt atbitrary fashion .

And,

u the aajor opponent of the govenment wu Mikolaj czyk's PSL. the aovemMnt
used every •ans available, including genuine political arg111en t1, privileged
official propaganda, and brute force , to defeat and terminate all activities
of the party.

The PPR had no intention of al lowing the Yalta "free and unfet-

tered elections" to take place, u th• PSL, having by -far the strongest popular
backing , would pose a serious threat to the existing govemment.
police thus hupered PSL activities.

Security

Its publications and broadcasts were

severely restricted, its meetings interfered with , its officials threatened ,
and thousands of its •li>ers h1prisoned.

Gomulka, although personally dis-

liking many of the excesses perpetrated against the resistance movements , was
wil ling to support any •uures to defeat the PSL.

In July of 1945 he said that

''Mikolaj czyk is a syllbol of all anti-democratic elements, of all which is the
eneay of democracy and the Soviet Union . " 2

Mikolaj czyk threatened G011Ulka's

!Quoted by Zbigniew Brzezinski , "Gomulka's Road to Socialisa," Problems
of Co1111Uni sm, VIII , iii , pp.8-15.
2
ni1cocks , ()p.c.tt . , p . 103, quotina Zarys hiptorii polskiego t-uchu robot
niczego, 1944- 194
55.

�
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power.
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1
The Teherm; Yalta, md Potsda a1ree•nt1 all, in one way or another,

expressed th• view that post-War Butem Europe wu to be aovemed by regi•s
"de11e>cratic md friendly" to the l.6SR. 2

At Yalta lt wu aan•d that election•

for the co.position ot the future pvenment were to be held ·"u soon u pos
sible" and the co.mnique issued at Potsd• stated that the pvern•nt in Polmd
had agreed to do so.

However, the elealom , despite Westem pnssure, were

not held till January of 1947·.
Between JWle, 1946, ad January, 1947 , the PPR and PPS leaders visited
Mo9 c:ow and are said to have ncelved personal iutructiou by Stalin re1ardin1

th• January eleaiou.

In Novellber Cyrwlewlca, on behalf of th• PPS, slped

a pact with the PPR unltina -that party with the PPR in a 10-callecl ''De110cratic
Bloc" for mdted action.

Also iacluded in th• Bloc wen the Comuni1t d•inated

De110cratic and Peasant parties who previoualy had bMn repnsented on the Lublin
Comitt.. .

The purpose of the Bloc wu to or1ani1e all Marxist• in the stru1-

al• for a "People ' s O..ocracy . "

I n Septellber, 1946, an Bleaoral L av w as passed

which dl1frachi1ed all persona ,W. lty of collaboratina with th• occupation
authorities or with "Pucist oqwzatlons . u

The Comuni1t1 used this law u

a pntext to deprive over a 111. llion people of th• vote .

One week before the

ballotina, PSL candidates were struck off th• lists in 10 out of 52 election
districts.

These 10 dlatricts �oaed nearly one fourth of the total popu

lation of the country and included anu when the PSL wu the 1 tron1est .
Bleaion day, January 19, 1947, found only few PSL scrutineers at the poles ,
thus no b1partial supervision could be clai•d.

A total of only 36 wt tnesses

111or a list of protested actions made by the Polish Peuant Party 111 the
Provisional Parliaaent in Wars., see t.tlkolaj czyk , Op.ci t . , p . 294.
2
However "free but friendly'1 was a contradi ction. As Stalin put it at
Potsdu: "A freely elected aovem•nt in any of these countries woµld be
ati-Soviet . " fro. P . B . Mosely, Face to Pace with Russia, PPA Series No. 70,
1948, p . 2 3 .

1 36
of the Peasant Party were allowed to be present during the counting of the
In those 36 polling p laces , the PSL offi

ballots in S ,200 polling places.

cially gained between 65 and 85 percent of the votes .
The results of the election were not published unti l January 28, 1947.
Out of a total electorate of 1 2 , 701 ,056 there were 1 1 , 413,618 votes cast.
governaent ' s "Democratic Bloc" received aver
nered 394 seats .

The PSL won 28 seats.

80

11\e

percent of the votes and gar

Of the re.aining 22 seats, all but

the one won by the independent socialist Zygmunt Zulawski went to collabora
ting parties.
1

saw

•

•

•

In the first debate in the new Seja, Zul•ski stated:

surpassed all

II)'

•

•

•

fears .

"What

I t wu not a free election, it was

not an election at all, but organized violence over the electorate and its con
s cience • • • • "l

The United States and Great Britain protested and the Aaerican

ubusador to Poland n1i1nod but to no avai l .

The Communists were i n complete

control.
11\e purpose of the elections had been to elect a Seja which would act as
a

cons

tituent uselbly.

This Seja, however, did not fulfil l its mission of

providing Poland with a permanent constitution until 1951.
meeting held on Pebruary

4,

President of the Rep\i>Uc.

During its first

1947, a l• wu pused restoring the offi ce of
Bierut wu i-diately elected to that office.

On

February 19 a constitutional law wu passed which gave the country a provisional
constitution known as the "Little Constitution. "

This l• created a new execu

tive body composed of the President, the Marshall, and the three Vice-Marshalls
of the Seja.

The Seja it•elf was the sole legislative body.

Between sessions.

the gonrnaent could issue decrees having the force of l aw , which required the
Counci l of State• s approval and the subsequent endors
lHiscocks, 0p. cit . , p. 105.

t of the Sej• when it

eaen
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reuseli>led.
The new govern•nt vu closely controlled by the C0111Duni sts.

Although

the PPR formed only a minority in the new government , its •abers held five
key positions.

G011Ulka retained his old offices, Hilary Mine and Radkiewicz

reaained in charp of Industry and Commerce and Public Security , end tvo PPR
•llbers held the ainistries of Education and Foreign Affairs .
Mikolaj czyk and the PSL were now coapletely excluded froa the governaent.
The spirit of the PSL had been broken in the electoral defeat and in its exas
perating elCperiences before •the election.

After the elections the aovem•nt

put an end to all opposition f� that direction by arresting aany mellbers of
the PSL and forcibly closing local branches of that organization.

Political

pressure was made quite evident through public political trials in which 4eath
penalties were often handed out and throuah
against party •llbers .

•

ni. gn of tenoris• carried out

Collmboration with the party wu also reduced through

the appeals of the govem•nt to the patriotic sentiment of the people and
through its moderate prograa.

In October, 19•7 , Mikolaj czyk and a few of his

COIU'ades in the PSL , believing their lives to be in danger, escaped to the West .
The collapse of the PSL •ant the end of the unequal struale for the
esteblish•nt of Comaunist power in Poland.

The Communists were now well on

their way to esteblishing the "monolithic bloc."

The only party reaaining

which might pose a problem to the Co•unists wu the PPS, although it was not
In fact , •any of its •llbers were prepared for colleboration

a real threat.
with the PPR.

Any real threat fro• the direction of the socialist cup had been

thrwarted in 19•5 when Zuletski had atteJ11>ted to found a separate Social De•o
cratic Party;

Durin1 the followlna period PPR confidence in that party was

shown when the PPR deliberately had chosen two PPS mellbers in succession as
pri• ministers .

Conflict between the two parties was Jdni11al until the years

1947-1948 when the Co1111Uni1ts had solidly esteblished their position and were
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ready to tum aaainst the PPS.
During the "Pint Goaalka Period," 1945-1948, Soviet influence was quite
evident throuahout the country.
police and the any.

Russians held key positions in both the security

General Zylderski, Co-.nder-in-Chief of the Polish Antf

and Minister of Defense from 1945-1949 , was little 11e>re than a Soviet puppet.
In fact, the new Polish Any was trained and rebui lt under Soviet supervision.
Bedrich Bruepl says th•t "There is little doubt

•

•

•

that there were Soviet

officials as agents in the different ainistries and in all branches of the adlain
istration which were l�ortant enough from the Soviet point of view , to make
their presence desirable. " l Brzezinski. lists six upects of imposed political
control on Poland and the other Eutem European states including direct consul tation between the Soviet and sate 111 te leadership, permanent supervision
of clo•stic events through reliance on the Soviet ubas1adors, close contact
between the various party organs , direct penetration of govem•nt institutions,
isolation of the satellites from the rest of the world and from one another,
and Soviet mi litary lli&ht.

In Poland all high positions in the party and/or

aovem•nt hierarchy were completely subordinated to Soviet authorities .

Jozef

Swiatlo, a high level Polish defector, has testt.fied before a Comittee of the

US Congress that "No one can be appointed as a JMnli>er of the Central COllJlittee
of the Polish Co•nmist Party
ties . u2

•

•

•

without the prior approval of Soviet authori

The Polish. secret police carried on their work with the assistance

and general supervision of Soviet officers , especially General I . Serov.

The

head of the Polish Security Ministry, S. Radkiewicz, had Soviet officers as
his personal body guards and was advised by General Lalin of the Soviet Ministry
of State Security.

Of the 20 departments in the Polish Ministry, eight were

l Bedrich Bruege l , "Methods of Soviet Domination in Satellite States ,"
Intemational Affai rs , Jan , 1951.

2 us Conpres s , House of Representatives , Select Co-1 ttee on Communist Aggre..
sion, Investigation of Co-1st Agre11ion, Tenth Interi• Report of Hearings ,
dsession (Washlnjton , 1954), pp . 53-54.
8ld Congress, 2

139

headed by Soviet officers directly and three had Soviet advisors.

Eleven Poles

or Polish Jews have been identified in these ainistries.

11, 4

former employees of the NKVD and

1

Of these

were

a foner officer of the Soviet armed forces . 1

The so-called "Mu9covites" were also Moscow trained and took orders froa
the Soviet govem•nt.

Any distinction between them and Soviet agents and

officials in Poland, especially before

1949,

is obscure.

The aajor di fference

between the Muscovites and the native CC>lallli sts, Go1111l ka, Spychalski , Bienkow
ski , Kowalski , Klissko, and Loga-Sowinski , rested on the &JM>unt of stress put
on Polish nationalism.

The Muscovites , led by the former officasrof the Soviet

NKVD Bierut , urged a tougher line during the period of the bogus coalition,
relying upon the Soviet forces alone for backing.

The Muscovites accused the

natives of being "radishes ," red outside but white inside .

They themselves

were beetroou, red all the way through.
An article pmlished in Nowe Dro1i (New Roads) , the theoretical j ournal
of the PPR'• Central Committee , by Gomilka in January ,

1947,

entitled "Strong

in Unity" reveals the underlying differences felt between the Polish Comrunists ,
especially the Natives , and the Soviet Union. ·

The article maintained that there

was no need in Poland for the violence and bloody revolution that had taken
place in Russia, no need for the dictatorship of the proletari at .
Gomulka, will follow along its

own

road to Socialism.

Poland, says

This can take place be0

cause "our democracy is not simi lar to Soviet democracy , just as our social
structure is not the same as the Soviet structure. "

Gomulka then stressed the

"peaceful, evolutionary develop•nt" toward socialism which could take place
throuah the cooperation of the two worker's parties and their alliance with the
lAdaa Brollke writes that "'11le Polish Comunists now admit their subordina
tion to the Russian Comunists prior to 1956. A recent article published in
the theoretical j ournal of the Polish Coanunist Party acknowledged that the
relationship between the foreign CollllllWlist parties and the Soviet Co11111unist Party
meant in practice 'the imposition upon all the parties of the views and opinions
of one p arty , or to be more precise the opinions and views of its leadership . ' "
Adam Bromke , "Nationalism and Comunis• in Poland," Foref;,an Affairs , XL 4 , p.636.
..
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peuants .

Go11Ulka described this Polish system as a "People's Democracy. 11 1

However, the basic assumption of all Marxists, that of hosti 11 ty between
capitalist and socialist states and the funduental hostility of all ''bourgeois
de110cracles ," wu not forgotten.

The Polish state aust be significantly trans

ferred internally in order to lift the state out of any such stage .
Oe110cracy" was this stage.

As

Bierut was to explain :

'lhe "People 0s

"The People's Demcracy

is a special fora of. revolutionary authority which c... into being under new
relations &JDOng classes in the internal arena. u2 1bus even the Muscovites
expressed the•elves in similar teru .

In June of 1946 Bierut had stated that

"This specific order is not bued on any existing aoclel .

It is not similar to

the Soviet socialist order or to the classical economc system of the West. 11 3
I

Goaulka, however, was even •ore explicit when he said:
deaocracy u well as tho social structure built and consolidated
by us are without historical precedent . . . . We are not a country with
a typical capitalist structure , because essential branches of our indus
try u well as banks and transport have been nationali zed . We are
not a country of social structure , because the non·socialist sector of
our production occupies a very i11portant place in our national econOllY .
We have acknowledged the necessity and the utility of individual initi
ative and of non·socialist foras of production for a definite section of
our industrial production: we have rejected completely the collectivi1a
tion of agriculture. 4

Our

Gomulka believed that the Comaunist party could not divorce itself co,.,letely
frm nationalisa and patriotisa, thereby appearing to be a purely Soviet aaency
as had been done in the put by the party.

Instead, the -party would stress the

basic COllpatibility between Polish national interests and world Coamunisa.
Goaulka, analyzing the put failures of the party and the correct policy of the
lttiscocks , 0p.cit. , p. 115.
2s . Kardelj, On People 's Deaocracy in Yugoslavia (New York , No Date) , p . 29 .
31bid. ' p . 14 .
4Hi1cocks , 0p.cit . , p. 115.
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future , stated in

1944 that :

The fundaaental error of the CmllUftilts was that , while fully appreciating
the question of the stnagale for the social eaancipatlon of the working
•uses , they did not sufficiently appreciate the question of independence • • • •
The struggle for social eaanclpation cannot be separated froa the stnaggle
for natioru�l euncipation . l
Puture seeds of confllct with Moscow were being sown.

As Peter Brock points

out, even the radicals and socialists in Poland in the

1840 ' s had found that:

Wi thout national independence the achieve..nt of socialis• was iapossible.
But in order to win independence the Polish socialists were constantly
driven to abandon at least for the time being, the propagati on of their
.a
�
socialist ideals .
During the period

1945-1948 the Soviet Union practiced the policy of wide

spread disaantling and other fons of economi c exploi tatlon in Poland •

.

In the

fluid post-War political conditions , the Soviet Union was not certain how the
West would react to its political tactics in Eutem Europe.

This uncertainty ,

coup led with the enormous needs of domestic reconstruction in the Soviet Union
itself, made exploitation most opportune.

Stanley Zyzniewski observes that :

During certain stages when relatively minor concessions appeared necessary
to enhance its political interests in these East European countries , the
Soviet government did not hesitate to make them . But the continuing un
certainty about a successful attainMnt of its political objectives like
wise pra1pted Sovi et authorities to confiscate and commandeer through a
variety of devices as aach of the But European econolli c assets
was
feasible to bolster a rapid rehabilitation of the Soviet economy .

8!

Polish-Soviet economic contacts began with the Soviet policy of pressing
for control over the affai rs of the Eastem European states .
of the Lublin group in July of

The Soviet support

1944 included an agree•nt for deliveries of

emergency foodstuff and materials to Poland.

This was undoubtedly meant to en

hance the effectivene11 of the Lublin adllinistration .

Bconoai c agreements by

l ar1ezinski, 0p.cit . , p . 5 3 , quoting Trybuna Wolnos ci , Dec. 2 2 ,

1944.

I

2Peter Brock, "Social11• and Nationali1• in Poland,
Slavoni c Papers , IV, (1959) , p. 146.

1840-1846," Canadi an

3
stanley J. Zyzniewski, "Soviet Tutelage and the Polish Economy fro11
to 1956," Polish Review , IV, (1959) , iii , p . 2 2 .
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1945 included short ten credits fro• the Soviet Union.

The beginning of the

redirection in the flow of trade froa West to But now began.

In an August

1945 agree•nt , the Soviets unilaterally recognized the new Western boundaries
of Poland.

The new western areu were quite beneficial to Polish interests

but were outweighed by extensive disaant ling by the Soviets before the war
ended.

An

official Polish state•nt puts the value of the disaantled products
'

at over $1 billion in post-War prices .

Purthenore , in a reparations agree•nt

signed in Auaust o.£ 1945 the Polish aovern..nt a1reed to deliver shipments of
coal to the Soviet Union at reduced prices .

This was for compensation for the

remaining Ger.an assets in the new territories u well u for sU>sequent deli
veries of 15 percent of the Genan reparations due the Soviet Union.

Mikola

j c zyk says that a price of $ 1 . 25 a ton was set while world prices ranged froa

$12 to $16 a ton at the ti•.
coal to the Soviet Union.
in reparations .

Poland delivered .,re tha 52 lli l lion tons of

The Poles received in return no more then $60 mi llion

Polish losses can be set at $650 ,ooo ,ooo.

It ldght be added

that in 1947 the Soviet govern•nt , in answer to the Marshall Plan, extended
a short tera loan of $28 111 l lion to Poland to fad 11 tate purchases in the West
for econoaic reconstruction.

Such schizoid policies continued throughout 1946-

1947 • •
'nle aain task which facecl the Polish govem•nt in the po1t-War period
wu reconstruction.
recovery· prOIJ'••

By the autum of 1946, mch pro1re11 had been aade on the
The Three Year Plan of Reconstruction covering the period

1947- 1949 emphasized recovery md not a r.tical transition.
on the whole, reaarkable.

The results were ,

This wu due in part to Gomlka's skillful leadership

and to the patriotic deteraination of the people.

The main objectives of the

Three Year Plan were achieved and in aome cues surpassed.

However, during the

early staps of the prograa, UNRRA assistance played a great part ($600 ,000 ,ooo

143
in supplies and administration and shipping costs ) .
In the SUllJDer of
of Marshall Aid.

1947

the Polish Government desired to accept the � offer

Hilary Mine explained in June of that year that Poland was

not in the sa.e situation as a Great Power such as the USSR.
Ameri can help .

Mine was convinced that the Soviet Goverruaent would take that

into accmmt.
Western aid.

Poland needed

However , Soviet press�e later induced Polish rejection of this
The Soviets answered the threats to their satellites from the West

by erecting their own econosi c bloc which emphasized rapid industriali zation
and close econOlli c links with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union was now forced

to alter its policies as the state of Eastem European resources aade it manda
tory that the Soviet Union extend credits and supplies of equipment .
the Soviets now aade a considerable loan to Poland.
one hand and took with the other.

As seen,

But the Soviets gave with

There was only a slight reduction in the

outright Soviet exploitation.
After the defeat of Mikolaj czyk and his PSL, there was no danger of
"reaction," thus the friction between the PPR and the PPS was revived.

Prior

to this time it had been the policy of the PPR to stress the close cooperation
between the two parties.

Now , however, the party had served its function , and

the Comnmists had no intention of allowing the widespread sympathy the PPS had
amng the workina class to deve lop into an effective threat to their supremacy .
On

1

May

1947,

Goaulka called for the fusion of the party with the PPR.

During

the 11011ths of May and June the PPS felt the s - t�ctics that had been used
against the PSL.

More than 200 right-wing aemben of the PPS were arrested

durina this period.

Political trials were then held to find these gui lty of

various "cri11es " against the state.

By July of

1947

the mellhership of the PPS

had been reduced froa 800 ,ooo to below the PPR level , a reduction of more than

150,000 "undesirab les . "

The final union of the PPS and PPR did not come unti l
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after Goaulka's fal l .
During this period there occurred a bifurcation in Poland's political life ,
that of domestic politics and that resulting froa the relationship of dependence
on the Soviet Union.

The two-faced character of many Soviet political state11ents

now became quite apparent.

1946

beaan in

The first differences betwen Moscow and Goaulka

simultaneous ly in the two fiel ds .

Soviet "liberation" and "fratemal" help was n ow seen as a pretext to
ruth lessly occupy and exploit Poland.

This was all too visual in the passing

of political rule over Poland into the hands of "delegates" and "advisors" sent
fro• Mos cow .

Go•ulka would now begin his struggle for political power.

A dispute with Moscow was also occurring at this tiae in the economi c
sphere .

Here , reck less orders froa Moscow to speed up the sociali zation of

Poland ' s economi c life were seen in Poled, and especially by Gomulka, to be
a harbinger of chaos .

Gmaulka felt that it would be suicidal both for the

econOllY and for the party as such tactics would sow the seeds of dissatis faction
and possibly revo lt
programs .

UlOl'lg

the masses .

His state•nt in

1946

He there fore offi cially opposed all such

that "We have not the s lightest need to follow

in the footsteps of Soviet agrarian policy
tion • • • • 111

now took on an oainous omen .

•

•

•

because of the Polish condi-

G0111Ul ka wu now showing an mtforgi veable

sin, independence of judge•nt and courage of action .

Goaul'ka had also been

the only person throughout the satellite states to oppose the foraation of the
Cominform and later to cri ticize that organizations attitude to the Yugos lav
party .

As the period of diversity in the satellite states drew to a close ,

Gomulka shown out like a beacon in the dark.

Moscow would not tolerate such

independence , an independence which was driving Poland outside the political

l • R • ,"The Fate of Polish Socialism," Forei
gn Affai rs , Oct,

1949.
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sphere of Mos cow.

The goal , said Golllllka, "Both for the PPS and for the PPR"

is the "independence of Poland

•

•

•

to which all others are subordinated." 1

Such presuation was intolerable to the leadership in Moscow who now espoused
a aonoli thic view.

In JWte of 1948 Go11Ulka brought the conflict into the open

at a meetina of the PPR central c�ttee.

He foWtd, however, that his support

even &J10ng his fellow party •llhers was limi tted by the great Soviet power
which had brought in and maintained his party in Poland.

By early autumn Go11Ulka

was made to recant his errors and the Polish state became completely subservient
to Moacow.
1 Zbigniew Brzezinski , "Go11Ulka's Road to Socialism," Probl•• of Co-..nisa,
VII I , iii , p . 10 , quoting w. Walce, Vol . 2 , p . 163.

OONCWSION
Two ati the cal current• ••rae when 1tudyin1 the histories of the Coau
nist parties of Poland and Yuaos lavia.

'11\ese currents first nwal th•••lves

at the births of the n1pective parties.

On the

one

h•d, there ls 1mordina-

tion to the Coaintem •d Moscow hlnaf.n1 upon th• "21 Condi tlons" and intematlonal
10Udarity , and on the other hand then an centri fuaal tendendes bued on
ideolo1ical, practical, and national differences .

Unity and conflict are ever

recurrin1 the_. .
In Yuao1lavia the Sociali1t Workers • Party he been founded to oppose
the "ldnl1terial11a" of the Social Oeaouats.
1tnac:k its

own

However, cll11entlon iflllediately

ranks when the "centri1ts" refuaed to accept the "21 Condi tlons 0 • ·

t.elin1 that such action would •• subat.1sion to a foreign body.

From

this

period on, the party wu divided between Left ad Right-wins factions stnssln«

naw "Nenahevik" and nc. "Bolshevik" tactics .

Individual Mlll>ers aravitated

fl'Oa an outlook of dependence and subordination to Moscow to one of independence
and ''national Comwi1a."

Popular support of the party reached i t1 zenith

t...diately after th• party ' • inception and f1'0tl thenae waned considerably.

1be party wu an l l leaal· orsanl 1atlon lacklna
lar support.

any

nal local autonomy or popu...

Befon the outbnak of hostilities in Burope, the party could

fon1ee no hope of political 1ucces1 in the imediate future.
The Comauniat Party of Poland was also a party invested with dissention
at its birth.

'lbe Comunist Workers • Party of Poland wu formed vith the

union of the PPS-Left md the SDKPtL.
tical views . "

Both parties brou1ht with the• ''here·,,

1be PPS-Left brou&ht with it the right deviation or so-called
146
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Zalews 1czr1ana, and the SDlPiL the left-wini

or

Luxellbur1est deviation .

1be

right deviation wu born of national 110tivatiou (Pol11h Road to Socialisa)
and the left with a feeling of reput1nance against any inhibitin1 of "prole�
tarim de11C>Cracy . "

'lbe CWPP 1-diately proclai•d its •llbenhip in the

Co-..ni1t International and its amservience to the "21 Conditions . "

However ,

throuahout the 1920' and 1930'1 Moscow found it a continual nece11ity to take
the party in hand.

'lb• party found no support

aong

the traditionally anti•

Russi• popula.tion, and the continuoua smordination of th• party to the
imperialistic pollci•• of Moscow further added to the party ' • unpopularity .
Th• nationalistic Pol11h people could not accept those who "C011prollised" th�
ho•land.

The party was thua torn between allegiance to Poland and to Moscow.

At its helaht the party cowted no •re tha 20 ,000 •llben and could hardly
be called a political or1ei 1auan.

In 1939 th• party wu di11olvecl by fiat

froa Moscow.
Soviet fonign policy durins World War II further C011pounded this dicho...
toll)" in the Yuaoslav ad Poli1h partie1..

'lbe division of Poland by Nasl

Geruny ad the Soviet Union all but ended any Comunist sympathy �lthin Polad.
'11l• party had been pulled by its roots and would now have to be transplanted
froa Moscow.

With the invasion of the Soviet Union, c_. the rebirth of the
However, th• party vu created frOll and wu co11p letely sub

eo-t•t party .

servient to the Soviet Union.
foreip policy.

It wu simply uaed � another apnt in Soviet

As the Red anies •ved toward the west they brouaht with

th•• the Polish Comittee of National Liberation, a or1an11ation abd lar to
the Bialystok Coamittee of 1920.
In Yuao1 lavia , however, the situation wu different .
ngi•s aet up

by

Here the puppet

the AJd.1 wen infi 1 trated ad obstructed by the Commnists

juat as they had done with every other 1overnment during their existence.
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And with the Gerun invuion of th• Soviet Union. the eo-iats were ordered
to bepn an all out 1t�1l• aaalnat th• Pudsts muter a popular front.

Now,

for the first tilM in the party '• history, the i-diate al• of the party were
at one with those of the peoples of v-.oslav!a.

The confusion betwHn patrio

tlsa to the ho•lad ad Co-..nisa dls1ppeared.

Tito now welded his Parti1ans

into a wel l-ol"dered fl&)ltina unit utilisln1 the various ethnic ,roups within
the state.

nae only doMstlc cnpetition faced

by

Tito were th• Chetnik forces

of Mihai lovic who suffered mch the •- fate u the Comuniat Party of Poland .
colllboratlon with the invaders and loss of much popular support .

And yet the

Soviet Union continually chutlsed Ti to for smordinating the fi &ht aaainst
th• Axis to social revolutionary aoall.
'ftaus while Soviet policy

wu larply beneficial to the Yugos lav Co1m1-

ni1t1 , (it h1ppened to be in confoalty for th•

.,..nt

with the de1in1 of at

leut a larae 111.nority of the population) it wu destructive to any Coaunlst
sympathy in Polmad.
In Yuaoslavia the forcH of the Partisans were able to achieve victory
thrwah their

ow

lndiaenom party 1pparatua in an

Pucista and dOMati e ennles.
in the wake of the Red Any.1
•nt in London.

armed

strual• aaaimt

In Poland th• Co..mlats swept to victory
Popular support rested with the Polish Govem

'ftaat covemaent wu defeated thrqh the political uchinatlona

of Stalin and the fait &CCO!pli created by the Soviet Arr11 .
Post-War Soviet foretan policy towards Butem Europe revolved about the
twin ai• of exploitation and consolidation of power.

Diversity within the

l
Te1ti110ny heard be fore th• u.s. Conanas. Houae. Select Comittee on
eo-mist A1,nssion. Second Interia
Wuhinaton :
ort . (H. Rept. 2650.
Govemmnt Printina Office, 1§54), p .S�eatlblished the fact that Cowml••
wu able to fuse l ta rule upon the people of the captive nations only when it
wu supported by the Red ArflY. preceded by subversion which wu poll tlcally,
technically. ad flnacially enpneered by the Krealln . "

�

149
the b lock wu extolled for reuons of ellpediency.

Later, when opportunity
This

knocked, ideological considerations would tlke on an added impetus .

process began with Stalin ' s adjust•nt to the policy of the "contain•nt of
Co..mis•" beaun by the United States in 1947 (Truaan Doctrine, Marshall Plan) • 1
Stalin now ai•d at preventing the disintegration of the Co-.mlst regi•s in
Butern Europe and at strengthenin1 their loyalty to the Soviet Union.

Stalin

would accept no challenaes to hit ideolo1ical and political leadershlpe
Stalinist dictua wu now applied riltdly to do•stir. ""ci-rcuutances . ..
Sterility in thought , policy, ad action ensued. 2

The new pattern wu to serve

as a buis for relations between the USSR and Eutem Europe.

The clus

stl'\lagle was to be intensi fied, and all enellie1 who had infi ltrated the Co1111U
nist move•nt were to be liquidated.

A radical sociali zation of agriculture

and industriali zation were to t rans form the "Peoples De11<>cracies . ''

'11\e result

would be uniformity and confond.ty throughout the satellites .
Gomlka and 7.ito now s • their power challenged and their countries faced
with economic chaos .

Centri fugal tendencies bued on practical , national, and

ideological di fferences were heightened.

'lbe results were felt !mediately in

the Soviet-Yugos lav dispute and in the actions of Go11Ulka.

Hawever, Gomulka

wu to fail in his resistance to the Stalinist dictum and T.i to was to achieve
success.
11\ere

are

a n'Ullber of detel'llinin1 factors which have been •ntioned to

explain Tito' s uintainence of Power and Gomlka' s failure.

Firs t , the libera

tion of Yugoslavia occurred largely throup local effe>rts by the Partisans rather
lTito probably could not have broken •fr/ frOll the Soviet Union if the
U . S . had shown no interest in Greece, if the Commnist parties had not been
pushed out of the govem•nts in France and Italy , and i f the general atmosphere
of international relations had been one of \Dlb1peded expansion of Soviet power.

2An article appearing in Rude Pravo, May 25 , 1952, explains this aptly:
"Love of the Soviet Union does not tolerate the slightest reservation. 11\e road
into the morass of treuon indeed begins on the inclined plane of reservations
and doubts regarding the correctness of the policy of the Sovie� Union . "
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than

by the advancing Red armies as in Po land where Soviet troops sti 1 1 remained

in 19•8.

Here , geoaraphical contiguity and the lines o f communi cation to Soviet

forces stationed in East Germany made it necessary that Pol and should
able meniber of the Soviet block.

be a reli

Thus for purely geoaraphi c reasons Poland had

not the sue freedoa as Yugos lavia to detach herself fro11 the Soviet alliance.
Second, in Yugos lavia there was a aradual develop11ent of the party and its regime
on native soil rather than the C011p lete importation of persons from Moscow.

Together,

this gave the Yugoslav group a greater degree of independence from Moscow than that
enjoyed by the Poles .

Furthermore , Tito was unique among ComJl\D'l ist leaders in Eas-

tem Europe in having peasant support, in facing no considerable bourgeoisie
oppos ition, and in being a genuinely popular national leader.
Polish Co9Ulli st Party was relatively weak.
Union to maintain its power.

Ganulka

In contras t , The

It needed the support of the Soviet

enjoyed tremendous popularity

among his

comrades but at the same time his control of state and party organs was in no
sense co111p arab le to that of Tito ' s .

Tito could count on the unquestioned obedi

ence and loyalty of the COllllWli st hierarchy.

He was tbe head of a solidly united

group of native Co18'lDlist leaders who controlled the ansy , the secret police, and
the party apparatus .

Go111Ul1ca was at the mercy of the Sovi et security system.

The •ajor cause of the survival of Tito's regime was , •t the sue tie, the basic
cause of the breach with the Soviet Union .
his own army and civi l adllinistration.

This was simply that Tito had created

He had made the careers of his officers

and his bureaucrats , and with a handful 1 of exceptions , they re•ained loyal to
him.

Brzezinski observes that "Tito had achieved his power by accepting and

practicing Stalinisa, and the Stalin-Tito rift revolved about, and was resolved
on , the power plane.
was

Go111U lka fai led in 1949 because his ideological rosition

divorced fr011 effective power . " l

Political power wu thus the determining

factor in the divergence of Co111111ni s� in Poland and Yugos lavia in 1948.
l.

Zhigniew Brzezinski , "COlllWlist
ll
Ideolof')' and Power:
Journal of Politics , XIX, p . 549.

FTo• Unity to Diversity,"
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TABLE NUMBER 1

MBMBBRSHIP OP 'nlB a»Y (1919-1941)
1919
June 1920
July 1920
December 1920
Deced>er. 1923
1924
January 1925
May 1926
First half of 1928
November 1928
January 1929
Middle of 1932
End of 1932
October 19 33
Oecellber 1934
End of 1�35
Aut\Jml of 1937
May 1939
October 1940
Beginning of 1941

·S0 ,000
60,000
65,000
80,000
688
800-900
2 , 300
2 , 000
3 ,000
2 ,034
3,SOO
300-500
1 ,000
1 ,600-1 ,700
2 , 000
3,000
1 , SOO
3 ,000
6 , 4SS
8,000

Source:
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TABLE NUMBBR 2
URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION

35.8 64. 21

Pol1nd (1949)
Yuaoslavia

(1948) 16.2

83.82

loxtord Realonal Economic Atl as , The USSR and
Eastern EurOJ?! (Oxford University Press , tondon , 1§56) , p.93.
2cordon w. Eut ad A. E. Moodie , The Ch1Dgin1
World (Harr1p , London , 1956) , p . 12·6 .
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TABLI! NUMBER 3
SIZBS OP THE aM«JNIST PARTIBS OP BASTSRN EUROPE

CaeClloslovakta
Hun1ary
Bulaari a

R011an la
Poland
Albania
Lk5SR

Yu1os lavia

Source:

Percent ofTot&l Population Belonging to the Party
·
circa 1938
circa 1948
.s
21.
10 . 9
.3
6.3
.4
. 6.3
.006
6.0
.06
3.8
.o
3.8
1.4
2.6
. 09

Sr••

R . V. Burki , The Dynudcs of Co-.miaa in Eutern
(Princeton: Princeton Dnlvenlty Pre11 , 1961), p .S�
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DOCUMlNT NUMBER 1
Directive for Future Work
9 May 1941
l. The ti• has COM when decisive new s'teps IBUlt be taken along the path to
world nvolutlon. Th• obstaclu to be overcom an still fonddable and call
for a new tactical flexibility which must be carefully worked out and boldly
practised along the followin1 line:
a. The Comuniat world revolution BUit be pnsented u a series of mea1una to achieve • tNe de110cracy , ' and al 1 poll ti cal and al 11 tuy leaden
of the Comunist Movement 11U1t depict their activity in this llaht. Up to
30 percent of Party •lllb•n aay come out into the open u • front-line fiahten
for democracy' in the eyea of the •asse1 .
b . The Gov•rn•nt of the Soviet Union aay alto find it necessary to aake
teaporuy conce11iou in the s- 1ense in OTder to further the nvolutionuy
cause in those countries where conditions deaand it.
c. Until the 1ei1un of power, the Collllunia t Party of the coun try where
revolution is beina prepared should be care ful to uintaln 1ood nlatiou
with patriotic and religious circles . No discrbdnation should be made against
the Churches ; each should be treated on the s- footing in the eyes of the
Ulses. National traditions , too, should be respected. Where necessary ,
and with the authorisation of the Central Comttee of the Party, represonta
tlv.1 of the Olurchea should be al lowed to take part in preparing and carrying
throuah the revolution. their nmerical 1tnn1th should dete!'lli ne the pace at
which church influence b later to be ell11inated froa State affairs.
d . The press should be used for p\j)llcisina the new line uonpt the
auses. Printed utter intended for the confidential instruction of Party
•••rs and organizations will conttain the s .. contents as hitherto. Secret
circulars should continue to keep all active nvolutionaries infonned of the
real situation.
•· Once power hu been seized by tho Party , foreign policy will be laid
down by the diploutic repnsentatives of the �SR, who will receive the neces
•aJ:Y directives froa the Coaintern . The representatives wi l l maintain liaisan
between the Central Coaai ttee of the C0111i11Un st Party of the USSR and those of
the countries when the Party hu newly usued power. Reports and enquiries
will be passed to th••· with copies di·rect to the Colld.ntem.
f. I-diately after seizing power, the Central Coaittee wi l l set up a
new aovernment. This body shall be representative of the bTOad aasses of the
people and preserve every appearance of de110Cracy. 11\e country wi l l be adllli n
isterecl throuah the subordinate provincial, reaional. district, and local
co..tttees . Por internal affairs , the Central Comi ttee wi l l remain the supreM
ex.ocutiv• authority, whilst �oreign policy will be controlled by the ExecutlVt.'
Colllli ttee of the Colllntern.
I•
Opponents of the new administration, especially those who sti l l enjoy
soae prestige amongst the people and those whose participation in the l'evchlUon
aay have given thea access to the secret ncords of the Comamist Move•nt ,
should be removed as soon as possible, but in ' de11e>crat i c ' fashion ; l1y :1oi1i�
brought to trial before a re1ular court or a People ' s Court. The latter should
coaprise one known •aber of the Party and two so�ret menbisrs or reliahle :·.;1r< 
pathiaen . Important trials should be conducted by larger courts of a conespond
inaly ' democratic' nature .
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2.
The coWltry where the Central Caudttee has recently uswnad power should
not mpply for inclusion in the Soviet Union unti l the necessary instructions
to this effect have been received from the Executive Comm! ttee of' the Condntem.
Until the inclusion of the country in the Soviet Union, at least SO per
lo
cent of the •llbers of the Comuniat Party ..at reuin in underground conspira
torial work and act u the adlllniatratlon's chief allies in the aovem•nt of
the country.
4 . Traitors to the Party are to be liquidated wi thout trial once a full report
confindna their treachery has been smmi tted to the Party organization to
which th.y belon1. Buller instructions are herewith 1upeneded ad the death
penalty prescribed for treachery of any sort aaainst the interest of the Co-.i
niat revolution.
S . The frontien of countries pogTaphlcally remote from the Soviet Union
are not to be closed imediately after the revolution. Everythina should
rather be done to induce all nfugeea, en les , etc. , to retum home under demo
cratic safepards. Only then shall ahe frontiers be closed. Mnbers of all
Central C�tteea an reainded that the Collintem was once obliged seriously
to hold up its plans for the world revolution owina to the large ntlllber of
Russian ••an• who succeeded in stirring up the democracies against the Coau
nist Nove•nt. '11le fewer ••ans today, the more assured wi l l be the succe11
of the revolution.
Conslderlble d1 fficultie1 aay be encountered in the 11pprehen1ion and des
truction of internal opponents and c:lu1 enelll e s. No ti• should be lost ,
however, in pl ac1n1 thea wider restraint and placin1 foraal char&•• against
thea to justify their detention in the eyes of the democ:ratic world .
6 . The ten • clus enemy' comprises the follcwina categories : aelllbers of
ideolopcal move•nta of a nationalist or religious character, priests , 11ea
ber1 of the police force , officen' corps , diploutic and civil services in
so far as they have refused to side with the revolutionary forces , all aeabers
of the rulina dynasties , any individuals known to be actively opposed to the
preparation or the carrying out of the revolution .
'nte way these clus enfti•• are to be re11e>ved will be detenined by the
,eneral situation and the •thods used will be prescribed by the delegate of
the Bxecutl ve Comi ttee of the Cold.ntem who wl 11 be attached to the Central
Comittee as soan as the latter hu assmed pcwer and place his rich experi
ence at their disposal.
7. After the sei1un of power, the Party shall dispose of dunds , kept separate
froa State funds , froa the followina sources : property belonginc to class
enemies who have been liquidated or had their p�sessions confiscated by the
findlna of a court of l•; property belonpna to hostile 11e>vnents and orgMi
zations ; property confiscated froa the Churches , fr°"' the rulin1 dynasty , and
from war profit"n.

Source :

Stephen Cll11old, Whirlwind : An Account of Marshal Ti to' s Rise
to Power (New York : Philosophical Library , i§so), pp.239-241.
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DOCUM!NT

NUMBER 2

Decree of the National Ho• Counci 1 , July 2 1 , 1944 , appointing the Polish Com111ttee of National Liberation
'lhe decisive 1tru11l• for the eapulalon of the Gerun invader fro11 Polend
has started. In face of this historic event the National Hom Counci 1 sets up
th• Polish Comlttee for National Liberation u a provisional eacutive authority
to lead the nation ' s struggle for liberation , md to secure its independence
and the rHstabU1h•nt of the Polish State. 'The fol lowing are the ..t>en of
the Polish Commi ttee for National Liberati on :
1 ) Edward Bole1lw Osobka-Mor•ak i , Olairaan and Head of the Department
far Porei an Affairs .
2) Andr1ej Wltos, Vlce-Olairaan and Hem of the Depart•nt of Aaticul
ture and Agrarian Refont.
3) Wanda Wuilewska, Vice-Olainan.
4) General Michal Rola-Zyaienki, Head of the Department of National
Defence.
S) Lt. Gen. Zypmt Berltng, Deputy Head of the Depart•nt of National
Defence.
6) Stanislw Kotek-A1roszew11d , Head of the Department of Public Adadn
istratlon.
7) Jan Stefan Haneun, Head of the Dep artment of National Economy and
Finance.
8) Jan Czechowski , Head of the Depart•nt of Justice.
9) Stanisllw Radklewlc1, Head of the Depart•nt of Public Security.
10) Dr. Boleslaw Drobner, Head of the Depart•nt of Labour, Social
Welfare and PlJ>Uc Health.
11) Bnaineer Jan Michal Gni>ecki , Head of the Department of Communications , Posts and Tele1raphs.
12) Dr. Emil Sommerstein. Head of the Department of War �eparations .
13) l>r. StanlsllW Skrzeszevski , Head of the Depart.ent of Education .
14) Wincenty Rz.ymowskl , Head of the Departll81lt of n.tl ture and Pine Arts .
lS) Dr . Stefan Jodrychowskl , Head of the Department of Propaganda and
Inforaation .
The National Council of tho Ho11eland h as directed the Polish Collllli ttee
for National Liberation to establish its temporary HQ on liberated territoTy,
and hu appointed u •lll>en of the rolish Cowai ttee of National Liberation
leaders of the Under1round Move•nt who succeeded in cros1lng the front line .
and leaden of Poles in the USSR . Ptve Mlllbers of the Polish COlnl'lli ttee for
National Liberation reaain in th• terrl tory under occupation. where they lend
the struagle for liberation and ensure liaison with the NAtional Counci l of
the Hoae land. 11\e na•s of these five members cannot be revealed for obvf. .,u�
reasons.
Chaiman of the National Counci l of the Homeland
Boles l• Bierut
Olaiman of the Polish Commi ttee for National Liberation
Edward Bolesl., Osobka-Mor.,ski
Source :

lnstytut Historyczny illienla rl9nerala Slkorskelgo, Op. cit e ,
Appendix Number 6 , p . 650.
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